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Sustainability, innovation and  
finance: integration challenges  
 
This book aims to provide an introduction to the main characteristics of the 
innovation and green financing promoting sustainable developments.  
Both innovative and green activities are phenomena with positive externali-
ties and are, among other things, characterized by underfunding. The state, 
the regulator, has a significant role in boosting innovation and green ecosys-
tems as well, including funding systems. Besides, green things are often in-
novative; therefore, they are a subset of innovative, creative companies/ac-
tivities. The discipline is currently fragmented into the following: innovation 
macro- and microeconomics; sustainability studies macro and micro (e.g. 
SCR) level, innovation (corporate) management; innovation finance systems 
(crowdfunding, venture capital) and green approaches. The text tries to inte-
grate the different approaches and methods, which would give it a novelty. 
Before a detailed discussion of financing issues, it is indispensable to clarify 
the role of innovation and sustainability play in economic and management 
thinking. It is worth examining those aspects in which these domains/fields 
of economics are different from the traditional functioning of the economy 
and industries and why they deserve special attention from a macroeconomic 
and social point of view. Furthermore, the relationship between the govern-
ment and the market and the role of the government give rise to an essential 
professional debate. The integration of finance and sustainability is not a con-
flict-free situation. 
 
The Editors 
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I. Innovation 
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Árpád Szőcs 
1. Trends, models and ecosystems  
In this chapter, the essential terms are Innovation and R&D interpretations, 
risks, common goods versus private goods, external effects, Innovation eco-
systems (USA, Israel, China). 
In the ongoing global economic race, all nations are looking for the Holy 
Grail that can ensure their competitiveness. Given the different historical 
backgrounds and regional characteristics of each country, it is difficult to 
make a sure recipe for everyone. However, the important role of innovation 
is recognized by economic decision-makers. The following are three coun-
tries that have been successful in developing their innovation ecosystems and 
play a key role in the international economy. The US, Israel, and China mod-
els also contain elements that are worth reviewing and analysing. The fol-
lowing is an overview of the historical development and experience of these 
countries in building their innovation ecosystem. 
1.1. USA  
In just over a hundred and fifty years, the US innovation ecosystem has be-
come a model for the world. The practice-oriented approach, the economic 
policy is supporting innovation, the higher education is cooperating with the 
corporate sector, and all the factors that contributed to its success. Within the 
US innovation ecosystem, the relative importance of the main actors (univer-
sities, large corporations, and small science-based start-ups) has changed 
over time. Government policy also plays a powerful enabling role in deter-
mining innovation success through the broad areas of trade, tax and regula-
tory policy that shape the innovation environment. The U.S. system of intel-
lectual property protection has its roots in the U.S. Constitution, which gave 
Congress the powers to promote "the progress of science and useful arts" by 
providing inventors with the limited but exclusive right to their discoveries. 
The US economic and political decision-makers have learned that innovation 
and its protection are essential elements of economic success. In light of all 
this, the current conflict between the United States and China can be regarded 
as a technological war rather than a trade war. 
11 
1.1.1. A historical perspective  
From the 1870s, the United States has risen from a relatively backward posi-
tion in science and technology to an area of undisputed pre-eminence1. The 
development of the American innovation ecosystem can be divided into three 
main periods:1870s-1945, 1945-1980s, and 1980s-to date. 
In all three periods, the actors that were the drivers of innovation can be iden-
tified. From the second half of the 1800s, American universities were centers 
of practical knowledge for the local economic environment. An important 
advantage of the American innovation environment over Europe was that it 
was available in a kind of "greenfield." It was not influenced by previous pre-
industrialized systems. 
World War II demonstrated the practical applications of science to the mili-
tary and industry in many areas. After the victory, it was possible to increase 
research funding. By the mid-1960s, American universities enjoyed a world-
leading status in most fields of science. Enhanced university research envi-
ronments and rising subsidies have also encouraged large companies to in-
crease their R&D activity. Corporations such as AT&T, Merck, Kodak, IBM, 
and Xerox subscribed to the view that research was the key to growth. They 
employed thousands of scientists whose chief objective was to conduct re-
search2.  
From the 1980s, the contribution of large firms to research and innovation 
declined, and the contribution of small firms rose. NSF data indicate that 
firms with more than 10,000 employees accounted for 73 percent of non-
federally funded R&D in 1985. By 1998, this share had dropped to 54 per-
cent, and 51 percent by 2008.3 The role of smaller businesses was strength-
ened by the fact that the entire US economy was shifting from "manufactur-
ing" to high value-added industries. IT, biotechnology and pharmaceuticals 
have provided opportunities for smaller start-ups in a large number to enter 
R&D activities and serve the needs of large companies independently. 
  
                                                     
1 Arora, A., Belenzon, S., & Patacconi, A. (2017): The decline of science in corporate R&D. Stra-
tegic Management Journal, 2693. 
2 Aurora et al. (2017): i.m. 
3 Mowery, C. (2009): Plus ca change: Industrial R&D in the “third industrial revolution”. Industrial 
and Corporate Change, 1-50. 
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1.1.2. Main elements and players 
As a result of historical development here are three main factors in the US 
innovation ecosystem  
• universities and other public research institutions,4 such as the Federal 
labs and the National Institute of Health 
• large corporations and their corporate labs, and 
• individual inventors, small firms, and science-based start-ups.  
 
As Christopher Freeman defined it, a national innovation system is "the net-
work of institutions in the public and private sectors whose activities and 
interactions initiate, import, modify and diffuse new technologies."5 
Federal Labs and university research 
The United States funds a system of between 80 to 100 government research 
laboratories, and the largest labs are funded by the departments of Defense, 
Energy, and Health. Research is mainly funded to help these agencies to 
achieve their mission goals.  
The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and Advanced 
Research Projects Agency-Energy (ARPA-E) have also played an important 
role in the US innovation ecosystem. DARPA has held to a singular and en-
during mission: to make pivotal investments in breakthrough technologies 
for national security. The genesis of that mission and of DARPA itself dates 
to the launch of Sputnik in 1957, and a commitment by the United States that, 
from that time forward, it would be the initiator and not the victim of strategic 
technological surprises. University research is supported through agencies 
like DOD (Department of Defense), DOE (Department of Energy), and NIH 
(National Institutes of Health), to help them achieve mission goals, and the 
National Science Foundation funds university research largely unrelated to 
agency mission goals. While the system is based on the conception of the 
                                                     
4 The education sector itself is a target of venture capital market, educational technology (Edtech) 
startups attract increasing investments. Bethlendi András, Szőcs Árpád (2019): IKT startup-ok 
pénzügyi kérdései. Információs Társadalom, 19 (3). 
5 Freeman, C. (1987): Technological infrastructure and international competitiveness. USA: 
OECD. 
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linear model of research, some argue that federal funding for university re-
search should take a more explicit account of the needs of the commercial 
economy and promote tech transfer6. 
Corporate labs 
An advantage of large corporate labs is that they can organise their research 
by a problem or a market demand, rather than by discipline, the approach 
generally taken by universities. Within the US innovation ecosystem, the rel-
ative importance of the main actors (universities, large corporations, and 
small science-based start-ups) has changed over time. Large firms can either 
grow through internal research carried out inside their labs, or commercialize 
inventions created by start-up partners. Besides, in the past decades, new 
technology firms funded by venture capital, have become prominent in many 
sectors7. 
Individual inventors, small firms and science-based start-ups 
An important class of small firms is VC-backed start-ups. Venture capital 
(VC) partnerships finance a very small minority of all new firms - about 1/6 
of 1% on average per year in the US8. Nevertheless, VC-backed firms feature 
disproportionately among the fastest growing and the best-performing com-
panies. In the US, from 1999 to 2009, over 60% of IPOs originating from 
industrial start-ups received VC funding. VC-backed firms are also distinc-
tive innovators. On average, a dollar of venture capital results in three to four 
times more patents than a dollar of traditional corporate R&D, indicating 
perhaps superior efficiency in the invention, but also perhaps a greater focus 
on product, rather than process, the invention by VC-backed start-ups9. 
1.1.3. Influencing factor 
Trade, Tax, and Regulatory Environment  
Government policy plays a powerful enabling (or detracting) role in deter-
mining innovation success through the broad areas of trade, tax and regula-
tory policy that shape the innovation environment. Compared to other na-
tions, the U.S. regulation system erects few barriers to entry for firms to break 
                                                     
6 Atkinson, R. (2014): Understanding the U.S. National Innovation Systeem. USA: The Information 
Technology and Innovation Foundation. 
7 Aurora et al. (2017): i.m. 
8 Lerner, J. (2012): The architecture of innovation: The economics of creative organisations. Cam-
bridge, MA, USA: Harvard Business Review Press. 
9 Kortum, S., & Lerner, J. (2000): Assessing the contribution of venture capital to innovation. Rand 
Journal of Economics, 674–692. 
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into existing markets and relatively easy to start a new business (World Bank 
index). The U.S. corporate tax rate is quite high (in both statutory and effec-
tive terms), besides the R&D tax credit is relatively anaemic compared to 
other nations. Furthermore, the United States is also one of the very few na-
tions that do not use a border-adjustable value-added tax (VAT)10. 
Intellectual Property 
The U.S. system of intellectual property protection has its roots in the U.S. 
Constitution, which gave Congress the powers to promote "the progress of 
science and useful arts" by providing inventors with the limited but exclusive 
right to their discoveries. This applies to copyrights and patents, with trade-
marks similarly protected by Congress under the Commerce Clause (Article 
I, Section 8, Clause 3). The view then, as well as now, is that without reason-
able protection for their IP, individuals and companies would innovate and 
create less. Patents and trademarks are governed by the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office (PTO) in the Department of Commerce. Copyright is gov-
erned by the Librarian of Congress. Moreover, of course, Congress writes the 
laws under which these agencies must function, and mostly objective courts 
can rule on their decisions11. 
1.1.4. Systems of knowledge flows 
Technology Transfer Systems  
Before the 1980s, technology transfer (from universities or federal labs to the 
commercial marketplace) was largely an afterthought, at least as far as the 
federal policy was concerned. To be sure, some institutions, like MIT and 
Stanford, had long played an essential role in working with industry and sup-
porting new business spin-offs. However, such efforts were primarily due to 
unique institutional factors and were not widely adopted by publicly sup-
ported research institutions. In 1980 the Congress passed the Stevenson-
Wydler Technology Innovation Act. The legislation stated that "technology 
and industrial innovation are central to the economic, environmental, and so-
cial well-being of citizens of the United States."  
The Act made several changes to enable better the transfer of technology 
from federal laboratories to commercial use. Likewise, the Bayh Dole Act 
changed the intellectual property rules governing federally funded research 
at universities, allowing universities to retain IP rights, giving them more 
                                                     
10 Atkinson (2014): i.m. 
11 Atkinson (2014): i.m. 
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incentive to commercialize research. Congress also passed the Federal Tech-
nology Transfer Act of 1986, and Competitiveness Act in 1988 (that among 
other things created the Technology Administration in the Department of 
Commerce and created many programs to help industry with innovation). 
Besides, some agencies, like NSF and NIH, have begun pilot programs to 
link their funded research to commercialization outcomes better. Overall, 
while policies have been put in place to help spur commercialization, the only 
federal agency explicitly focused on commercial innovation is the National 
Institute of Standards and Technology12. 
Innovation Clusters 
Clusters have been found to increase the innovation levels, efficiency, and 
productivity with which participating companies can compete, nationally and 
globally13. The concept of innovation clusters has been long understood by 
regional planners. In the 1990s, many governments in the United States be-
gan to focus more explicitly on spurring innovation clusters. Clusters are ge-
ographic concentrations of interconnected businesses, suppliers, and associ-
ated institutions. They can contain anchor institutions, small firms, start-ups, 
business incubators, and accelerators14. The emergence of a few high-profile 
clusters such as Silicon Valley and North Carolina's Research Triangle Park 
(RTP) lent credibility to the notion that innovation clusters can power inno-
vation and growth. Nowadays, many U.S. states have innovation cluster pro-
grams and policies15. 
Industry Collaboration Systems  
Compared to many other nations, the United States has a highly developed 
and successful industry-research institute collaboration system. Universities 
like MIT, Cal Tech, and Stanford are models that the rest of the world, and 
indeed, other universities in America, look to for inspiration. There is no sin-
gle reason for U.S. success at university-industry collaboration; rather, sev-
eral factors play a role. One factor is culture. A long tradition of John Dewey-
                                                     
12 Atkinson (2014): i.m. 
13 Porter, M. (1998): Clusters and the New Economics of Competition. Harvard Business Re-
view.baily 
14 Baily, M., & Montalbano, M. (2018): Clusters and Innovation Districts: Lessons from the United 
States Experience . USA: Economic Studies at Brookings. 
15 Stewart, L., & Atkinson, R. (2012): The 2012 State New Economy Index. USA: Information 
Technology and Innovation Foundation 
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like pragmatism has dominated U.S. universities, leading them to view col-
laboration with industry not as something that sullies the purity of basic re-
search, but rather as something that is useful and can advance knowledge. 
Also, the U.S. system, with a diversity of kinds of universities and ownership 
(with a large number of world-class private universities), has created a more 
competitive environment where universities innovate and compete to work 
with industry. On top of this, U.S. universities are much less hierarchical than 
universities in many nations, where faculty must wait until they become full 
professors to work with industry or start new companies. Finally, in many 
states, public colleges and universities are encouraged and supported by state 
and local governments in their efforts to work more closely with industry. 
Despite this overall positive record, it is important to note that there is still 
considerable diversity in commercialization performance. For every MIT or 
Stanford, there are ten universities where commercialization is more haphaz-
ard and less effective16. The National Science Foundation's Engineering Re-
search Center (ERC) and Industry/University Cooperative Research Center 
(I/UCRC) programs have also played a role in facilitating university-industry 
collaborative research into complex engineered systems17. 
Acquiring Foreign Technology and Exporting U.S. Technology  
In part because the U.S. economy is so large and because it generally is at 
the leading edge of technology development, there has been little explicit 
policy directed at acquiring foreign technology. The general policy approach 
has been to welcome inward foreign direct investment because of the tech-
nology transfer that it brings. To the extent that the government supports in-
ward FDI attraction, that support has been at the state and local levels. For 
example, in the 1980s and 1990s, states aggressively courted Japanese auto-
mobile company investment in part for the jobs they provided, but also be-
cause of the technology transfer that occurred as U.S. auto firms were more 
easily able to learn the Japanese system of auto production. However, more 
recently, the Obama administration has established the Select USA, a small 
initiative in the U.S. Department of Commerce designed to work with the 
states to help attract foreign investment. 
Besides, the United States monitors foreign acquisitions of U.S. companies 
through the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS). 
                                                     
16 Singer, P. (2014): Federally Supported Innovations: 22 Examples of Major Technology Ad-
vances that Stem from Federal Research Support. USA: The Information Technology and Innova-
tion Foundation. 
17 Atkinson (2014): i.m. 
17 
CFIUS is an interagency committee authorized to review transactions that 
could result in control of a U.S. business by a foreign entity ("covered trans-
actions"), to determine the effect of such transactions on the national security 
of the United States. In part, this reflects a belief that foreign acquisitions of 
U.S. firms can, in many cases, provide needed injections of capital, know-
how, and market access that can help the U.S. establishment become more 
competitive. 
Concerning exporting technology, there are few limits on exporting U.S. 
commercial technologies to other nations, unless those technologies have po-
tential benefits for current or potential military adversaries. As a result, the 
Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security oversees the 
transfer of certain sensitive U.S. technologies to some foreign nations. How-
ever, again, the number of technologies covered is relatively small. Moreo-
ver, in the past decade, there has been increasing pressure from industry and 
others to reduce the restrictions to boost U.S. innovation competitiveness, in 
addition to the U.S. government18. 
The role of VC-s  
The modern organisational form of venture capital, however, dates back only 
to 1946. Bank lending rules then (and now) looked for evidence that borrow-
ers had collateral and could make timely payments of interest and principal. 
Most entrepreneurial firms, however, did not meet these standards, so they 
required risk capital in the form of equity. There was usually no regular 
source of such capital, meaning that entrepreneurs without wealthy friends 
or family had little opportunity to fund their ventures. Along came George 
Doriot to solve this problem. General Doriot, so-called for his rank in the 
U.S. Army quartermaster's office during World War II, recognized the need 
for risk capital and created a firm to supply it. His firm, American Research 
and Development Corporation (ARD), began operations in 1946 as the first 
true VC firm. Unlike modern funds, it was organised as a corporation and 
was publicly traded. 
In its 25-year existence as a public company, ARD earned annualized returns 
for its investors of 15.8 percent.19 ARD also sets a standard for generating 
these returns that have persisted in the present day. Excluding the $70,000 
investment in their biggest "home run", the Digital Equipment Corporation, 
ARD's 25-year annualized performance drops to 7.4 percent. Many modern 
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venture capitalists spend their days searching for their home runs, now with 
more fanciful names like Yahoo!, eBay, and Google—all firms that started 
as venture capital investments and made legendary reputations for their in-
vestors.20 
1.2. Israel 
Israeli innovation is defined by several dimensions. Technologically, the ma-
jority of the innovation activity is focused on the ICT sector. From a geo-
graphical perspective, the dominant mass of activity is still concentrated in 
central Israel, with only relatively low activity even in major cities like Haifa, 
Jerusalem, and Beersheba. An important feature of the Israeli innovation eco-
system is that the state has a major role to play in funding research activities. 
1.2.1. A historical perspective  
Today's Israeli innovative, start-up-oriented ecosystem is characterized by 
continued collaboration between public programs and the private sector, of-
ten with novel connectivity solutions21. In the early nineties, the Israeli RDI 
structure underwent a major transformation, rapidly replacing the military-
based innovation base with the entry of a Silicon Valley-type system focused 
on high-tech civilian start-ups and increasingly multinationals. Venture cap-
ital played a critical role in the rapid development of the innovation ecosys-
tem, which can be divided into three stages22.  
The pre-90s period is interpreted as the preparatory phase when the Israeli 
innovation system base was established, and the high-tech structural change 
took place. The second, initial start-up phase (1991-93), looks at the period 
when the number of start-up companies and their evident financial difficul-
ties led to the decision to launch public intervention, Inbal and then Yozma. 
In the third period, the concrete upswing phase (1994-2000) is identified, 
when the venture capital industry already had billions of resources, deeply 
embedded in the innovation system, actively contributing to its development. 
  
                                                     
20 Metrick, A., & Yasuda, A. (2011): Venture Capital and the Finance of Innovation. USA: John 
Wiley and Sons. 
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1.2.2. Main elements and players 
Government programs for supporting innovation 
An important feature of the Israeli innovation ecosystem is that the state has 
a major role to play in funding basic research. The Ministry of Defense offers 
programs for supporting technological innovation (MAFAT, TALPIOT) and 
many initiatives support dialogue between industry and government. 
MAFAT is a governmental agency aimed at coordinating between the Min-
istry of Defense, Israel Military Industries, Israel Aerospace Industries, Ra-
fael Advanced Defense Systems, the Institute for Biological Research and 
the Space Agency. TALPIOT is an elite Israel Defense Forces (IDF) training 
program for young people (high school graduates) who have demonstrated 
outstanding academic ability in the sciences, physics, and mathematics. 
Graduates of the Talpiot program pursue higher education while serving in 
the army, and then utilize their expertise in IDF's R&D projects. During their 
military service, these very young people develop considerable entrepreneur-
ship skills and gain substantial work experience in a highly competitive and 
high-pressure environment. After the completion of their military service, 
Talpiot graduates easily assimilate into the Israeli labour market and occupy 
senior positions in the Israeli high-tech industry23. 
Incubation system 
Incubators play an important role in the Israeli innovation ecosystem, the 
structure of which began in the early 1990s24. The program was expected to 
have complex effects: (1) further expansion of one of the key sectors for eco-
nomic growth, the R&D and Innovation (R&D) sector; 2) market entry of 
small businesses through project generation; 3) the reduction of territorial 
disparities and the catching-up of peripheral areas; 4) productive placement 
of immigrant, skilled labour and progress in social inclusion; and (5) the ab-
sorption of domestic and foreign capital for innovation purposes25. A major 
change in profile took place once in the nearly three decades of the incubator 
program at the turn of the millennium when ICT and software innovation 
tenders overtook medical, biotechnology and pharmaceutical research26. At 
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the end of 2008, 41% were in medical and related instrument development, 
18% in bio and pharmaceutical technology, 12% in software development, 
10-10% in communication, environmental and agricultural technology, and 
6% Electrical engineering research was carried out in incubators27. Accord-
ing to international trends and experience, the most successful incubation 
procedures are associated with technology-intensive, innovative businesses, 
start-ups based on specialized knowledge and skills. Israel is one of the most 
eclectic examples of how serious economic success factors such as incuba-
tion mechanisms can become - with appropriate contextual factors and the 
use of well-thought-out polycyclists. The Jewish state's political, economic, 
geopolitical, and social ecosystem provides a mix of favourable and unfa-
vourable conditions for this innovative and business-friendly incubation en-
vironment. Israel is an excellent model for RDI practices in general, and spe-
cifically for incubation mechanisms. 
Public agencies 
Support for private sector activities for enhancing innovation is given by two 
public agencies: the Israeli Industry Center for R&D (MATIMOP) and the 
Israel Export Institute. MATIMOP, the executive agency of the Office of the 
Chief Scientist of the Ministry of Industry, Trade, and Labour of Israel 
(OCS), is the official National Agency for industrial R&D cooperation 
charged with promoting highly supportive policies to build Israel's industrial 
infrastructure and nurturing industrial innovation and entrepreneurship. This 
agency generates and implements international cooperative industrial R&D 
programs between Israeli and foreign enterprises. The Israel Export Institute 
is an Israeli government agency that operates under the Ministry of Trade 
and Labour to facilitate trade opportunities, joint ventures, and strategic alli-
ances between international businesses and Israeli companies. 
The role of VC-s  
There was a growing demand for venture capital funds ready to invest in the 
early stages of business start-ups since the early 1990s, but these types of 
funds were scarce. To this end, the Israeli government prepared a program to 
boost the venture capital industry, launching the Inbal initiative in 1991. The 
intervention set clear priorities: to provide a 70% state guarantee on invest-
ments and to encourage the expansion of the capital market by creating funds. 
A total of three foundations were institutionalized but did not fulfill their ex-
pectations: they collected little private funding; they were unable to mobilize 
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critical mass within the innovation system, and did not contribute to network 
and cluster building; they have proved to be rather bureaucratic, failing to 
meet market requirements; besides, they have opened up too wide a range of 
eligible enterprises28. The main benefit of the program was, in fact, a list of 
inferences that could be deduced from which a new, profoundly reformed 
model, called Yozma, was launched in 199329. 
Under Yozma, the state earmarked 100 million dollars, 80 for a total of ten 
equity funds to provide 40-50%, and 20 for direct high-tech investments. An 
important feature of the program was that it attracted significant private and 
market capital at an early stage so that only half of the money managed by 
the ten equity funds to be set up was provided by the state. Also, Yozma 
guaranteed for five years, at a rate of 5% per annum, an option to redeem the 
State's share, which was used by investors in all funds, meaning that not only 
did the program be privatized in the short term, it also generated profitable 
capital. The Israeli experience shows that without the involvement of market 
participants (full transfer of private capital, professional control, facilitation 
of privatization on favourable terms), the public sector is slow, bureaucratic, 
not sensitive and adaptive, and too rigid and inflexible. Supported start-ups 
have become dynamic due to easy-to-obtain, passive investments, their 
growth has been slow, and state supervision and monitoring have not proved 
to be motivated either. The strongest catalysts of the Israeli innovation eco-
system are the joint demand and supply processes, focusing on government 
and public policy measures, private sector activities, and dual private-public 
initiatives30. 
Those countries wishing to adopt the Israel model should always be aware 
that formal organisational, institutional, financial, and so on structures are 
always based on human agents, with their worldview and identity, and other 
informal qualities31.  
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1.3. China 
Following a long and unprecedented economic development in the last thirty 
years, China is entering a stormy period for the upcoming new industrial rev-
olution. As China begins to catch up with the world leader in technology, it 
is approaching an innovation frontier where productivity can no longer be 
increased by foreign direct investment (FDI) and technology transfers only, 
thus generating domestic innovation. It is therefore, essential for the econ-
omy to move from an investment-driven model to a productivity-based 
model32. High consumer demand and domestic competition in consumer-
driven innovation-based industries are likely to compel Chinese companies 
to compete even harder on the domestic market and expand internationally, 
leveraging their home-based experience in the global arena, particularly in 
emerging markets33. 
1.3.1. A historical perspective  
Since the start of the Reform and Opening Program launched by the Com-
munist Party in 1978, the country has achieved an average GDP growth rate 
of almost ten percent per year for the last few years, raising its GDP per capita 
to more than 50 times the 1978 figure. From $ 155 to $ 7,920 in 2015, lifting 
800 million people out of poverty, contributing more than one-third to pov-
erty reduction between 1990 and 2005. By numbers, China is already a world 
leader in promoting innovation. The country's annual research spending ex-
ceeds $ 300 billion, slowly but surely catching up with the United States. 
Almost 30,000 students graduate in science and technology each year, and 
the country is the world leader in the number of patent applications filed, 
with nearly one million filed in 201434. However, the performance of Chinese 
companies that innovate for business and compete in the global market does 
not always reflect the potential that would be suggested by the level of in-
vestment in the country and the level of R&D support35 
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As China's share of the global revenue base reveals, China has emerged as a 
world leader in sectors that have evolved to serve domestic demand, while 
more challenging innovations such as private label drugs, biotechnology or 
the automotive industry, China has not yet become globally competitive36. 
The Internet Plus Action Plan, announced by Prime Minister Li Keqiang at 
the 12th National People's Congress in March 2015, aims to promote further 
the use of Internet-based technologies in traditional sectors as well as broad-
band internet access and promote business development in rural areas by im-
proving e-commerce37. Like the United States, China is trying to move from 
manufacturing activities to high value-added services as quickly as possible. 
1.3.2. Main elements and players 
China's innovation ecosystem is characterized by the strong position of local 
government and official research institutes. The state council has final deci-
sion-making authority for the structural organisation of the research system 
and guidelines for research policy. Traditionally, there has been a disconnect 
between academic and industrial research. Today, however, universities are 
increasingly pursuing exciting joint projects with enterprises. They are also 
setting up their technology enterprises. Technology parks and incubators 
connect entrepreneurs with local resources. 
China has developed national mid and long-term plans for scientific and tech-
nological development that set building an innovative nation as a strategic 
goal; put in place plans to develop nine strategic emerging industries includ-
ing next-generation information technologies, high-end equipment, new ma-
terials, bio-industry, new energy vehicles, new energy, energy conservation, 
and environmental protection, digital creativity and relates service industry38. 
In 2015, China launched a pioneering program called Mass Entrepreneurship 
and Innovation. This is in line with the country's goal to shift from labour-
intensive manufacturing to growth driven by innovation. The country also 
has an enormous and valuable internal consumer base, which is hungry for 
new technology39. In recent years, the government has also launched several 
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programs aimed at cultivating scientific talent. The more prominent among 
these include the National Science Fund for Distinguished Young Scholars, 
which provides research support to deserving scientific projects, the Chang 
Jiang Scholars Program aimed at attracting distinguished visiting professors, 
and the Thousand Talents Plan aimed at luring back top Chinese researchers 
from abroad40. 
Innovative regions 
In the rankings of cities in China in terms of innovation ecosystems, the cities 
are divided into three tiers based on their total scores. Among the first tier, 
Tier 1 cities, including Beijing, Shanghai, Shenzhen, and Guangzhou, remain 
at the top, with Hangzhou rising to the fourth place in replace of Guangzhou. 
Nanjing, Chengdu, and Wuhan are among the top few in the second tier. The 
third tier mainly includes cities that promote breakthroughs of innovation 
ecosystems via policy guidance, such as Dongguan, Foshan, Zhuhai, and 
Guiyang.  
On the regional level, innovation ecosystems in China are distinct in charac-
teristics. Innovation development in the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region is cen-
tered in Beijing; the overall level of development in the Yangtze River Delta 
region is higher than in other regions; the development in the Guangdong-
Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area is promising; the central and western 
regions are accelerating development41. 
Hi-tech parks 
China sees rapid development in more than 130 high-tech parks and inde-
pendent innovation demonstration zones. These parks and zones, accounting 
for less than 1% of China's territory, account for nearly 40% of R&D invest-
ment by all the country's enterprises, as well as 32.8% of revenue from sales 
of new products.  
The Zhongguancun Science Park (Z-Park) in Beijing recorded 4.07 trillion 
yuan in revenues in 2015. Covering only 3% of the land, it contributed 37% 
of Beijing's economic growth. The Z-Park is already at the global forefront 
in such sectors as Internet+, AI, biomedicine, smart manufacturing, and new 
materials. Strategic emerging industries contributed 71.6% of its revenues. 
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Shenzhen has been spending over 4% of its GDP on R&D in recent years. In 
2015, its GDP expanded by 8.9%. The value added by its seven strategic 
emerging industries increased by 16.1%, and GDP grew from 28% five years 
ago to 40% today. In 2015, Shenzhen also submitted 13,300 PCT patent ap-
plications, representing 46.9% of China's total. The city leads the world in 
such sectors as supercomputing, gene sequencing, metamaterial, and 4G 
technology. It is home to 1,283 labs, including key labs, engineering labs, 
engineering centers, and corporate technology centers42. 
Sectoral characteristics 
Manufacturing is the fundamental industry for China's innovation develop-
ment. In China, the advancement of a smart manufacturing ecosystem would 
not be possible without a deep dive into user values. China has a complete 
set of supporting industries for manufacturing and, therefore, could help 
manufacturing enterprises go even further on the journey of a smart upgrade. 
However, to play a leading economic role, China has to make a similar shift 
from manufacturing activities to high value-added industries. 
The best practice of innovation ecosystems in China is the AI industry. 
Fueled by both policies and capital, the number of AI enterprises is rising 
rapidly, with the most located in the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region, Pearl 
River Delta region and Yangtze River Delta region43. 
Intellectual Property 
The common thing many foreign founders are scared of is IP leakage. The 
fundamental difference between China and many other countries is that IP in 
China does not follow a first to use, but first to file a trademark system. A 
foreign business can register its trademark, have local authorities raid infring-
ing factories, take infringers to court, and have Chinese customs seize in-
fringing goods before they leave China's borders. Foreign investors must pre-
pare early, register trademarks and other key IPs in China, and understand 
how to use the system. It is important to get good legal advice regarding IP 
well before approaching the market44. 
So, China is no longer just the home of copycats. Massive investments, a 
huge market and the hiring of worldwide talent have boosted the innovative 
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Chinese ecosystem. Today, some of the biggest companies in the world are 
based there. China is already moving from a policy-driven economy, with a 
big share of investment in GDP and its specialization as the "workbench of 
the world," to a market-driven economy. One where consumption counts for 
the larger share of GPD with a focus on an innovative, service-driven econ-
omy45. 
The role of VC-s  
Since the 1980s, venture capital in China has grown steadily alongside the 
robust national economy. In 1984, the National Research Center of Science 
and Technology for Development suggested that China establish a venture 
capital system to promote high technology46. The early 1990s saw a prolifer-
ation of venture capital firms backed by state and local governments. Because 
of the lack of experience among the government officials and the entrepre-
neurs, these efforts usually failed47. To increase the professionalism of the 
industry, the Chinese Venture Capital Association was inaugurated in 2002 
and it has experienced extensive growth in the years since48. 
 There are hundreds of government guidance funds (on the national, provin-
cial, city, and district levels) that are focused on venture funding in China 
today. Some of these funds allocate capital to further specific policy plans, 
such as 'Made in China 2025,' or towards advancing areas such as AI and 
robotics. Unlike private venture capital, government guidance funds are well 
represented in inland regions49. The leading private VC institutions in China 
include Zhen Fund, K2VC and Sinovation Ventures in the initial funding 
stage, and IDG Capital, MatrixPartners, and Sequoia Capital China in the 
subsequent funding stages. While most of the top venture capital firms invest 
most heavily in internet services, Tianxing Capital invests in chemistry and 
new materials as well as on green tech and energy50. 
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Foreign investors are a growing presence in China's VC scene. The case for 
China is strong: outside of the US, China is the clearest investment oppor-
tunity for foreign investors in terms of potential scale and growth. With a 
population of over 1.38 billion people, China is a market where 'popular' 
takes on an entirely different meaning. For investors, whether in transporta-
tion or logistics, fintech or biotech, China's startup scene is exceptional in 
every way. In support of this, the Foreign Investment Law (FIL), which was 
passed on March 15, 2019, during the 13th National People's Congress, will 
likely have a further stimulating effect in fostering a foreign investment-
friendly environment51. 
Summary 
The innovation ecosystems presented all have unique characteristics, 
strengths, and areas for improvement. Overall, state involvement was the key 
factor in all three countries. Universities, research institutes, programs to sup-
port young researchers, or venture capital funds can hardly be imagined by 
supporting market players alone. It is also undeniable that, in the case of both 
the US and Israel, military developments in the national interest have, in 
many cases, been the cradle of future innovation frameworks. However, after 
these initial factors, the state played an essential role in ensuring the com-
mercial exploitation of the research infrastructure. It can be stated that the 
characteristic feature of the examined countries is that the cooperation of the 
state, the higher education, and the corporate sphere was able to provide a 
stable basis for serving the ever-changing economic needs. 
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Zsolt Gilányi 
2. On the Economic Sustainability of Market 
Economies 
Ecological economics alerts that even durable zero growth (and a fortiori 
growth) at the present level of resource consumption of our modern market 
economies is incompatible with a sustainable future because it exhausts the 
non- or “slowly” renewable resources (including the environment). There-
fore, degrowth and zero growth in resource consumption (including the en-
vironment) to an ecologically sustainable level is a prerequisite for a sustain-
able future. 
The dominant economic thinking (the whole orthodox economics and the 
outmost of heterodox economics) maintains that zero growth non-crisis 
steady state is possible in our market economies: in these models, growth is 
a matter of individual choice between present and future consumption; 
growth is a matter of the exogenously given preferences. In other terms, there 
is no intrinsic property of market economies that implies growth imperative. 
Accordingly, green movements, for example, may, in principle, remedy the 
excessive ecological footprint of modern economies.  
Some economists warn that the orthodox perception of sustainability is basi-
cally false; ecological movements aiming at a sustainable future are neces-
sarily ineffective on global level. The anti-these is that growth imperative is 
an inherent systemic property of market economies; hence market economies 
are ecologically unsustainable. That growth is a systemic property of market 
economies means that growth in market economies is not up to individual 
but to collective choice. Collective choice is substantially different from in-
dividual choice: collective choice creates social rules (institutions), while in-
dividual choice does not.52  
Two social rules (institutions) define a market economy. First, market econ-
omies are monetary production economies, i.e. the production (creation of 
social wealth) is monetized. Second, market economies are free, i.e. they are 
based on private property and decentralization53. Growth imperative follows 
                                                     
52 As an example, I can decide each morning to take or not to take my car to get to work, but I cannot 
choose to ride on the left or on the right hand side on the road the same morning if I really want to 
reach my workplace. Riding on the opposite side is possible only if the parliament (collective 
choice) of a country decides to change the traffic rules.  
53 Note that this freedom does not exclude slavery! 
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from the social rule of monetary production economy: no growth and mone-
tary production economy mutually exclude each other. 
Surprisingly, empirical data do not help in deciding on the validity of these 
two diametrically opposed propositions. Though historical data show that 
capitalism experienced in average outstanding growth relative to other eco-
nomic systems, (interrupted from time to time by a crisis), also capitalism 
knew long periods of stagnation. Both camps interpret these facts as the em-
pirical evidence of their truth.54 As a consequence, the debate on the (eco-
nomic) sustainability of market economies is relegated from the field of em-
pirics back to the field of theory. At first glance, this procedure seems para-
doxical: theories are tested by empirical evidence and not the other way 
around. In fact, all that happens is that the battlefield of testing is shifted from 
the direct test of the existence of growth imperative to the test of the hypoth-
eses of the opposed theories on growth imperative. 
In summary, the sustainability of our modern market economies seems to 
hurt into ecological, social (inequalities, migration55) and economic (growth 
imperative, crisis) limits. Recently ecological limits of sustainability gained 
much attention. However, sustainability seems to depend less on ecological 
limits rather more on social and economic ones. 
In the following, we deal with what we think the core theoretical problem of 
the economic sustainability of our modern market economies: the growth im-
perative. 
2.1. Locating the theoretical problem of growth 
In order to situate the theoretical problem of growth, let us consider a closed 
economy and start from the banal identity drawn from national accounting, 
which states that in any period t, gross domestic product Yt can be split up 
into consumption Ct plus gross investment It, where the bold typing refers to 
aggregates: 
Yt=Ct+It  (1) 
  
                                                     
54 Is it the Sun that orbits around the Earth or the other way round? 
55 For example, think of Laurent Obertone’s (2018) negative scenario on the effects of migration 
into France. Obertone, Laurent (2018): Conférence de Laurent Obertone á Orange, 12.10.2018. 
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If net aggregate investments in period t are strictly positive, gross invest-
ments are: 
It>At  (2) 
where At is the depreciation in period t in the economy. 
As depreciation is the result of past investments, equation (2) holds for all 
periods if and only if gross investment is increasing. As the lower bound on 
consumption is zero, strictly positive net investment implies a tendency for 
gross domestic product to grow. In fact, gross domestic product Y may tem-
porally decrease because a drop-in consumption C may counterbalance the 
increase of gross investments I, but this drop cannot perpetuate because con-
sumption cannot fall below the lower bound zero.  
In the aggregate, investments are always equal to savings; hence investments 
net of depreciation INt in period t always equal net savings: 
INt=SNt  (3) 
All put together, if aggregate net saving in period t, SNt, is a strictly positive 
aggregate net investment, INt, is also strictly positive. Hence, aggregate gross 
investment is increasing, and by force of identity (1), gross domestic product 
abides the same property. No growth is equivalent with zero aggregate net 
saving, SNt =0; growth means strictly positive aggregate net saving SNt >0. 
Thus, a sufficient condition for growth in nominal or real terms is the exist-
ence of strictly positive aggregate net savings in monetary or in real terms 
regardless of the specific model with or without phony mathematics. The 
specific models are required to make the link between nominal and real 
growth. 
According to this, any growth models must come in one way or another to 
the same end: aggregate net savings must be strictly positive. In each model 
where zero growth is a feasible state, net aggregate savings may be zero. 
In order to avoid digressions, let us comply with the custom by considering 
exclusively proportional steady states (i.e. cyclical paths excluded) of a 
closed market economy and by supposing that none of the economic agents 
can run a constant negative budget.56 These hypotheses make the link be-
tween strictly positive net retained earnings of one single economic agent and 
strictly positive aggregate net savings.  
                                                     
56 In evidence, the state (government) is able to run constant negative budget. A proportional sta-
tionary state is a situation, where all variables change proportionally and which can be maintained 
ad infimum. 
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In this perspective, the core of the debate on growth imperative is whether 
the behavioural rule attributed to the model agents allows for SNt,i=0 for all 
economic agents i, or not. If the behavioural rule allows for zero net savings 
for each economic agent, the zero value of the aggregated net saving SNt=0 
is a state, which may be in accordance with the will of the agents and, as 
such, is a feasible state that can be maintained ad infinum. As a consequence, 
in zero growth models, it is possible that all the economic agents are able to 
realize their plans ad infimum if there is no growth, while in growth impera-
tive models after a while there is necessarily at least one economic agent, 
who cannot realize his or her plan (regardless of the concrete plan) if the 
economy does not grow. Michel Rosier calls the situation where there is at 
least one economic agent who necessarily cannot realize his or her plan (re-
gardless of the concrete plan) (general) crisis and the opposite case when 
economic agents have the theoretical possibility to execute their plans normal 
functioning of the economy. In the omnipresent equilibrium models, there is 
not just a theoretical possibility to execute all the plans, but these plans are 
de facto realized. Inversely, the failure of an agent to realize her plan does 
not mean that the economy is in crisis.  
Logically, there are two ways to assure strictly positive net retained earnings: 
either we postulate that some economic agent pursuit the aim of realizing 
strictly positive net retained earnings; or we make other hypotheses that as-
sure this end. In evidence, zero growth models have the same options with 
the opposite aim to assure zero net retained earnings. These models implicitly 
postulate that none of the economic agent pursuits the aim of realizing strictly 
positive net retained earnings. In concrete terms, these models make hypoth-
eses (generally the profit maximization rule) that imply this postulate. 
2.2. Toward growth imperative models: the Rosier-
model 
Though we cannot speak of a generally accepted common core for growth 
imperative models and Michel Rosier does not speak of growth imperative, 
Michel Rosier’s model57 seems to be a good candidate for several reasons. 
First, Rosier’s model departs from the postulate that market economies are 
                                                     
57 Rosier, Michel (1991): Eléments d’une approche théorique et comptable du phénomène d’en-
dettement. Cahier monnaie et financement. Université Lumière Lyon 2. 20. 176-185. and Rosier, 
Michel (1992): Des causes et des remèdes aux surendettements nationaux et internationaux. Cahier 
du G.R.A.T.I.C.E. 
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monetary production economies.58 This means that the production process is 
conceived differently from the orthodox theory. The orthodox theory first 
gives a description of the real economy without money and only afterward 
tries to integrate money in a second step59; accordingly, money is inessential 
in the economy and hence in the orthodox production process.60 For Rosier, 
the economy is ab ovo monetary; economic calculus and payments are in 
monetary terms; the model framework is based on national accounting with 
some modifications as it is the case in the stock-flow consistent models where 
the accounting is condensed into the transactions flow matrix.61 The most 
aggregated closed economy model has just two macro-agents: banks that can 
create money and non-bank agents who are unable to do so. That is, if we say 
that our economies are in the first instance money economies, then the ag-
gregation cannot hide the money creation process, but it can hide the produc-
tion process: the banking sector’s profits necessarily follow (perhaps with 
some lags) the non-financial sector’s profits. Second, as in Rosier’s model, 
production is not made explicit, the problem of connecting real and nominal 
variables is avoided at the expense of arguing simply for growth in nominal 
terms. As such, the theoretical possibility to believe in everlasting nominal 
growth without growing resource consumption remains open: the zero real 
growth literature is not discredited with a stroke by this maximally simplified 
model. 
It is important to underline again that Rosier does not aim to show that there 
is growth imperative in modern market economies. He simply shows that if 
banks convert their savings rather in financial assets than in real assets – 
which is the case if we observe their balance sheets: the share of real assets 
compared to financial assets are negligible in banks’ balance sheets – then 
the overall net claims of banks on non-bank agents (i.e. banks’ claims on 
non-bank agents minus banks’ financial liabilities toward non-bank agents) 
is necessarily increasing. Rosier’s behavioural hypothesis means that from 
                                                     
58 This postulate is attributed to Keynes. Therefore, all the models that depart from this postulate are 
labelled post-Keynesian. Nevertheless, few such models claim growth imperative. 
59 I note that this integration is impossible. For an overview see for example Cartelier, Jean (2018): 
Money, markets and capital. The case for a monetary analysis, Routledge. 
60 If it were essential, then without money a model necessarily cannot describe an economy with 
money. 
61 See Godley, Wynne and Lavoie, Marc (2007): Monetary Economics. Palgrave Macmillan. The 
most important difference between national accounting in practice and this theoretical accounting 
is that shares are not considered as a part of individual wealth but as an item of financial liabilities 
for the issuer. This property assures that a society’s wealth does not increase with share issuance. 
35 
period to period, the increase in banks’ real assets is always less than the 
increase in their financial assets. 
The variation of banks’ balance sheet during period t fulfills the identity that 
the variation of all the assets (variation of real assets ΔRAB, plus the variation 
of financial assets ΔFL62) is equal to the variation of all the liabilities (varia-
tion of own wealth called saving SB, plus a variation of financial liabilities 
ΔFA): 
 BANK 
 
 NON-BANK 
ΔRAB 
SB  
ΔRANB 
SNB 
ΔFL 
 
ΔFA  
ΔFL 
 ΔFA 
   
Formally, 
ΔRABt+ΔFLt=ΔFAt+SBt  (4) 
According to Rosier’s hypothesis, banks real assets always increase less than 
their positive savings, i.e.: 
ΔRABt<SBt if SBt>0 (5) 
 
From identity (4) it then follows: 
ΔFLt>ΔFAt  (6) 
That is: 
FAt -FAt-1<FLt -FLt-1 < FLt  as FLt≥0 for all t. 
Banks’ financial assets take all kinds, but basically, they are claims because 
the bank’s main role is to create money by credit in our economies; as a 
counterpart, banks’ financial liabilities are basically money.63  
This said, if banks have strictly positive savings (i.e. retained earnings) in the 
aggregate, then there is a tendency for banks’ claims in monetary terms 
(loans of non-bank agents) to increase more than the money stock in the 
                                                     
62 Because the financial liability of non-bank agents is the financial asset of the bank toward non-
bank agents. 
63 Money is financial assets with which one can pay all the claims on herself. 
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economy. It is important to underline that strictly positive interest rate in it-
self does not necessarily imply strictly positive retained earnings and hence 
is not sufficient for growth in monetary terms. 
The tendency to increase means that these stocks may temporarily decrease, 
because banks other financial assets and liabilities may also change, but these 
stocks cannot decrease durably, because in that case, banks’ balance sheets 
would contradict banks’ behavioural rule of creating money via credit (and 
hence banks’ balance sheets obtained in the model would contradict the em-
pirically observed balance sheets of the banking sector where loans and 
money are the dominant entries). 
The proposition above can be directly put in an equation without loss of gen-
erality if we keep in mind that the simplified equations are to be interpreted 
as tendencies. Namely, as banks’ main role is to create money via credit, we 
omit banks’ real asset purchases (ΔRAB=0). As already noted, this in con-
cordance with the empirical observation that the proportion of real assets rel-
ative to the total assets in banks’ balance sheets is negligible. Though banks’ 
financial assets take all sorts, they are mainly claims on non-bank agents. We 
suppose that banks’ financial assets are exclusively such claims, which we 
will call from the point of view of non-bank agents’ loan, L. Banks’ financial 
liabilities are also of different types, but as a counterpart of loans they are 
mainly composed of money, M. We suppose that banks’ financial liabilities 
are exclusively money, M. With these simplifications Rosier’s general model 
can be simplified to: 
BANK 
ΔL 
SB 
ΔM 
 
ΔMt=ΔLt-SBt  (4’) 
Keeping in mind the above simplifications, this equation shows that in a 
closed credit money economy there is a tendency for the variation of the 
money stock to be equal with the variation of the outstanding stock of loans 
on non-bank agents diminished by banks’ retained earnings. If banks’ sav-
ings in the aggregate is strictly positive, i.e. SBt>0, then (4’) becomes: 
ΔLt>ΔMt  (6’) 
or 
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Lt-1-Mt-1<Lt-Mt≤Lt, as Lt and Mt≥0 for all t. 
as above. 
In order to illustrate the patterns that the stock of outstanding loans should take 
in the omnipresent orthodox models with constant money stock, let us consider 
the following simple example of a credit-money economy. Suppose that all 
loans taken in period t must be reimbursed with interest in the subsequent pe-
riod. The interest rate is 10% and there is no bankruptcy. Banks do not spend 
out of their profits. The money stock is constant, say 100 dollars. In the begin-
ning, there is neither loans nor money. For the money stock to be constant at 
the beginning (end) of periods, the money inflows must be equal with money 
outflows during the periods. This means that the amount of money correspond-
ing to the interest payments must also be assured by new loans. Accordingly, 
the stock of outstanding loans at the end of periods as well as the flow of money 
and the flow of loans during the periods are increasing: 
 Stock Flow  
The stock of outstand-
ing loans with interest 
at the beginning of the 
period, D 
Money stock at 
the beginning 
of the period, 
M 
Loans taken 
during the pe-
riod, FL 
Reimbursement 
with interest dur-
ing the period, R 
0 0 0 100 0 
1 110 100 110 110 
2 121 100 121 121 
3 133,1 100 133,1 133,1 
4 146,41 100 146,41 146,41 
If banks integrally spend their profits, this growth imperative in monetary 
terms disappears. This means that compound interest in itself does not lead 
to growth imperative in monetary terms: 
       
The stock of out-
standing loans 
with interest at the 
beginning of the 
period, D 
Money stock 
at the begin-
ning of the 
period, M 
Loans 
taken dur-
ing the pe-
riod, FL 
Reimburse-
ment with in-
terest during 
the period, R 
Expenditure of 
interest in-
come during 
the period, O 
0 0 0 100 0 0 
1 110 100 100 110 10 
2 110 100 100 110 10 
3 110 100 100 110 10 
4 110 100 100 110 10 
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In the first case, trivially we cannot start the subsequent periods with the same 
amount of money stock at the beginning of the periods because in that case, 
the ratio of the money stock at the beginning of the periods relative to the 
flow of transactions during the periods tends to zero, resulting in the impos-
sibility of executing all the transactions. Since, even if on an aggregated 
level, the initial money stock plus the money inflows cover all matured debts 
during the periods, these debts cannot be reimbursed if debt maturity inside 
the period is not appropriate. Image, for example, that at the beginning of 
period four non-bank agents should reimburse 101 dollars, but they have not 
taken further loans yet. This means that there are still just 100 dollars in the 
economy, hence at least 1 dollar due payment cannot be made. It follows that 
we can suppose that economic transactions take place smoothly during the 
periods only if the money stock at the beginning of the periods increase more 
or less proportionally to the flow of transactions during the periods. 64 For 
this reason, in the first case, the economy is not viable: none of the models 
(orthodox or not) with constant money stock can describe our modern econ-
omies where the money is created via credit. For example, if the increase of 
the money stock is constant 11% in our first example, then both the money 
stock and the stock of outstanding loans will permanently increase and reach 
the constant 1:11 ratio in the stationary state.65 
 
2.3. Growth imperative in market economies: the 
Rosier model altered 
Let us aggregate economic agents in a closed market economy into two 
macro agents: firms and all other agents (banks, households, state), called 
non-firms. The variation of their balance sheets during period t is the follow-
ing: 
 
 
                                                     
64 The proof of this proposition goes by shifting all the periods in a way where payments are neces-
sarily cannot be executed. This shift means that the beginning (end) of period money stock will 
become a stock at a moment inside the period that is not represented and a moment previously 
situated inside the period becomes the beginning (end) moment. The proof also holds if the length 
of the period is changed leading to a new representation of the reality. The shift or change of periods 
is possible because model periods are arbitrarily chosen.  
65 This ratio follows from equation (4’). Namely, qMt-1=qLt-1-rLt-1, where q is the stationary growth 
rate, r interest rate. This gives: Mt-1/Lt-1=1-r/q for all t. 
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The variation of the balance sheet of firms is: 
ΔRAVt+ΔFAVt=ΔFLVt+SVt  (7) 
Let us apply now Rosier’s argument applied for the banking sector! Namely, 
empirical observation of firms’ balance sheets shows that the share of real 
assets far exceeds the share of their financial assets. This means that firms 
place their positive savings rather in real assets than in financial assets. For 
this reason, we postulate that from period to period the increase in firms’ 
financial assets is always less than the increase in their real assets:  
ΔFAVt<SVt if SVt>0 (8) 
Thus, from equation (7) it follows: 
ΔRAVt>ΔFLVt  (9) 
Firms’ real asset purchase is investment. Neither real assets nor financial li-
abilities can take negative values, i.e. RAVt≥0 and FLVt≥0 for all t. It follows 
that financial assets cannot decrease ad infimum either. This means that there 
is a tendency for ΔFLt≥0. From equation (9): 
0 ≤ ΔFLVt < ΔRAVt = It-At < It (9’) 
This means that in a normally functioning closed market economy, there is a 
tendency for the net and gross investments to increase in monetary terms.  
The income of all economic agents is called the total product, total product 
minus intermediate consumption measured at market prices is called GDP 
(Y). Pt-CIt=Yt=Ct+It. As consumption (Ct) has the lower bound 0 and invest-
ment is increasing (It), there is a tendency for the total product as well as for 
the GDP in monetary terms to increase. It follows that the money flows and 
also the money stock must have an increasing tendency. 
This means that a normally functioning market economy is compatible only 
with a financial system where the money stock can increase according to the 
needs of the economy. In this perspective, the modern monetary system is 
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just a response to satisfy market economies’ thirst for money. Though it is 
true that the banking system reinforces the need for growth in monetary 
terms, however, it seems that the banking system is rather an effect than a 
cause: this is a flexible system that is able to satisfy the money thirst.  
If we exclude that firms and commercial banks may fulfil their plans with 
zero retained earnings, then we do not just have a tendency for growth in 
monetary terms, but also growth imperative: if the economy (GDP) is not 
increasing, sooner or later firms (and commercial banks) are unable to realize 
their plan, because equation (9’) will not be satisfied and there will be a crisis. 
2.4. Critiques against growth imperative models 
Put aside some attempts, growth imperative models argue in an accounting 
framework, like Rosier. Some economists see in a Rosier type model the 
demonstration of the growth imperative. In addition to the accounting frame-
work, the Rosier type model highlights the central role of the financial sector, 
including the assumption that banks retain earnings from strictly positive 
profits.  
In evidence, a Rosier type model is insufficient to demonstrate the existence 
of growth imperative for two reasons. First, if growth imperative is due to 
the financial sector, then market economies per se are not necessarily subject 
to the growth imperative. This said market economies’ growth imperative 
must be invariable to the financial system. Second, if banks’ profits are not 
strictly positive but zero – as it is the case in general in equilibrium models 
– then retained earnings are also zero, and there is neither growth nor need 
to growth: a Rosier type model always allows for this possibility. 
However, critiques do not stop here; they also aim another substantially dif-
ferent assumption on the financial sector not yet made in any models. 
Namely, instead of the behavioural hypothesis of banks’ keeping strictly pos-
itive retained earnings from strictly positive profits, the other behavioural 
hypothesis under attack is that banks seek strictly positive retained earnings. 
That is, in the first case, zero profit in monetary terms is a situation where 
banks can realize their plans while in the second case, banks cannot fulfill 
their plans.  
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The critiques are twofold. Some claim that the assumption of banks seeking 
strictly positive retained earnings “ is self-contradictory in an economy de-
signed to converge to a stationary state”.66 Others call for the “theoretical foun-
dation” of his hypothesis.67 
As to the present state of the art, it seems that there is an implicit consensus 
among both economists who argue for capitalism’s growth imperative and 
economists who deny the existence of such systemic property that one cannot 
postulate that for-profit firms and commercial banks seek by definition 
strictly positive net retained earnings in monetary terms. Otherwise, there 
were no numerous attempts to assure strictly positive net aggregate savings 
from other hypotheses. For example, strictly positive net retained earnings is 
explained by risk considerations68 or banks’ aim to maintain a fairly constant 
capital to loans ratio69, or by innovation70. All these attempts are of limited 
success though the model settings vary substantially.  
2.5. Refutation of the critiques against the postulate 
of strictly positive net retained earnings 
As to the critique of the lack of the theoretical underpinning of the postulate 
of strictly positive net retained earnings to assure growth, it also applies to 
the postulate of the possibility of zero net retained earnings. Namely, if it is 
assumed that none of the economic agents’ aim is to retain net earnings, this 
should then also be underpinned theoretically as the main reason for zero 
growth. 
The fact that this “critique” also applies to the “opposite” model shows that 
it is fundamentally misplaced. The problem with this critique is that postu-
lates cannot be “underpinned theoretically”. Namely, a postulate is, by defi-
nition, an assumption that the theoretician makes according to his or her ob-
                                                     
66 Cahen-Fourot, Louison and Lavoie, Marc (2016): Ecological monetary economics: a post-
Keynesian critique. Ecological Economics. 126. 163-168. 
67 Richters, Oliver and Siemoneit, Andreas (2017): Consistency and stability analysis of models of 
a monetary growth imperative. Ecological Economics. 136. 114-125. 
68 Gordon and Rosenthal (2003): Capitalism’s growth imperative. Cambridge Journal of Econom-
ics. 27/1. 25–48. 
69 Binswanger, Mathias (2015): The growth imperative revisited: a rejoinder to Gilányi and John-
son. Journal of Post Keynesian Economics. 37. 648-660. 
70 Richters, Oliver and Siemoneit, Andreas (2017): Fear of Stagnation? A review on growth imper-
atives. VÖÖ Discussion Papers.  
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servation of the reality, and that serves for the basis for reasoning in the the-
ory. If two models are logically coherent with different postulates, then the 
test of the models indicates which model gives a better representation of the 
reality. In other terms, the test of the model will decide which properties of 
the reality that the theoretician a priori thought important prove to be im-
portant a posteriori. The argument that in a non-growing economy, some 
economists see no reason for banks seeking to realize strictly positive net 
retained earnings in monetary terms is completely irrelevant. With Rosier’s 
terms71, a hypothesis of a scientific model does not have to be reasonable for 
the theoretician; i.e. a hypothesis of a scientific model does not have to con-
form to the understanding of the theoretician. 
In order to illustrate the absurdity of the argument behind the rejection of the 
hypothesis of the behavioural rule of strictly positive net retained earnings, 
consider the following example. We reject the explication of the phenome-
non called “pressure” (macroscopic phenomenon, like growth in economics) 
on the basis of the kinetic theory of gases (the microscopic theory that makes 
postulates on gas molecules, as we do in economics on the behaviour of eco-
nomic agents), because it is not “logical” for me (i.e. it should be “under-
pinned theoretically”) that molecules follow Brownian motion in a closed 
container (i.e. if I were a gas molecule I would not follow the Brownian mo-
tion in a non-changing world like the critics would not retain earnings in zero 
growth steady state if they were bankers). 
As to the critique of presupposing the result, yet again it applies also to zero 
growth models: if we postulate that none of the economic agent pursuit the 
aim of realizing strictly positive net retained earnings, then we presuppose 
the result we are willing to obtain, namely the possibility of zero growth. 
Hence, we could (erroneously) conclude that zero growth models are incon-
sistent because they assume that (commercial) banks (and for-profit firms) 
do not keep accumulating retained earnings in each period, an assumption 
that is self-contradictory in an economy designed to converge to a strictly 
positive steady-state growth. 
Again, the fact that this “critique” also applies to the opposite model shows 
that it is fundamentally erroneous. The problem with this critique is that all 
models necessarily presuppose the model result. With Soros’s terms, all 
model results are necessarily contained in the model assumptions. The prob-
lem with a theory starts if it is not supported by empirical evidence: “In the 
absence of equilibrium, the contention that free markets lead to the optimum 
                                                     
71 Rosier, Michel (1993): L’Etat expérimentateur. PUF. 
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allocation of resources loses its justification. The supposedly scientific the-
ory that has been used to validate it turns out to be an axiomatic structure 
whose conclusions are contained in its assumptions and are not necessarily 
supported by the empirical evidence. The resemblance to Marxism, which 
also claimed scientific status for its tenets, is too close for comfort.”72 
However, empirical evidence in the field of economics is rather precarious, 
because “[t]he researcher’s free option is in his ability to pick whatever sta-
tistics can confirm his belief—or show a good result—and ditch the rest”.73 
According to Romer, “The trouble with macroeconomics is worse: … In the 
1960s and early 1970s, many macroeconomists were cavalier about the iden-
tification problem. They did not recognize how difficult it is to make reliable 
inferences about causality from observations on variables that are part of a 
simultaneous system. By the late 1970s, macroeconomists understood how 
serious this issue is, but …we are now "Back to Square One."74 
2.6. Some remarks on the standard basic (zero) 
growth model: the Solow – model 
The basic growth model of orthodox economic theory is the Solow model. 
The Solow model supposes that the production function is first-order homo-
geneous.75 Therefore, income is integrally distributed among the “factors of 
production”, namely between capital and labour, where the term capital 
stands for the means of production.76  
Hence, in such a model setting, firms have never retained earnings. Only 
consumers have saving decisions; therefore, investment is the result of the 
preference between the present and future consumption. In these models, one 
                                                     
72 Soros György (1997): The Capitalist Threat. Atlantic Monthly. 279/2. 4 
73 Taleb, Nassim (2012): Antifragile: things that gain from disorder. Random House. 431 
74 Romer, Paul (2016): The Trouble With Macroeconomics. https://paulromer.net/trouble-with-
macroeconomics-update/WP-Trouble.pdf (2020. 02. 14.) 
75 If all factors of production are increased proportionally, production also increases proportionally. 
Formally, the production function y=F(K,N), where y is the output, K is capital and N is labor, is 
homogeneous in first degree if for all a>1, ay=F(aK,aN). 
76 Kt=Kt-1+It-At, where It is investment in period t, At is depreciation in period t. Investment is spend-
ing in monetary terms. The translation of a monetary magnitude into real terms is not without diffi-
culties (see 1.7 below). Orthodox models argue in real terms. Accounting approaches argue in mon-
etary terms. Real terms are not directly observable; monetary magnitudes (payments) are directly 
observable. 
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can obtain any result (s)he wishes: zero growth or growth depends on the 
exogenously given preferences.77  
As firms do not have investment decisions in these models, savings deter-
mine investments and not the other way around. For a long time, we all know 
that in a monetary production economy, the logical chain is in the other way 
around, as explained, for example by Kalecki78 or by Keynes (see widow’s 
cruse or paradox of thrift). Hence, by construction orthodox models cannot 
describe monetary production economies. 
Even if left implicit, in orthodox models, firms are supposed to seek profits 
(maximal or not has no importance for us here). The profit objective is fully 
compatible with zero net saving. This said, there is no need for growth so 
that each economic agent be able to fulfill its plan; there is no growth imper-
ative even if we observe growth. 
2.7. Growth in monetary terms or in real terms? 
As it is clear from the Solow model, orthodox economics thinks in real terms: 
money, if at all, is added afterward. This procedure is clearly a logical non-
sense: the functioning of an economy with money can be understood by ex-
amining the functioning of an economy without money only if money is in-
essential (M. Friedman) or neutral (R. Lucas). However, in that case, there is 
no need to integrate money into the model. Some non-orthodox economists 
believe that a monetary production economy (market economy) is different 
from an economy without money. Therefore, they depart from the existence 
of money. However, most of the adepts of this heterodox thinking integrate 
the production function into their models in order to get real magnitudes. 
They generally make the mistake that in a national accounting (monetary 
flow) framework, investments also refer primarily to money flows and not to 
means of production: the passage between nominal and real variables is not 
underpinned theoretically. 
Though the passage between nominal and real variables is generally consid-
ered as a simple mechanical calculus, the transformation between these mag-
nitudes is far from being without difficulties, because we should aggregate 
different products into one magnitude that represent somehow “physical” 
                                                     
77 This choice is left implicit in the exogenously given savings rates. The aim of internalizing the 
saving decision by considering the agents’ intertemporal choice gave rise to the proliferation of 
more sophisticated orthodox growth models. The point here is that the net saving rate can be set 
both to zero or to strictly positive values.  
78 „Capitalist earn what they spend and workers spend what they earn.” 
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quantities. According to the general solution, instead of the genuine money 
flows, i.e. instead of the GDP measured at the genuine prices, the GDP is 
calculated with the prices of a fixed period. The first measurement is called 
GDP measured at current prices or nominal prices, and the latter measure-
ment is called GDP measured at a base price or real price. The reference 
period is called the base period. If in a period the price of the same commod-
ity bundle is p times higher than the price of this same bundle in the base 
period, then we call p price level, p-1 inflation if it is positive and deflation 
if it is negative. 
From this passage between nominal and real variables, it is clear that differ-
ent commodity bundle choices will generally result in different price levels. 
For example, the commodity bundle that represents the total use of products 
(Y) is probably different from the composition of the consumption goods (C) 
and of the investment goods (I). Therefore, the price index calculated on the 
basis of the composition of the commodity bundle that represents the total 
product will not reflect the evolution of the composition of the GDP in real 
terms. If the composition changes – and it changes except for the beloved 
proportional path – then it is not at all sure that the employment or the con-
sumption of non-renewable resources increases if the GDP in real terms in-
creases. For this eventuality, it is enough that the less labour-intensive pro-
duction increase or the production that does not use non-renewable resources. 
In brief, the aggregated production functions taken by analogy from the mi-
croeconomics textbooks’ single firms’ production function used in the mac-
roeconomic models are dubious. 
In order to illustrate these difficulties, consider one single consumption good 
and one single investment good, which are different from each other. Hence, 
there is no problem of measuring the production in physical quantities and 
the composition of the consumption and investment goods are completely 
different. Consider the base period 0 and the subsequent period 1 in three 
different scenarios: 
 
data PCCreal + PIIreal = GDPnom 
  
period PC PI Cfiz Ifiz Cnom 
 
Inom 
 
GDPnom P GDPreal 
0 2 3 100 30 200 
 
90 
 
290 1 290 
1_1 3 2 100 30 300 
 
60 
 
360 1,24 290 
1_2 3 2 200 60 600 
 
120 
 
720 1,24 580 
1_3 2 3 200 60 400 
 
180 
 
580 1,00 580 
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 Nominal variables transformed  
Into real variables 
Ratios 
period Creal Ireal GDPreal Cfiz/Ifiz Creal/Ireal 
0 200 90 290 3,33 2,22 
1_1 241,67 48,33 290 3,33 5,00 
1_2 483,33 96,67 580 3,33 5,00 
1_3 400,00 180,00 580 3,33 2,22 
 
In the base period, real and nominal GDP, as well as the real and nominal 
consumption and investments by definition, coincide. We can observe that 
the consumption in real terms (200$0) does not coincide with the consump-
tion measured in physical terms (100kg), and the ratio of the consumption 
and investment in real terms (100/45, no unit) is different from the same ratio 
measured in physical quantities (100/30 kg/liter) because the real variables 
are influenced by the base period relative prices. For this reason, a propor-
tional growth measured in physical terms (1_2; or the special case of zero 
growth: 1_1) changes the ratio of consumption and investment in real terms 
if relative prices change. 
This said, the existence of a growth imperative in nominal terms in itself does 
not necessarily impede the ecological sustainability of an economic system, 
because nominal growth does not necessarily imply real growth (though this 
seems to be the general case) and real growth is also possible with structural 
change (again empirical evidence shows that this change is not sufficient). 
2.8. Some concluding remarks 
Ecological economics has catalysed pure economic thinking by asking the 
taboo question about whether modern market economies bear systemic prop-
erties required for a sustainable future. Empirical facts seem to show that 
there is no non-crisis market economy with durable zero growth. However, 
this empirical observation is not concluding: the fact that we have not seen 
any durable zero growth non-crisis market economy yet does not mean that 
we can exclude the possibility to see one in the future.79 
According to the ruling paradigm, zero growth is possible in a normally func-
tioning modern market economy. Few are those who deny the possibility of 
non-crisis zero growth capitalism and state that “Needed: a new economic 
                                                     
79 The inconsistency with this quite rational belief in the existence of black swans on behalf of the 
dominant economic thinking is that this same dominant thinking excludes the possibility of black 
swans in their models because they use the Gaussian probability distribution. See Taleb (2007) 
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paradigm”80. These economists have spent many efforts to obtain strictly 
positive aggregate net savings and hence growth from other hypotheses than 
simply postulating the existence of some economic agents who pursue the 
aim of realizing strictly positive net retained earnings in monetary terms. 
None of these models can demonstrate the existence of growth imperative.  
If we simply postulate that the aim of production is not to satisfy human 
needs but to realize strictly positive savings in monetary terms (!), then we 
obtain growth imperative in monetary terms.81 Most of the economists call 
for the theoretical underpinning of the postulate of strictly positive net re-
tained earnings in monetary terms as the reason for a growth imperative. The 
same “critique” applies to standard economics: the postulate of firms not 
seeking strictly positive net retained earnings should also be underpinned 
theoretically as the main reason for the possibility of zero-growth. Also, the 
objection that the postulate of strictly positive net retained earnings is equiv-
alent to postulating growth imperative; and therefore, these models presup-
pose the result is also completely irrelevant. In standard economics, the pos-
tulate that firms do not seek strictly positive net retained earnings (namely 
firms seek to maximize profits) is also equivalent with postulating the possi-
bility of zero growth; hence these economists also presuppose what they want 
to obtain as a result. This said, all model results are necessarily contained in 
the model assumptions, and none of the postulates can be underpinned theo-
retically.  
None of the models which depart from money82 is appropriate at present to 
establish in real terms the growth imperative of market economies per se. To 
do so, an appropriate price theory should be included in these models, which 
is missing. In brief, a growth imperative in nominal terms is not equivalent 
to a growth imperative in real terms. As to orthodox models, they cannot 
describe monetary production economies per se, because genuine money is 
missing in these models, as manifested, for example, in the paradox of thrift. 
                                                     
80 Stiglitz (2010): Needed: a new economic paradigm. Financial Times. 08.19. 
81 Two remarks are in due order. First, it is true that a firm cannot sell if its product does not satisfy 
human needs, but this is just a prerequisite to be able to sell and realize profits. Second, the aim of 
firms is to realize strictly positive savings and not just strictly positive profits! Think of the differ-
ence between for-profit and non-profit firms: non-profit firms also realize profits but they use this 
profit for other purpose than to realize profits again. This said, a for-profit firm does not always 
distribute all of its profits as dividend. The omnipresent profit maximization model rule allows for 
for-profit firms to distribute always all the profits, hence in the orthodox models firms are in fact 
non-profit firms. 
82 Let us call these models accounting approaches. For example: Kaleckian models, post Keynesian 
models, stock-flow consistent models, monetary circuit models. 
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None of the models where the growth imperative is due to the behaviour of 
the financial sector is appropriate to establish the growth imperative of mar-
ket economies per se. At best, all that these models can do is to establish that 
the present version of market economies with the present financial system is 
subject to the growth imperative. These models erroneously suggest that fi-
nancial reforms would eliminate capitalism’s growth imperative. 
Orthodox economists believe that all social phenomena, like growth, are the 
result of individual choice, and therefore green movements may be the cure. 
Even if it were the case, in order to get zero growth from now on, these econ-
omists should explain what would make the same free agents to change their 
behaviour in a concerted way after some centuries and not to choose availa-
ble options that lead to growth. Furthermore, why these agents have not cho-
sen the options leading to zero growth in the past? As to the “strength” of 
this orthodox explication, the same logic applies if we turn upside down the 
problem. That is, if the observed empirical fact were zero growth capitalism, 
and we were to expect the black swan of growing capitalism, we should ex-
plain why free agents were to change their behaviour from now on.83 
In brief, for-profit firms’ and commercial banks’ aim of realizing strictly pos-
itive net retained earnings in monetary terms linked to the habitual simplifi-
cations of considering proportional steady states and non-negative savings 
for all economic agents imply that the capitalist system so defined is subject 
to a double growth imperative in nominal terms stemming from the behav-
iour of for-profit firms on the one hand and from the behaviour of commer-
cial banks on the other hand. Would a financial reform eliminate commercial 
banks as proposed in the Chicago plan84 or just reduce their importance85, the 
pace of nominal growth needed for the normal functioning of the economy 
would decline. This proposition says nothing on real growth – though intui-
tively, one expects real growth, too.  
                                                     
83 This logic is frightening: communism and fascism also wanted to change people who not fitted 
into the system. Should “non-green” people be eliminated? 
84 See for example Benes, J., & Kumhof, M. (2012). IMF working paper: The Chicago plan revis-
ited. WP12/202, August. 
85 See for example Barrdear, John and Kumhof, Michael (2016): The Macroeconomics of Central 
Bank Issued Digital Currencies (July 18, 2016). Bank of England Working Paper No. 605.  
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Béla Pataki, Pál Danyi 
3. Innovation management; entrepreneurial 
mindset at large corporates 
This section focuses on some important company-level aspects of innova-
tion. First, we will distinguish the basic types of innovation that are present 
in the life of companies. Then we will describe the theory of disruptive inno-
vation, explaining how innovation can be used to modify business models 
depending on the relation between the performance of the technologies con-
cerned and customer needs. Afterward, through the collective genius theory, 
we will explore what kind of organisational cultures encourage innovation. 
The chapter on entrepreneurship and intrapreneurship will discuss how an 
organisation can stimulate innovation on both organisational and individual 
levels. Since innovative ideas may also come from outside the company and 
be used outside the company, we will discuss the possibilities of open inno-
vation as well. 
Béla Pataki  
3.1. Types of Innovation 
Schumpeter, who created the concept of innovation, identified five basic 
types86: 
• introduction of new products, 
• introduction of new methods of production, 
• opening of new markets, 
• development of new sources of supply for raw materials or other in-
puts, 
• creation of new market structures in the industry. 
Nowadays, we use a modified version of this list proposed by Schumpeter, 
and we distinguish the following four types87: 
• product innovation, 
• process innovation, 
• marketing innovation, 
                                                     
86 Oslo Manual (2005): 3rd ed. Paris: OECD & Eurostat, p. 29. 
87 Oslo Manual. op. cit. pp. 47–52. 
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• organisational innovation. 
The meaning of the term ‘product’ must be clarified, as it can be understood 
in two different ways. When the expression ‘product and/or service’ is used, 
the concept of a product does not include services, only physical goods (ob-
jects, livestock). According to the other approach, ‘[m]any people think a 
product is tangible, but technically a product is anything that can be offered 
to a market to satisfy a want or need, including physical goods, services, ex-
periences, events, persons, places, properties, organisations, information, and 
ideas.’88 The latter interpretation includes both physical goods and services 
in the concept of a product (see, for example, the concept of banking prod-
uct). We have adopted the second, broader interpretation. 
Considering its content, technology can be classified either as product tech-
nology or process technology. Product technology refers to what is created. 
Product concepts, specifications, designs, application engineering, or after-
sales services, for example, are issues of product technology. Process tech-
nology refers to how something is created. Equipment and tooling, the eval-
uation and selection of the inputs of the production and their suppliers, man-
ufacturing or service systems and technologies, logistics, quality manage-
ment, and maintenance, for example, are issues of process technology. Con-
sequently, technological innovation also has two types: product innovation 
and process innovation. This means that the first two items of both lists pre-
sented above, i.e. product innovation and process innovation, together make 
up the concept of technological innovation. 
In companies manufacturing physical goods, usually, there is a clear distinc-
tion between product and process technologies, in services companies, how-
ever, that distinction is not always so clear, since service provision, for the 
most part, is the implementation of a process. Consequently, it is mainly in 
the case of physical goods that the concepts of product and process innova-
tion can be clearly distinguished, while in the case of services carrying out 
different processes for the customers, it is far more difficult and sometimes 
even impossible. 
Innovation in companies is characterized by the following features89: 
• Innovation is associated with uncertainty: it is not known what the re-
sult of the innovation activities will be (e.g. success of the product, 
                                                     
88 Kotler, Philip and Keller, Kevin Lane (2016): Marketing management. 15th ed. Harlow, Essex, 
England: Pearson, p. 389. 
89 Oslo Manual. op. cit. pp. 34–35. 
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process, marketing or organisational method, and how much time or 
resources will be needed). 
• Innovation involves an investment (salaries, costs of fixed and intangi-
ble assets, materials and services, etc.) that may yield potential returns 
in the future. 
• Innovation is subject to spillovers. The benefits of innovation are rarely 
appropriated only by the inventing company. Other companies that 
adopt the original innovation can also benefit from it. Imitation costs 
can be substantially lower than development costs. 
• Innovation involves the utilization of new knowledge or a new use or 
combination of existing knowledge. New knowledge may either be gen-
erated by the innovating company or acquired externally. 
• Innovation aims at improving a company’s performance by gaining a 
competitive advantage (or maintaining competitiveness) by increasing 
sales, by reducing costs, or by improving the company’s ability to in-
novate. 
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3.2. Disruptive Innovation 
What kind of breakthrough opportunities does technological innovation—
which has changed the previous conditions of competition—offer, and how 
can they be seized? The answer can be found in the theory of disruptive in-
novation, but in order to understand it, first, we must get acquainted with the 
concepts of this theory. 
3.2.1. The Concepts of the Theory of Disruptive Innovation 
The theory of disruptive innovation uses the following concepts90. 
Innovation: The use of old or new technology to meet a new or old need for 
improving the performance of a product or process. This improvement is val-
ued by potential users, purchasers or influencers. (In this theory, influencers 
should be understood as the decision-makers inside the company.) 
According to this approach, we can talk about innovation when either the 
technology or the need to be met is new. The new need can be either a new 
                                                     
90 Paap, Jay and Katz, Ralph (2004): Anticipating disruptive innovation. Research-Technology 
Management, 48(5), pp. 13–22. 
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need of existing users or of completely new users. The novelty of the tech-
nology or the need to be met must always be considered from the perspective 
of the organisation concerned: if it is new to the organisation, then it should 
be regarded as an innovation, regardless of whether there is nothing new in 
it for others. Taking a look at the different types of innovation discussed in 
the previous chapter, we can see that the concept of innovation used in the 
theory of disruptive innovation includes technological and marketing inno-
vation but does not include organisational innovation. 
Three possible cases of technological innovation 
 Old New 
New 
  
Need 
X  
 
• Productivity: The extent to which an investment in technological inno-
vation yields a measurable change in the performance of a product or 
process. 
• Leverage: The extent to which an improvement in the performance is 
perceived as having value by users, purchasers or influencers. 
• Leverage minimum: The point at which the users, purchasers or influ-
encers of a product or process first value the performance improvement. 
• Leverage limit: The point beyond which the users, purchasers or influ-
encers of a product or process no longer value the performance improve-
ment. 
• Drivers: The performance characteristics whose leverage is the greatest 
and thus represents the major consideration by potential users, purchas-
ers or influencers when choosing a product or process. 
• Dominant driver: The driver whose leverage is the greatest. This is the 
primary aspect considered by potential users, purchasers or influencers 
when choosing between different products or processes. 
A distinction must be made between incremental and radical innovation, on 
the one hand, and sustaining and disruptive innovation, on the other. The 
comparison of incremental and radical innovation refers to how much the 
new solution is different from the old one from a technical perspective. The 
comparison of sustaining and disruptive innovation, however, does not refer 
  
 
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to innovation itself but to its market impact. Disruptive innovation disrupts 
the previous business model, i.e. what is sold, how it is produced, distributed 
and promoted, who the purchasers and competitors are. Sustaining innova-
tion, however, leaves the previous business model as it was, and enables the 
company to maintain or improve its competitive position within an un-
changed framework. Of course, the distinction between the compared cate-
gories is far from being clear, so much so that in some cases, it is arguable to 
which category an innovation belongs. 
Those who coined the term ‘disruptive innovation’ originally used it in a far 
narrower sense, meaning only cases where a smaller company with products 
falling into a lower quality and price category and with fewer resources en-
ters a higher category and becomes a competitor of larger companies there91. 
Nowadays, however, almost everyone uses this term in the broad sense men-
tioned above. Two decades after the introduction of this concept, a termino-
logical debate developed. Some consider the original, narrower interpretation 
of the term to be correct and the broader interpretation accepted by the ma-
jority to be wrong92. In the narrower sense of the term, for example, Uber’s 
mobile technological innovation was not a disruptive innovation, since there 
was no shift from a lower to a higher category, but in the broader sense, it 
should be regarded as a disruptive innovation. Their only argument for the 
narrower interpretation is that it follows the original definition of the term. 
However, the overwhelming majority thinks that the broader interpretation 
cannot and should not be changed93. In fact, if we now switched to the nar-
rower interpretation, we would be in trouble for two reasons. First, we would 
not have a term for the broader sense, and second, the overwhelming majority 
of the relevant literature of the past two decades has been written using the 
broader interpretation, and it cannot be disregarded. Since we agree with the 
majority opinion, we will also follow the usage of the majority of the relevant 
literature, i.e. the broader interpretation. 
Technologies created through disruptive innovation are called disruptive 
technologies. While disruptive innovation may mean either the process or the 
result of innovation, disruptive technology can only mean its result. 
We need two concept pairs instead of one because reality is more complex 
than stating simply that incremental innovations are sustaining, and radical 
                                                     
91 Bower, Joseph L. and Christensen, Clayton M. (1995): Disruptive Technologies: Catching the 
Wave. Harvard Business Review, 73(1), pp. 43–53. 
92 Christensen, C. M., Raynor, M. E., and McDonald, R. (2015): What Is Disruptive Innovation? 
Harvard Business Review, 93(12), pp. 44–53. 
93 The Disruption Debate (2016): Harvard Business Review, 94(3), pp. 16–17. 
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innovations are disruptive. The Wankel rotary engine, for example, was a 
radical innovation, since technically it is completely different from the usual 
internal combustion engines. Nevertheless, in business terms and taking into 
account the entire automotive sector, it was not really disruptive, since during 
its history of several decades it only played a marginal role and proved to be 
a sustaining innovation. At the same time, the series of incremental innova-
tions of Diesel engines, uninterrupted for decades, has significantly modified 
the balance of power in the competition within the automotive sector and has 
finally become disruptive. 
The theory that we will now present focuses on disruptive innovation because 
it is this type of innovation that may turn the balance of power of the compe-
tition upside down and offer innovative companies a major breakthrough op-
portunity. Since this theory compares the performance of the technology con-
cerned with customer needs, we must get acquainted with the S curve de-
scribing technological life cycles. 
The S curve of technological progress during the life cycle 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The S curve shows the evolution of the performance of the technology 
against time if the development process is continuous. In this theoretical sec-
tion, we will only represent the time spent on development; therefore, certain 
authors label the horizontal axis as ‘cumulated development effort’. Should 
the development process be interrupted for any reason, the curve would con-
tinue horizontally and would only start to slope upwards when the suspended 
development is resumed. For reasons of simplification, we will draw the 
S curves assuming an uninterrupted development process and disregard any 
potential interruption; thus, the horizontal axis can be taken as the time axis. 
Performance 
Time 
Limit 
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Of course, in real life, development does not follow a continuous curve, it is 
more like a series of discrete points, each of them representing a new, more 
advanced version of the given technology. The approximating curve is drawn 
by us following these points so that we can get a clearer picture of the devel-
opment. 
The limit refers to the fact that the laws of nature limit the possible develop-
ment of the performance of a given technology. It is impossible to ‘raise the 
limit’, since it is immovable, that is why it is a limit. In literature, we usually 
find the term ‘physical limit’, while ‘limit’ without any adjective rarely ap-
pears. Here we have chosen to follow the minority usage because the adjec-
tive ‘physical’ applied to the term ‘limit’ is not the best choice since the limit 
to the performance increase deriving from the laws of nature may also be a 
chemical, biological, etc. limit. 
3.2.2. The Nature of Disruptive Technology Substitution 
After having clarified the basic concepts and the S curve, we can now begin 
the detailed description of the theory of disruptive innovation94. New tech-
nologies replace old ones when the following two conditions are fulfilled at 
the same time: 
• there is an unmet need in a (dominant) driver; and 
• the current technology is unable to address it. 
There are three patterns of substitution where these two forces above lead to 
pressure for disruptive technology substitution: 
1. the performance of the current technology (the S curve) approaches 
its limit; 
2. a new (dominant) driver emerges, but the current technology is inca-
pable of meeting this need; 
3. changes in the environment create a new (dominant) driver. 
 
Let us now take a look at the three above possibilities. 
1. In this case, the development of the existing technology—i.e. the S curve 
of its performance—reaches its final stage, where its limit stemming from 
the laws of nature makes it impossible for it to meet any existing higher need 
in terms of the (dominant) driver. 
                                                     
94 Paap, Jay and Katz, Ralph. op. cit. 
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2. In this case, the needs in terms of the previous (dominant) driver cease to 
grow, which means that the leverage limit has been reached. Another existing 
driver becomes dominant, in terms of which the existing technology is unable 
to meet the increased needs. 
An example of this is the ‘pixel competition’, i.e. the battle between digital 
cameras in the field of the resolution, which, after some time, became an end 
in itself and pointless for the overwhelming majority of users. Therefore, the 
focus of the competition shifted to the improvement of other features: reduc-
ing image noise by using a bigger sensor, increasing the zoom with reduced 
distortion, etc. 
There is often significant productivity remaining in the old technology when 
the leverage limit has already been exceeded; therefore, some manufacturing 
companies continue to insist on its further development. This is unlikely to 
provide returns, however, since customers are not interested in that feature 
any longer and focus on another driver instead. Any company that has a clear 
idea of the leverage limit and the drivers that are not yet dominant but may 
become dominant can gain an advantage by realizing targeted developments 
ahead of their competitors. 
3. Changes in the environment of the innovation my generate new drivers. 
Such changes may include changes in the economic or regulatory environ-
ment, the development of new technologies that allow for the creation of new 
things, changes in the way products are used, the adoption of new technolo-
gies by customers, or changes in customers’ activities, goals and preferences, 
etc. The old technology is often able to meet the new needs; thus, no tech-
nology substitution occurs. However, if it is unable to meet such needs, the 
search for a suitable new technology will begin. As opposed to the previous 
type of innovation, here it is not a previously existing need that becomes a 
(dominant) driver but a completely new driver comes into existence. 
A good example is how mobile photography has spread. Initially, no one ever 
thought of taking photos with a phone, but when it became possible through 
an incremental innovation—the combination of a mobile phone and a digital 
camera (both had already existed, and each of them had been a radical inno-
vation on its own)—, users got to like it, thus a new driver emerged, and the 
camera built-in mobile phones became a disruptive innovation in the market. 
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While the first case is evident to all since it is generally known when the 
performance of existing technology has reached its limit and must be re-
placed by another technology with a higher limit, in the second and third 
cases it is not clear at all what the object of development should be. 
3.2.3. Anticipating Disruptive Innovation 
In all three cases outlined above, the successful management of disruptive 
innovations requires that the following factors be taken into account95. 
• We have to understand the essence of the dynamics of innovation and 
the emergence of new technologies: there is an unmet need (old or 
new), and the technology currently in use (if any) is unable to meet that 
need. 
• When dealing with customers, it is not enough to focus solely on what 
they ask for now. It is much more important to focus on what they need. 
We must identify drivers that will emerge among the existing drivers 
when the currently dominant drivers reach their leverage limit or those 
that will emerge as new as a result of the changes in the environment. 
• We should not replace any old technology just because it has reached 
its limit of performance. Unless there are significant needs that the ex-
isting technology is unable to meet, there is no reason to replace it with 
another one simply because the latter is new, i.e. ‘better’. 
• Nevertheless, it is not enough to focus solely on how we can use our 
existing technologies to address old drivers that are becoming ever 
stronger. There can be new technologies that not only deliver perfor-
mance at the leverage limit of the existing drivers (even well below 
their leverage limit) but also allow for meeting the leverage minimum 
of new drivers. 
• In order to anticipate and manage technological change, we must: 
– collect information on changing needs, technologies, customers, 
and competitors; 
– take into consideration not only the importance of needs but also 
their leverage, as well as the limit of the development of technolo-
gies and their substitution for new technologies; 
– ensure that when project proposals are approved, priority be given 
to the early-stage and comprehensive exploration of the possibilities 
offered by potential new technologies; 
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– adopt development mechanisms that maintain the balance between 
the operation of our current business model and the innovation 
aimed at ensuring future competitiveness. 
 
Conclusion of this theory: although we cannot predict the future, we can an-
ticipate certain changes and prepare for them by focusing on the drivers of 
technology development. In order to ensure early-stage information and 
rapid reaction, there is always scope and need for even more extensive and 
comprehensive technology scanning. Any new technology can bring serious 
changes, for which proper preparation is advisable. 
 
Béla Pataki  
3.3. Organisational Requirements of Innovation 
Previously, the generally accepted position was that true innovators were few 
since most people were not really creative96. Recent research results, how-
ever, have revealed that most people are capable of coming up with original 
ideas if the organisation they work for has a sufficiently non-conformist cul-
ture. 
3.3.1. Collective Genius 
Nowadays, the organisational culture focusing on the ‘collective genius’ is 
regarded as the breeding ground for corporate innovation97. If people are 
given opportunities, encouragement and motivation to come up with new 
ideas, they will produce a surprising amount of good proposals and ideas. It 
has been found that there are significantly smaller differences between peo-
ple in terms of creativity and innovativeness than it was previously thought. 
The reason for which the apparently non-innovative and the silent majority 
did not come up with new, creative ideas was not their inability to do so, but 
the fact that the organisational culture and leadership style unfavourable to 
innovation discouraged them even from giving it a try. In a culture promoting 
and rewarding originality, however, a surprising number of good ideas 
emerge and are put to good use. For example, since the Dutch subsidiary of 
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the Tata Steel company group had introduced an organised suggestion pro-
grammed, it achieved great results, even saving USD 750,000 in one year 
alone. A typical employee of the company would make 6-7 suggestions 
every year and see 3-4 adopted98. 
Innovation usually emerges when diverse people work together to produce a 
wide range of ideas, which are then refined and developed into even more 
novel ideas through give-and-take and often heated debates. This means that 
collaboration must also include passionate opposition. It might be difficult to 
bear frictions and clashes of ideas since they generate tension and stress. Or-
ganisations often disapprove of and try to minimize disagreements, but by 
doing so, they only stifle the flow of ideas and meaningful discussions 
needed for innovation. Leaders must manage this tension by creating an at-
mosphere that is both supportive, so that people be willing to share their tal-
ent, and confrontational enough so that they can improve the existing ideas 
and come up with new ones. 
Innovation also requires us to try again and learn from our mistakes and fail-
ures. In most organisations, people like to proceed systematically towards the 
desired outcome: by setting a goal, preparing a plan, assigning responsibili-
ties, working step by step, and monitoring progress until reaching the goal. 
Innovation, however, cannot be managed in this manner: implementation is 
not enough; improvisation is also essential. 
In order to produce something new and valuable, we must leave the ‘ei-
ther/or’ approach behind and move on to the ‘both/and’ approach. Groups 
and their leaders often make decisions about the solution of problems through 
domination or compromise, which leads to less-than-inventive solutions. In-
novation requires the integration of ideas into more novel and better solu-
tions, even if, at first sight, they seemed to be mutually exclusive. Leaders 
must show enough patience to enable the members of all parts of the organ-
isation to produce great ideas. 
The community’s will and capability to innovate are essential, and it is the 
duty of the manager responsible for innovation to create this combination of 
willingness and ability. Both conditions comprise three factors99. 
Willingness 
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Innovative organisations must maintain a community spirit that relies on the 
following three elements: 
Purpose 
In this context, the purpose is not what exactly the group is doing but who is 
in it and why it exists. A collective identity must be created, and members 
must focus on a more general, superior and attractive common goal. Purpose 
makes people willing to take risks and do the hard work inherent in innova-
tion. 
For example, a study of the collective identity of Volkswagen employees 
found that people were proud of VW’s role in driving technological and eco-
nomic progress and they were excited to be part of the effort aimed at build-
ing one of the industry’s leading brands. 
Shared Values 
To form a community, group members must agree on what they consider 
important. Such values influence the group’s decision-making priorities as 
well as individual and collective thought and action. Each community has its 
own values, however, there are four values that all truly innovative organisa-
tions cherish: bold ambition, the responsibility to the community, collabora-
tion, and learning. 
Rules of Engagement 
Purpose and values, together with the rules of engagement in joint work, keep 
group members focused on the most important things, encourage activities 
that foster innovation, and discourage unproductive behaviour. Rules of en-
gagement fall into two categories. The first category contains the rules appli-
cable to the interactions between people: group members are expected to 
show mutual trust, mutual respect and mutual influence. All members of the 
community have a voice, and even the least experienced members should be 
allowed to influence decisions. The second category contains the rules appli-
cable to people’s way of thinking: everyone is expected to question every-
thing, be data-driven, and have a holistic view. 
 
Ability 
The willingness of the organisation is necessary but not sufficient for suc-
cessful innovation. Companies also need the ability to innovate. That re-
quires developing three types of innovation capabilities. 
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Creative Abrasion 
The group must be able to generate new ideas through discourse and debate. 
Instead of obediently following the instructions, the members must debate 
and argue. Creative abrasion has two essential ingredients: intellectual diver-
sity and intellectual conflict. 
Creative Agility 
The organisation must be able to test new ideas quickly with multiple exper-
iments. This must be followed by a reflection on and learning from the results 
of the experiments. Then plans must be adjusted on the basis of the newly 
acquired knowledge, and new tests and experiments must follow. This cycle 
must be repeated until a good solution is found or it becomes clear that the 
basic idea is not going to work. 
Creative Resolution 
The organisation must be able to make integrative decisions that combine 
disparate or even opposing ideas. 
3.3.2. Creativity and Discipline 
According to a frequent misconception, an innovative culture means nothing 
more than tolerating failure, willingness to experiment, a sense of psycho-
logical safety, active collaboration, and non-hierarchical governance. How-
ever, this is only half of the truth: all these factors must be counteracted with 
strict and less entertaining behavioural patterns100. 
Tolerance for Failure but No Tolerance for Incompetence 
Since innovation involves the exploration of unknown terrain, it is just obvi-
ous that tolerance for failure is an important characteristic of innovative or-
ganisations. Nevertheless, they do not tolerate incompetence: they set high-
performance standards for their members and recruit the best professionals 
they can. Experimenting with risky ideas that ultimately fail is fine, but a lack 
of expertise, negligence, sloppy thinking, bad habits, wrong working meth-
ods, and poor management are unacceptable. 
Tolerance for failure requires a staff made up of excellent professionals. The 
development of new technologies or business models is fraught with uncer-
tainty, and ‘failures’ under such circumstances are valuable learning oppor-
tunities. However, failures can also derive from poorly thought-out designs, 
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flawed analysis, a lack of transparency or poor management. Google, for ex-
ample, can encourage risk-taking and tolerate failures because it can be sure 
that most of its employees are fully competent since each year the company 
gets over two million applications for five thousand positions. 
Maintaining a healthy balance between tolerating failures and eliminating 
incompetence is not easy. A series of interviews with over 100 employees of 
Amazon included stories of employees crying at their desks amid enormous 
performance pressures. One reason that makes striking a balance difficult is 
that the causes of failure are not always clear. 
Willingness to Experiment but Highly Disciplined 
Organisations that embrace experimentation are accustomed to uncertainty 
and ambiguity. They tend to experiment to learn rather than to create a prod-
uct that is immediately marketable. However, without discipline, almost an-
ything can be labeled as an experiment. Discipline-oriented organisations se-
lect experiments with due consideration, on the basis of their potential learn-
ing value, and they design them in a way that they can yield as much infor-
mation as possible compared to the costs. Right at the outset, they establish 
clear criteria for deciding whether to move forward with, modify, or kill an 
experiment. They face the facts generated by the experiments in an unbiased 
manner, i.e. they admit if their initial hypothesis was wrong, and they are 
willing to kill or significantly modify even those projects that once seemed 
promising. Being disciplined about killing unsuccessful projects reduces the 
risk of trying new things. Senior executives must set an example, for in-
stance, by demonstrating a willingness to kill projects they personally initi-
ated or to change their minds on the basis of the data generated by the exper-
iments. 
Psychologically Safe but Brutally Candid 
In a psychologically safe organisational climate, individuals can speak 
openly about problems without fear of reprisal. Psychological safety is a two-
way street: it is safe for us to criticize the ideas of others, and it is also safe 
for them to criticize mine – whether they are higher or lower in the organisa-
tion. Unvarnished candor is critical to innovation because it fosters the de-
velopment of new ideas. 
In some organisations, confronting one another about different ideas, meth-
ods, and results, as well as sharp criticism is all part of the game. Everyone 
is expected to be able to defend their proposals with data and logic. In other 
organisations, the climate is overly polite, and words are carefully selected, 
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criticism is muffled (at least in the open) because to challenge too strongly is 
to risk looking like one is not a team player. 
When it comes to innovation, the candid organisation will always outperform 
the nice one. The latter confuses politeness and niceness with respect. Frank-
ness is not opposed to respecting, in fact, frank criticism is one of the hall-
marks of respect. We can only accept a devastating critique of our own ideas 
if we respect the contrary opinion of others. 
Brutally candid organisations are not necessarily the most comfortable envi-
ronments in which to work. To outsiders and newcomers, the atmosphere 
may seem to be aggressive and hard-edged. People do not mince their words. 
Everything anyone says is scrutinized by the others, regardless of the per-
son’s position. 
Building a culture of the open debate may be challenging in organisations 
where people tend to shy away from confrontation or where debate is viewed 
as violating norms of civility. Senior executives need to set an example by 
criticizing others’ ideas constructively yet without being abrasive. They can 
encourage this culture of debate by demanding criticism of their own ideas 
and proposals. 
Collaboration but with Individual Accountability 
People who work in a collaborative culture find it natural to seek help from 
colleagues, regardless of whether providing such help is included in their 
colleagues’ formal job descriptions. They have a sense of collective respon-
sibility for their work. Nevertheless, collaboration often gets confused with 
consensus. An exaggerated focus on reaching consensus can be detrimental 
to rapid decision-making. Someone has to make a decision and be accounta-
ble for it. Committees might prepare decisions, teams might put forward pro-
posals, but at the end of the day, specific individuals have to make critical 
decisions—deciding about product features, the selection of suppliers, strat-
egies, marketing plans, among others. 
Collaboration and personal accountability complement each other. Any de-
cision-maker shutting themselves off from feedback or from collaboration 
with who could help them would commit an error. 
Flat but Strong Leadership 
An organisational chart shows the structural flatness of a company but re-
veals nothing about its cultural flatness. In culturally flat organisations, peo-
ple are given ample scope for taking actions, making decisions, and voicing 
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their opinions. Deference is based on competence, not the title. Culturally 
flat organisations tend to respond more quickly to rapidly changing circum-
stances because decision-making is decentralized and closer to the sources 
of relevant information. They typically generate a richer diversity of ideas 
than hierarchical organisations, because they tap the knowledge, expertise, 
and perspectives of a larger number of contributors. 
A lack of hierarchy, however, does not mean a lack of leadership. Flat organ-
isations require stronger leadership than hierarchical ones. If the leaders fail 
to set and communicate clear strategic priorities and to give directions, flat 
organisations slide into chaos. Both Amazon and Google are very flat organ-
isations in which decision-making and accountability are delegated to lower 
levels and employees at all levels enjoy a high degree of autonomy to pursue 
their innovative ideas. At the same time, both companies have extremely 
strong and visionary leaders, who clearly communicate the goals and how 
their respective organisations should operate. 
Flatness does not mean that the management distances itself from operational 
details or projects. On the contrary, flatness allows leaders to be closer to 
them. They must be capable of articulating compelling visions and clearly 
explaining the strategies while simultaneously being competent with tech-
nical and operational issues. Steve Jobs was a great example of such a leader: 
he laid out strong visions for Apple while being passionately focused on tech-
nical and design issues. As regards employees, flatness requires them to de-
velop their own leadership capacities, to be comfortable with taking inde-
pendent actions, and to be accountable for their decisions. 
There are three obstacles that make it difficult to build and sustain an inno-
vative culture101. First, an innovative culture requires a combination of ap-
parently contradictory behaviours and, thus, might create confusion. For ex-
ample, if a major project fails, it is difficult to decide how to react. Should 
we hold someone accountable? Should we have made different decisions? 
What can we learn from this failure? And so on. 
Second, certain behaviours required for an innovative culture can be em-
braced more easily than others. Those who view innovation as a free-for-all 
will see discipline as an unnecessary constraint on their creativity, while 
those who like the anonymity of consensus will be reluctant to accept per-
sonal accountability. 
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Third, innovative cultures are systems of interdependent behaviours, which 
cannot be implemented in a piecemeal fashion, only together and concur-
rently. Behavioural patterns complement and reinforce each other. Highly 
competent people find it natural to make decisions and to be accountable; 
thus, their ‘failures’ are likely to yield learning rather than waste. Disciplined 
experimentation will cost less and yield more useful information. Accounta-
bility makes it easier to become flat, and in flat organisations, information 
flows faster, which leads to quicker and smarter decision-making. 
Leaders must make it clear to their entire organisation that an innovative cul-
ture is not all fun and games, but it also entails discipline and responsibility. 
They must be aware that there are no short cuts in building an innovative 
culture. Breaking the organisation into smaller units or creating autonomous 
‘skunk works’ can be similar to innovative start-up culture, yet they rarely 
work. Breaking a bureaucratic organisation into smaller units might be use-
ful, but it does not magically create the required entrepreneurial spirit. That 
requires a change in values, norms, and behaviours as well. The challenge of 
building innovative cultures should not be underestimated. 
Innovative cultures can be unstable, and when the signs of imbalance appear, 
intervention is needed to restore balance. This requires leaders to demon-
strate, with their own efforts, the ability to strike that balance themselves. 
 
Pál Danyi 
3.4. Corporate Entrepreneurship and 
Intrapreneurship 
One of the most crucial challenges for large brand-companies is staying en-
trepreneurial and innovative. Large companies are typically considered inef-
fective, not agile enough compared to small innovative companies or start-
ups. This issue will be studied here both from corporate and individual per-
spective: not just the entire company has the responsibility of making organ-
isations more successful in entrepreneurship, but also employees, who can 
act like entrepreneurs within a company. The latter type of employee is also 
called intrapreneur, and their approach is intrapreneurship. A follow-up 
question naturally derives here: is there any real chance for an employee to 
become an intrapreneur within a large company? What are the criteria that 
make a large corporation receptive and supportive enough for intrapreneur-
ship? 
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This chapter analyses the most important elements of entrepreneurship and 
intrapreneurship. Although the two concepts are very similar and share the 
same essence of innovation, they express different approaches. Corporate 
entrepreneurship is about how companies can stimulate employees to show 
more innovation and initiatives to a company’s success102 Intrapreneurship 
is about the implementation of innovations in organisations, where the adap-
tation is initiated and wanted by an employee in a bottom-up way103. We will 
focus here more on the intrapreneurial side and explains how the entrepre-
neurial environment can stimulate intrapreneurship. 
According to the serial entrepreneur Kenneth Morse, who is also the founder 
and managing director of the MIT Entrepreneurship Center, innovation is 
invention plus commercialization104. (Other sources characterize innovation 
as innovation + implementation, but we stick with the previous definition.) 
We also consider two additional aspects, corporate culture and organisa-
tion, that significantly impact the intrapreneurial potential and capability of 
a company. Summarizing the conceptual framework, we will demonstrate 
how these four aspects significantly contribute to the success of entrepre-
neurship and intrapreneurship in a large corporation. 
 
Innovation = Invention + Commercialization 
The innovation capability of a company is determined by the invention ca-
pability and commercialization capability. In general, a small startup is 
stronger in the invention, but weaker in commercialization than a larger com-
pany. The employees of a small company can view the entire process as a 
whole, so the inventors will participate in the implementation stage as well, 
fully understanding the goals and purpose throughout the entire life cycle. In 
a large company, however, the roles are much more segregated, so employ-
ees who make inventions have no clear understanding of how the company 
may or may not commercialize the conceptualized new product.  
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The conceptual framework for Corporate Intrapreneurship 
 
A company, which wants to be intrapreneurial, must provide the proper en-
vironment. This activity can be supported by many direct and indirect levers, 
such as organisation, culture, and tools. Based on several decades of experi-
ence of the author, the most important activities are listed in the following 
table. These lists may not be complete but demonstrate the complexity and 
difficulty of why it is not natural for companies to ensure intrapreneurship. 
Best practice levers for intrapreneurship 
Organisation Culture Specific Tools 
Dedicated organisa-
tion 
Motivation with bonus Competitions, dedi-
cated events 
Clear process of inno-
vation 
“Feel the company like 
yours” campaign 
Supporting software 
Incubator Communication of best 
ideas 
Trainings 
 Work environment Agile development 
 Free time allocated to 
new business develop-
ment 
 
 
In the following sections, we explain these activities with examples.  
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3.4.1. Organisation 
Dedicated organisation 
When Magyar Telekom (MT) was completely restructured in 2007 as a result 
of the merger of 5 telecom companies, a new large innovation business unit 
was founded. It was called ‘ABCD business unit’, standing for Alternative 
Businesses and Content Development. MT recognized that there was a need 
for a separate, independent business unit, which could become the com-
pany’s innovation engine of growth, including the responsibility of most 
R&D activities.105 ABCD had the task to recognize the complex services that 
customers require, and bundle together device (e.g. mobile phones or TV 
sets), access (internet or cable), and content (video on demand, mobile apps, 
etc.). The goal was to increase customer spend by entering into new, non-
core businesses (e.g., iwiw) that could utilize and leverage MT’s existing 
core assets. It was also an important task to develop attractive content to cus-
tomers in order to raise the need for core telco services and to boost customer 
experience. Although this business unit only existed for two years, it devel-
oped the concept for new non-core services such as electricity and gas pro-
visioning in the Hungarian market. 
Clear process of innovation 
Let us investigate invention and commercialization from the process ap-
proach. Almost every author in the world of start-ups (Blank, Aulet, Oster-
walder, Vecsenyi) has a different model for entrepreneurship, so there is no 
generally accepted one “silver-bullet” framework. Therefore, we have the 
freedom to suggest the following five-step model, which is compliant with 
the steps of the models characterized by the above-mentioned authors. 
Invention 1. Ideation (Idea Generation) 
2. Conceptualization and Business Modeling 
Commercializa-
tion 
3. Validation and Market Research 
4. Product Development (Lean, Agile) 
5. Delivery and Utilization 
Setting up Innovation Labs and Incubators 
Magyar Telekom was one of the first large Hungarian companies which rec-
ognized that establishing an innovation lab can serve not just as a CSR activ-
ity but also add value to the company’s own internal innovation engine. 
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Kitchen Budapest (KIBU) was founded in 2007, as an auxiliary unit to 
ABCD. The key concept was becoming independent from the mother com-
pany, so making telecom or IT related concepts or products was not a re-
quirement. It also contained a ‘maker space’ workshop where the tenants 
could immediately fabricate the working prototype of their ideas. The biggest 
success of KIBU came right at the start: they incubated Prezi106 and gave 
both financial support of 30 million forints107 and user feedback to them.  
K&H “Start It” is another example of how a large brand can support intra-
preneurship. After 2015 more and more Hungarian companies established 
their incubator to get closer to the startup ecosystem and utilize – indirectly 
– the results of such labs. KBC, one of the leading bank chains in Europe, 
decided to launch the Start It incubator in Hungary in 2017 after they made 
huge success with such incubators in Belgium. Their purpose is primarily 
CSR, to demonstrate their commitment to innovation, new ideas, helping 
young talents.108  
KIBU and Start It are examples that do not require for their startups to fit the 
industry of their mother companies, telecom or banking, respectively. How-
ever, there are other examples in the world, e.g., Intel’s Venture Capital unit 
(Intel Capital) which supported primarily such startups that worked in the IT 
industry: “Intel Capital focuses on making equity investments and acquisi-
tions in support of Intel's strategic interests and invests in hardware, software 
and services companies in several market segments, including computing, 
networking, and wireless communications.”109. 
3.4.2. Culture 
Intrapreneurial culture can boost the innovation performance of a company. 
As Záboji110 points out “Culture of an enterprise is determined exclusively 
by the employees. There is a need for a certain easy-going mentality, so that 
good mood and laughing should not disappear due to the stress caused by 
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failures. Those companies, which do not provide room for ideas and pro-
posals to change, will not motivate for risk-taking and therefore making er-
rors. These companies will have no chance in the fight for hiring an enlight-
ened workforce of excellent performance.” 
Company culture is a complex concept, but there are several success criteria 
that should be followed when companies want to be effective in involving 
their employees in the internal entrepreneurship process. Some examples are 
as follows: 
Motivation with bonus 
An easy-to-implement, typical way to motivate employees is including en-
trepreneurial activities into the bonus assessment system. If employees had 
creative ideas that were successfully implemented, special compensation 
could be provided. At Magyar Telekom, such competitions offered stocks for 
the winners. Not just employees, but also their managers should be motivated 
by bonuses; otherwise, managers will not be supportive enough to propagate 
the innovative initiatives. 
As far as the corporate culture of mergers and acquisitions is concerned, in-
ternational experience says that if you buy a startup, you have to leave them 
to work with their rules, with their motivation system, and do not try to melt 
them into the culture of the large corporation. An informal discussion with 
one of the employees of Ustream confirmed this pattern: one year after the 
company was acquired by IBM, they still worked in a separate(d) organisa-
tional unit, keeping their own, previously developed SME culture. 
“Feel the company like yours” campaign 
An important strategic exercise is running campaigns that explain the im-
portance of innovation and an entrepreneurial mindset for the employees. 
One of the best practices is focusing on the engagement and involvement 
factors of employees. ‘The company is yours’ feeling is very close to the 
commitment of start-up owners: they want to make a success of their busi-
ness. 
Communication of best ideas 
Communication is an extremely important element of corporate entrepre-
neurship for all stakeholders. For all employees, the message should include 
that the company is capable of making a successful business from innovative, 
new ideas. For the employees who participated in the idea generation or the 
entrepreneurial process, communication must be acknowledging. Also, the 
communication must be motivating for all employees emphasizing that “you 
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can do it”, i.e. everybody has the opportunity to create new, fantastic prod-
ucts or businesses. 
Work environment 
It started late 1990s during the dotcom boom when new startups realized in 
Silicon Valley that highly skilled, excellent techies prefer a relaxed work en-
vironment. So, if they wanted to attract them, the special atmosphere had to 
be provided for the employees, including amenities such as foosball tables, 
video games, free soda and lunch, no ties, flexible working hours, happy 
hours on Fridays, or even gym passes. This was the pattern and the reason 
for how the Hungarian startup-star Prezi furnished its office in Budapest: to 
attract the best young IT professionals and make the offices loveable at the 
same time. The premise was transformed from an old telephone switching 
center and the designers did a fantastic job.111  
Free time allocated to new business development 
Google’s innovation machine is revolutionary. They simply built innovation 
into their organisational design. Technical employees are required to spend 
20% of their time on the technical projects of their own choosing. One em-
ployee remembers that when he started his career at Google, he complained 
to a friend about a Gmail bug: “He told me to fix it myself, pointing me to a 
document on how to bring up the Gmail development environment on my 
workstation. The next day my code was reviewed by Gmail engineers, and 
then I submitted it. A week later, my change was live.”112  
3.4.3. Specific Tools 
Idea generation events and systems 
One of the best practices of large companies is organising competitions for 
collecting ideas on new business initiatives. Magyar Telekom, after the 2007 
restructuring, had regular internal idea generation campaigns to collect the 
innovative ideas of employees. ABCD business unit assessed these ideas and 
provided prizes to the best ideas. The implementation of these ideas is an-
other topic.  
Unfortunately, by the author’s personal experience, companies fail to de-
velop new businesses from collected ideas because they do not have well-
                                                     
111 Michal (2016): Inside Prezi’s New Budapest Office. https://www.office-
lovin.com/2016/08/05/inside-prezis-new-budapest-office/ (1/22/2020) 
112 Iyer, B., Davenport, T.H. (2008): Reverse Engineering Google’s Innovation Machine. Harvard 
Business Review, April 2008 
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defined processes for such initiatives: e.g., they do not involve the idea con-
tributor into the development stage, they do not make a proper market re-
search before going into production. Another typical problem is when em-
ployees suggest new ideas to their bosses, their line managers, who are not 
motivated enough to understand and evaluate the idea properly; it is much 
easier for the managers to simply forget about the ideas than spending time 
on their conceptualization. 
Google has introduced a special idea management system: “employees can 
e-mail ideas for new products, processes, and company improvements to a 
companywide suggestion box. Every employee can then comment on and 
rate the ideas.”113 With this feedback process, the company can predict if a 
new idea will be successful or not among the users: the thousands of review 
comments can nicely simulate the behaviour of the larger market.  
Supporting software 
Be-novative.com is a start-up company specializing in idea generation and 
assessment. Their customers are mainly large companies that want to gener-
ate new business ideas by involving their employees in this entrepreneurial 
step. Be-novative is a platform that “lets you run inspiring ideation sessions 
and connects diverse groups of people to solve challenges on a global scale. 
It fuses gamification, crowdsourcing and design thinking, delivering break-
through solutions.”114 Probably the most useful feature of this platform is 
able to establish a virtual space online where ideas can stimulate the ideas of 
others. The feedbacks are aggregated real-time and mapped on a two-dimen-
sional dashboard with free-to-choose axes such as feasibility and impact or 
novelty and marketability. 
Trainings 
Companies rarely organise trainings on fostering entrepreneurship. However, 
trainings on entrepreneurial mindset and performance can significantly con-
tribute to the innovative performance of an organisation. If employees un-
derstand the purpose and importance of intrapreneurship, and understand the 
tools and assets they can utilize, then the huge potential of employee creativ-
ity and commitment can be liberated. 
Agile development 
Agile software development and project management have been with us for 
almost two decades. They are compulsory methods of delivering innovation. 
                                                     
113 Iyer, Davenport: i.m. 
114 Be-novative.com (2020): Home page, https://www.be-novative.com/ (2/3/2020) 
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We only want to emphasize here the most important three features that are 
fundamental to entrepreneurship: iterative; incremental; and full teams. Iter-
ation makes a product or process development fast and agile when reacting 
to new demands or requirements. Fast feedback loops, review circles can en-
sure that development is on the right track. Incremental means that develop-
ments can be segmented into functional units that are being built upon each 
other. Full teams mean that every role and skill must participate in the devel-
opment process, which are related, e.g. not just developers (coders), but strat-
egists, architecture experts, marketing and sales process analyst, legal ex-
perts, and thus, problem-solving should be holistic.  
3.4.4. Case study – the intrapreneurial mindset 
77 Elektronika Ltd., with more than 700 employees, is one of the few Hun-
garian brands that could continuously enhance their entrepreneurial agility 
and performance when becoming a large high-tech corporation from a 
startup. Established in 1986 as a family business, the company reached its 
first peak in 2000 when they received the Hungarian Innovation Grand Prize 
for their blood glucose meter product family. The next worldwide success 
came after releasing their UriSed product in 2007, which is cuvette-based 
automated microscopy equipment with particle recognition for examining 
urine sediment. They could repeat their excellent innovation achievement 
again in 2016 when the company received the Innovation Grand Prize second 
time for their semi-automated urine sediment analyser (UriSed mini). 
We argue that the biggest contributor to their success is the intrapreneurial 
mindset of the company and the culture that makes entrepreneurship possible 
in the entire organisation. To understand in detail how 77 Elektronika could 
achieve such performance, we discussed the success criteria with Gabor 
Bayer, Director of Development. This section summarizes the most relevant 
statements of the semi-structured interview taken on 14 November 2019.  
Gabor Bayer joined to head 77 Elektronika’s Development in 2004 when the 
department had 30 employees. Now, in 2019, they have 100 employees.  
How are processes different now than 15 years ago?  
• Lost some of their flexibility, agility – as Mr Bayer said: „This is the 
price of growth: you have to give up flexibility e.g. by development of 
dedicated OEM products for big players in the world market. Now the 
operation is more stable, and we have much higher revenue”. 
• Time to Market: in general, time got longer, more control steps, go/no 
go decisions, much stricter international regulatory requirements. 
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• Availability of tools: To check the feasibility of certain solutions, ex-
perimentation is a must using different tools. Now the company can 
afford expensive tools that are used rarely, but they want them imme-
diately when needed. (Earlier they could not afford.) 
• 10-15% of activities are not planned in advance (e.g., working with 
new ideas). 
• In development: documentation of more details, milestone steps, all the 
changes are required for large partners (design control). 
What is the product planning process before deciding about product devel-
opment and production? 
1. Idea generation 
2. Conceptualization 
3. Feasibility check parallel with market research 
4. Go/No go decision about starting the product development based on 
the results of the feasibility and that of the market research 
How does idea generation work? 
• Brainstorming is a constant element of development in all stages. 
• Ideas come either internally or from outside: demands from sales part-
ners who know what features or solutions their customers would like 
to have. 
How do you motivate employees? 
• Bonus system: employees are rewarded differently, based on their per-
formance. 
• Employees can make mistakes (we are human…). Mistakes are esca-
lated only if they have a real impact. 
• It is important that employees should not be overstressed – otherwise 
their performance will decrease. 
• Owner aspect: employees look at the company as it had theirs. 
• Positive atmosphere: “there is no stupid idea”, honest and open discus-
sions. 
• Sharing knowledge – it is a required mentality for everybody at Devel-
opment. 
How has the organisation changed throughout the years?  
• All departments have been established and further developed that is 
typical in a large company. It is a full-scale company incl. develop-
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ment, separated test group, application team, technology group, pro-
curement/logistics, production, warehouse, quality, IT, sales & market-
ing, accounting departments, etc.. 
• Majority of development is execution and not just planning 
• Application Team – very important. They communicate what and how 
the equipment measures. They are responsible for publications, arti-
cles, presentations, trainings and application support not only for part-
ners but also for the internal service and marketing departments. 
• Quality Assurance – FDA compliance was achieved, responsible for 
up-to-date SOPs (Standard Operational Procedures). 
 
The Story of UriSed Mini 
1. 2013 March- Idea:  
• Market need: How to make the expensive, automated UriSed more af-
fordable for smaller doctors’ offices and smaller laboratories? 
• The challenge: “How to make it cheaper? E.g., can we do it smaller?” 
• “Let us do it smaller, that small” → “Ok, then forget automatic sample 
loading, i.e. the whole robot unit” meaning that the sample entry (the 
action of filling the sample in the cuvette) should be manual. After that, 
by pressing a button, everything is the same automatic analysis like in 
the large UriSed. 
 
2. 2013 April – Internal presentation about the new concept for the CEO:  
• This is a semi-automatic machine for a new market segment, a new 
instrument category. 
• Interesting direction: „downgrading”: the automatic machine was suc-
cessful, but expensive, mainly for large partners (buyers). 
• 2013 May – Decision, after hesitation, based on feelings. CEO decided: 
“Let’s GO”. 
 
3. 2014 H1 – Market Research:  
• Distributors were asked: “Maybe 200-300 equipment can be sold an-
nually”.  
• Not necessarily the end-user market should be asked, but the distribu-
tors. 
• 2013 Nov: Prototype was demonstrated at the MEDICA Exhibition. 
Partners hemmed and hawed. 
• 2014 Jan: A US veterinary partner (also in the urine sediment business) 
expressed interest. They wanted to use it for animals. 
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• 2014 June: Contract about common development with the veterinary 
partner. 
 
4. 2014-16: product development including preparation of production 
• New production line 
• 84 new jobs 
 
5. 2016 April – Product launch,  
• 4,9 billion HUF revenue already in the very first year (only 8 months) 
• 2000-3000 equipment sold annually 
• Innovation Grand Prize. 
We consider that 77 Elektronika’s case is one of the few success stories in 
Hungary that demonstrates that even a mid-size business (in worldwide com-
parison) can develop and sell products for the entire world if the product is 
high quality and innovative. This company started as a traditional small com-
pany as an ant type business, then with investing in development transformed 
into a gazelle type organisation and reached the tiger status when the com-
pany became a real innovative intrapreneurial business115 (Vecsenyi 1999). 
In addition, this success can be repeated only if the organisation has an en-
trepreneurial culture and atmosphere. 
 
  
                                                     
115 Vecsenyi, Janos (1999): Vállalkozási szervezetek és stratégiák. Budapest, Aula kiadó. (In Hun-
garian) 
78 
Béla Pataki  
3.5. Open innovation 
3.5.1. The Concept of Open Innovation 
Great ideas can sprout anywhere, they can be easily gathered using modern 
information and communication technologies, and valuable opportunities for 
putting them to good use can also arise anywhere. The number of potential 
partners and ways to collaborate with them is constantly increasing. The 
awareness of such opportunities has led to the ever more frequent use of the 
term ‘open innovation’, and other terms with a similar meaning have also 
been coined: user innovation, consumer innovation, crowdsourcing, living 
lab, etc. 
‘Open Innovation is the use of purposive inflows and outflows of knowledge 
to accelerate internal innovation, and expand the markets for external use of 
innovation, respectively. Open Innovation is a paradigm that assumes that 
firms can and should use external ideas as well as internal ideas, and internal 
and external paths to market, as they look to advance their technology.’116 
Initially, product innovation was the main area in which open innovation was 
used, particularly in its ‘outside-in’ form, i.e. using new ideas and knowledge 
generated by outsiders for developing new products. However, significantly 
more attention should be paid both to the application of open innovation in 
process innovation117 and to ‘inside out’ innovation, i.e. selling to other in-
novations that were created but cannot be used inside the company118. 
There are several ways to open up the innovation process to allow outsiders, 
either innovative experts or consumers, to participate in it. The different 
forms of opening have different advantages and disadvantages, and they 
should be used in different situations. The selection of the optimal form is 
                                                     
116 Chesbrough, Henry William (2006): Open innovation: a new paradigm for understanding indus-
trial innovation. in: Open Innovation: researching a new paradigm. (ed. Chesbrough, Henry Wil-
liam, Vanhaverbeke, Wim and West, Joel) Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, pp. 1–13. 
117 Krogh, Georg von, Netland, Torbjørn and Wörter, Martin (2018): Winning with open process 
innovation. MIT Sloan Management Review, 59(2), pp. 53–56. 
118 Chesbrough, Henry William (2012): Open innovation. Insight: Ideas for Change. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=02tCs3oKovc (Accessed 19/11/2019) 
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facilitated by a model—the product of approximately twenty years of re-
search and consulting in this area—, which focuses on two basic questions119: 
• How open or closed should a company’s network of collaborators be? 
• How flat or hierarchical should the governance of the collaboration be? 
 
3.5.2. Open or Closed Network? 
A closed network is created when we invite contributions to the solution of 
a problem from experts of domains that we consider relevant. An open net-
work is made up of a large number of people who voluntarily get involved in 
solving a problem that we have made public—participation is open to anyone 
who wants to join in. Closed modes tend to be smaller than open ones, there-
fore they are easier and cheaper to operate. 
Closed Network 
Advantage 
We can obtain ideas and solutions from the best experts of the selected 
knowledge domain. 
Issues to be Resolved 
Those opting for a closed mode must be able to identify the relevant domains 
from which the best answers will come and pick the best collaborators in the 
selected fields. 
Conditions of Use 
• Capacity to spot previously undiscovered talents within the relevant 
networks; 
• capacity to establish privileged relationships with the best participants. 
Open Network 
Advantage 
A large number of contributors can provide a wide range of interesting ideas 
or solutions, even from domains that we are not familiar with. It is not nec-
essary to identify either the most relevant knowledge domains or the most 
appropriate experts in those domains. Indeed, the fact that we do not know 
                                                     
119 Pisano, Gary P. and Verganti, Roberto (2009): Which Kind of Collaboration Is Right for You? 
Harvard Business Review, 86(12), pp. 78–86. 
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them can be particularly valuable; innovative solutions may come from peo-
ple or organisations we might never have imagined had something to con-
tribute. 
Issues to be Resolved 
It must be possible to attract and screen a vast number of different ideas from 
a wide range of domains and contributors. 
Conditions of Use 
• Capacity to test and screen great quantities of proposed solutions at a 
low cost; 
• IT platforms that facilitate contribution by the participants; 
• posting of smaller problems that can be solved using simple tools, or 
partitioning of bigger problems into smaller chunks that can be handled 
separately so that contributors can work on them autonomously. 
 
3.5.3. Flat or Hierarchical Governance? 
In hierarchical forms of governance, a specific organisation has the right to 
define the problem and select the final solution. In flatforms, these decisions 
are either decentralized or made jointly by some or all collaborators. 
Hierarchical Governance 
Advantage 
Our company controls the direction of the innovation efforts and decides who 
the beneficiaries of the value generated by the innovation will be. 
Issues to Be Resolved 
Choosing the right direction. 
Conditions of Use 
• Capacity to understand users’ needs and define the problem; 
• capacity to create and operate a network in which work can be shared 
among outsiders and then partial solutions can be integrated; 
• capacity to evaluate the proposed solutions. 
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Flat Governance 
Advantage 
The burdens (costs, risks, and technical challenges) of innovation are shared. 
This form works well even when no single organisation has the necessary 
breadth of perspective or capabilities. (Potential) contributors willingly join 
this form and collaborate if they see that they can assert their interests and 
influence decisions. 
Issues to be Resolved 
Contributors must be persuaded to cooperate and elaborate together with the 
solution that will be useful for the problem’s owner. 
Conditions of Use 
• Processes and rules that motivate the parties to coordinate work for 
achieving the common goals. 
 
3.5.4. Four Ways to Collaborate in Open Innovation 
The four possible forms of collaboration within the context of open innova-
tion are based on the two network types and two governance types described 
above. 
The four basic models of collaboration in open innovation 
  Governance 
  Hierarchical Flat 
Participation 
open Innovation mall 
Innovation 
community 
closed Elite circle Consortium 
Pisano, Gary P. and Verganti, Roberto (2009): Which Kind of Collaboration Is Right for 
You?’, Harvard Business Review, 86(12), pp. 78-86. 
 
Elite circle 
It is a select group of collaborators, in which the participants are selected, the 
problem is defined and the most appropriate solution is chosen by a single 
company. An example of elite circles is the group of more than 200 carefully 
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selected experts invited by Alessi to propose new designs for the production 
of home products. 
It should be used when: 
• we know the domains from which the best solution to our problem is 
likely to come; 
• it is important to work with the best experts and we are able to find and 
select them; 
• we can define the problem and evaluate the proposed solutions. 
Consortium 
It is a private ‘club’ of contributors, whose members define the problems 
requiring a solution, make decisions about the workflow and select the best 
solutions together. For example, IBM has established such a partnership with 
other companies for developing semiconductor technologies. 
It should be used when: 
• the problem is big and cannot be partitioned into smaller chunks that 
can be handled separately; 
• we know the domains from which the best solution to our problem is 
likely to come; 
• it is important to work with the best experts and we are able to find and 
select them; 
• all contributors are expected to be highly competent; 
• the participants are only willing to collaborate if we share the power 
with them; 
• the intellectual property produced can be shared with the rest of the 
collaborators. 
Innovation mall 
It is a forum where a company posts its problem, and anyone can contribute 
proposals for a solution, and in the end, the company will select the best so-
lution. An example of innovation malls is the InnoCentive.com website, 
where companies can post scientific problems. 
It should be used when: 
• contributions are required from a large number of collaborators, and 
the best ideas might come from unexpected sources; 
• a lack of better solutions that elite players not involved in the process 
could provide does not have serious consequences; 
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• it is easy to join the network and get involved in the work; 
• the problem is small, or if it is big, it can be partitioned into smaller 
chunks that can be handled separately; 
• many proposed solutions can be tried at a low cost. 
Innovation community 
It is a network in which anyone can post problems, propose solutions and 
decide which solution to use. An example of innovation communities could 
be the Linux open-source community. 
It should be used when: 
• contributions are required from a large number of collaborators, and 
the best ideas might come from unexpected sources; 
• we do not know all user needs; therefore, we want to share the costs 
and risks of innovation with others; 
• it is easy to join the network and get involved in the work; 
• the problem is small, or if it is big, it can be partitioned into smaller 
chunks that can be handled separately; 
• it is not important that our company be the owner of the intellectual 
property, i.e. the solution. 
 
Each approach can be effective under the right circumstances. One must al-
ways be wary about opinions stating that one form of collaboration is supe-
rior to others. Open is not always better than closed, just as the flat is not 
always better than hierarchical. The development of an effective approach to 
collaboration begins with a solid understanding of the company’s strategy. 
What is the business problem that the collaboration is expected to solve? 
What unique capabilities can we bring to the process of innovation? 
Designing financial and non-financial incentives that attract collaborators is 
crucial in any of the four forms of collaboration. Non-financial rewards—
like high visibility in the labour market, good reputation among a peer group, 
the psychological fulfillment of pursuing a professional interest, or the 
chance to use the solutions in one’s own business—can replace or comple-
ment monetary rewards. There are no rigid rules about which incentives work 
best with particular forms of collaboration. 
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Kelemen Ottó János  
4. The role of the state, the entrepreneurial 
state  
We have previously learned about the role of the state, and after superficially 
repeating these, we highlight four topics that give us a better understanding 
of what it is actually doing. However, before we do, let us look at what tasks 
the state has. We highlighted four main topics that will make it clear from 
the practical side what the state is doing. These include research and devel-
opment, environmental protection and a complex safety net that is being used 
during an unexpected economic recession. Nevertheless, these are the fol-
lowing: legal, institutional framework, stabilisation, redistribution, alloca-
tion.120  
Providing the legal, institutional framework for economic activity: 
In order for the economy and the market to function, it is necessary to create 
the laws and authorities that define and enforce the rules applicable to all 
players. The protection of private property, the freedom of enterprise, the 
protection of consumers, competition and taxation all require legislation that 
must be enforced. 
Role of stabilisation: 
The self-regulatory role of the market does not always lead to economic equi-
librium. Unemployment, inflation, economic downturn, and deficit may ac-
company operations. These need to be counterbalanced and managed, which 
is also implemented by the economic policy of the state. In the event of mar-
ket destabilization, the state also strives for full employment. It also aims to 
create a welfare triad. You have many tools to do this in your arsenal.  
Redistribution role: 
With the help of the tax system, it withdraws income from economic agents 
and transfers transfers (unpaid income) from it to other actors. The level of 
income withdrawal is adjusted to the ability to generate income. Higher-in-
come players contribute to a greater extent, while lower-income actors con-
tribute less or no contribution to public spending. This is not always the case. 
                                                     
120 Vértesy László (2014): Az állami beavatkozás joga és hatékonysága. Nemzeti Közszolgálati 
Egyetem. 31-38. 
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Let us just look at what and how the iPhone came about. (See State vs. iPh-
one) 
Allocation responsibilities: 
It encompasses all public activities which affect the quantity, composition 
and quality of the goods and services produced in the economy. Within this 
framework, the state produces or produces public goods, manages externali-
ties, restricts monopolies, supports road construction, public transport, and 
agricultural prices. The allocation role allows you to use tax money to finance 
investments that make the environment greener; or even tax the polluters 
with a higher tax.  
If we are to pursue an innovation-driven, sustainable and inclusive economic 
environment that respects social and environmental constraints, the status of 
the state must be restored, both in our minds and in our actual income ac-
counts. Enterprising means not only managing a business but also character-
ized by the taking of financial risks in the hope of profit121.  
4.1. Creating Markets, not only fixing them  
Exploring and understanding of externalities is also important in your stud-
ies. It is an important factor that we consider in the political or economic 
decision-making process (or more precisely in the preparation of the deci-
sion-making process). 
Externalities when the well-being (profit-costs or utility level) of an eco-
nomic operator (producer or consumer) is directly influenced by the activities 
of another economic operator, i.e. not through the price system. We are talk-
ing about effects that are not caused by the price system, that is, by the func-
tioning of the market mechanism122. 
How the decisions of economic agents are able to influence the decisions of 
other players by mediating equilibrium prices. For example, if a new pro-
ducer enters the market for a product, the profits of the other producers will 
change as well, and this will not leave consumers' welfare intact. Although 
the activities of the new entrant have an impact on the profitability of other 
producers and on consumer welfare, we do not call this effect an externality, 
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since the effect of this is on the price system through the operation of the 
market mechanism123. 
For the same reason, it is not considered an external effect if, for example, 
an increase in income due to a tax cut affects the welfare of other economic 
operators through changes in equilibrium prices. The study of externalities is 
particularly important because, in our microeconomic studies so far, we have 
found that the market mechanism coordinates the activities of economic op-
erators through the price system, leading to Pareto-efficient states. This may 
not be true for external effects. 
 Note that if the ownership rights for external action are clear and if the par-
ties have the opportunity to negotiate with each other, a situation is created 
as if there is a market for the underlying rights (mutually beneficial win-win 
situation). If the parties can begin to bargain free of charge for changing the 
original situation, all that is done is to create a hitherto lacking market for the 
free sale of the rights in question. As soon as the sale and purchase of these 
rights are completely free and there are no other obstacles to the transactions, 
the resulting situation will be effective markets124.  
The state and government have prominent and non-transferable roles in two 
important areas: one is to protect the present society and health and environ-
ment; the other is to shape the future generation through education and envi-
ronmental protection. The rest (development of infrastructure, support of ag-
riculture, assistance to private enterprises, etc.) follow. So, research develop-
ment has always been overshadowed in our history. Just think of the two 
R&D drivers: aerospace and military125. Let us ask: What do we spend more 
on Public Health insurance or space research?  
If no one can be excluded from consuming an animal, and if the animal can 
be used by an unlimited number of consumers without shortening each other 
in any way. In other words, if consumers of a given commodity do not rival 
each other, then the commodity in question, distinguished from commodities 
to which the above criteria do not apply, is called a public good. 
The opposite of public goods is private goods. So far, our microeconomic 
studies have focused exclusively on private goods. Private goods are prod-
ucts and services that are subject to foreclosure (for example, those who do 
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not pay for them cannot participate in the consumption of the good) and con-
sumers rival each other. The consumption of one consumer reduces the con-
sumption of the other. 
Since the exclusion criteria and the lack of rivalry criteria jointly define the 
public good, there are obviously temporary cases where only one of the two 
criteria is met. Goods, where both the impossibility of exclusion and the lack 
of rivalry exist at the same time, are called pure public goods. Transitional 
cases bear certain features of public and private goods. It may be possible to 
exclude some of the consumption of a given commodity, but consumers of 
the commodity do not shorten each other. But it may also be possible to ex-
clude an animal from the consumption of an animal, but the more people 
have access to the animal, the less valuable it is to them. To distinguish these 
cases from pure public goods, they are called mixed goods or unclean public 
goods. 
In the Middle Ages, tolls were levied on users of roads and bridges; later in 
most places, the state made the use of roads free of charge; and since the end 
of the twentieth century, more and more places have been paying for the use 
of roads. Public service television broadcasting is accessible to everyone, but 
at low cost, broadcasting can be coded and some can be excluded from con-
sumption. Some commercial taxes also make use of this possibility126.  
Providing such leadership, the State makes things happen that otherwise 
would not have. Not only does it stimulate the economy through interest rate 
policy and redistribute collected taxes, but it also finances basic research, 
maintains research institutes, finances education, and maintains universities, 
or healthcare. Through these added values, the state only profits indirectly 
through taxes. But is it justifiable that the state acts for the public interest and 
is a courageous actor in the economic system? The characteristics of public 
good and the role of externalities lead to an understanding of the possibilities 
of the State. There is not only a narrow view of what the State can invest in 
or what (in the economical role) policy options are acceptable127. 
Anyone who takes the risk gets a profit in modern capitalism. To understand 
the fundamental role of the State in the pioneer innovation sector, we have to 
recognize the collectivizing power of the state. 
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Private investors often follow a predetermined path. Thus, in the hope of 
growth in business, they do not have to go through many walked paths or 
dead ends. The need to deploy and to prove new technologies appears both 
the supply slice, but also on the demand side. The question arises as to what 
recognition the state will receive for the work it is invested in: especially 
from the most pressing social and technological challenges.128  
4.2. State vs. iPhone 
From the internet to nanotechnology, most of the technological break-
throughs of the past half-century have been funded by public organisations, 
from basic research to commercialization of exploitation129.  
The hero of many, Steve Jobs, has combined many of the existing solutions 
that were developed earlier by the State of the USA. The basic research was 
funded by the US (evidently from taxes) and Apple distributed it to consum-
ers. This working method is true from the first Macintosh PC. There are 12 
major technologies integrated within the iPod, iPhone and iPad that stand out 
as features that are either enablers or that differentiate these products from 
their rivals in the market. These improvements are the result of successful 
chin-driven units. Is that rather value creation or value extraction? The fair 
distribution of profit may be questionable, but only one actor received the 
honor. „These include semiconductor devices such as:  
• microprocessors or central processing units (CPU);  
• dynamic random-access memory (DRAM); as well as  
• micro hard drive storage or hard drive disks (HDD);  
• liquid-crystal displays (LCDs);  
• lithium-polymer (Li-pol) and lithium-ion (Li-ion) batteries;  
• digital signal processing (DSP), based on the advancement in fast 
Fourier transform (FFT) algorithms;  
• the Internet;  
• the Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) and Hypertext Markup Lan-
guage (HTML);  
• and cellular technology and networks – all of which can be consid-
ered as the core enabler technologies for products such as the iPod, 
iPhone and iPad. On the other hand,  
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• global positioning systems (GPS),  
• click-wheel navigation and multi-touch screens,  
• and artificial intelligence with a voice-user interface program” 130; 
131. 
 
Innovative features that have drastically impacted consumer expectations 
and user experiences, furthermore enhancing the popularity and success of 
these products. The following diagram takes a closer look at the core tech-
nologies and features that Apple has managed to ingeniously integrate, ini-
tially in the iPod and later on the iPhone and iPad. These state-developed 
solutions have changed the world for all of us.  
Impact on basic research on innovation 
 
Mazzucato Mariana (2018): Entrepreneurial State: debunking public vs. private sector 
myths: The State Behind The iPhone. Great Britain, Penguin Random House UK, 116. 
 
However, the state only indirectly benefits from these successes in the form 
of taxes. At the same time, countless ongoing research leads to a dead end, 
with its risks and losses alone. The public sector, on the other hand, only 
adapts and communicates successful solutions 132. 
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Basic research is the beginning of a process and a prerequisite for innovation. 
Innovations are not only new products and technological production pro-
cesses but refer to many more and wider phenomena, including new organi-
sational forms and the creation of new markets. Most of the innovation liter-
ature defines innovation as something that is new to the firm adopting or 
developing it, rather than new to the whole market or indeed the whole world.  
Basic research starts a lot, which does not seem like the result right away. 
Basic research is followed by applied research, which is conducted according 
to a directed goal. Innovation development is specifically designed to meet 
latent needs and, if successful, production development will tailor the prod-
uct to the client’s needs. Here the client means the company. At the time of 
the sale, Deürl was light that it was worth investing in this work. What is 
outlined in this paragraph is how much preliminary work is needed to put 
together a new innovative product. All elements of the following Ishikawa 
diagram were born under similar prerequisites. 
Recognize that the state not only spends money but also invests and takes 
risks, while at the same time receiving the return on its investments only in-
directly through increased tax revenues due to the enrichment of the private 
sector. Finally, if, in a particular case, it is concluded that public good can 
best be realized in the financing of the State, it does not follow that the exe-
cution itself must be carried out by the State. In such cases, it is advisable to 
entrust the work to private companies, which are more cost-effective than 
state-owned companies, through appropriate competitive tendering. But only 
one possible answer is to trust the state. This would be a viable option if the 
state had adequate information on consumer preferences and income status. 
In practice, the government does not have the information needed to produce 
the public good at the optimum level. Decisions are usually made under con-
ditions of uncertainty, so the more general criterion for optimal decision is to 
maximize the difference between expected benefits and expected costs. 
The time Factor: Uncertainty and risk mean that the consequences of the al-
ternatives available can be multiple and occur with different probabilities. 
4.3. State vs. Climate changes  
At the last climate conference in Paris in December 2015, the participating 
states undertook to balance emissions by 2050 with the ability of nature to 
absorb greenhouse gases in order to keep global average temperatures (meas-
ured by the Industrial Revolution up to 2100) below 2 °C. That is, emissions 
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are reduced to levels that can be absorbed by natural processes, which is es-
sentially a carbon-neutral global economy. To achieve this goal, advanced 
economies will provide $ 100 billion in aid to developing countries. The 
achievement of the objectives set shall be reviewed every five years. These 
resources are implemented by the EU through the Member States.  
It is also worth noting that it is a binding EU target for a 40% reduction in 
greenhouse gas emissions by 2030 compared to 1990 levels. The share of 
renewable energy should be raised to at least 27% by 2030 27% improvement 
in energy efficiency compared to projections completing the internal energy 
market by achieving the 10% minimum interconnection target for existing 
electricity networks. 
Furthermore, in line with the European Council agreement of October 2014, 
the EU has committed itself to reduce greenhouse gases within the Union, 
increasing the share of renewable energy sources and improving energy effi-
ciency. The implementation of this framework requires an urgent adaptation 
of the legislation. This is where the role and responsibility of the legislator 
appears. This is not a purely economic decision but an ethical one. Although 
nowadays, Technology allows us to produce cleaner energy in a more cost-
effective way.133 
If the State making an investment in the Internet or clean energy (because of 
the national security or for achieving energy independence, or political rea-
son), it can do so on a scale and with tools not available to businesses: taxa-
tion, regulation, monopolization, market manipulation, etc. Environmental 
public procurement is often referred to as green public procurement. Green 
public procurement is a procedure whereby public authorities give priority to 
the purchase of goods, services and works which are less harmful to the en-
vironment than other goods for the same purpose. Green public procurement 
encourages the development of environmentally friendly technologies and 
products and supports their widespread market penetration. 
If a central hurdle to business investment in new technology is that it will not 
make investments that can create benefits for the ‘public good’ (since it then 
cannot capture the majority of the value created), then it is essential the State 
do so – and worry about how to transform those investments into new eco-
nomic growth later.134  
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 A series of agreements between states can lead to green investments (green 
loans, green bonds, green investments). The state can control the market by 
supporting investments and varying degrees of taxation, or even create mar-
kets! Moreover, able to shaping existing frameworks by supporting research 
and development, incubator programs, competitions, or even withdrawing 
grant money (from e.g. polluting companies). Climate change affects us all. 
Individually we can do less for it than collectively, so the state has a role in 
managing the markets, not only fixing them 135.  
As you can see the capital requirement for given technology investment and 
its risk increase in a straight line. As a result, small garage companies have 
no chance of being a breakthrough. Excluding costly funding for basic re-
search is a reasonable market opportunity. At the same time, the value of 
innovation is not for the skillful sales guy, but for the company / state who 
takes the risk. This shows that small start-ups can play a minimal role in 
green investments and technological developments. 
Grouping innovation and green technology by risk 
 
Mazzucato Mariana (2015): The Entrepreneural State: Debunking Public vs. Private Sector 
Myths. Great Britain, Penguin Random House UK, 137.  
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4.4. Fixing Markets - financial crisis ’08 
The state must intervene forcefully in a crisis to bring order and balance. For 
example, in an extreme case where one of the state's goals is to provide li-
quidity and maintain creditworthiness in the financial sector during a crisis. 
States, for example, one of the objectives of the State is to provide liquidity 
and maintaining creditworthiness in the financial sector. States have used 
different methods to help banks, including capitalization, with or without na-
tionalization.136 Guarantee for interbank deposits or loans, and taking over 
the wrong tools137. 
An excellent example of capitalization through nationalization is the case of 
the British Northern Rock Loan. In 2008, the British Parliament passed the 
Banking (Special Measures) Act, which gave the state 100 percent ownership 
in Northern Rock. The reason for the nationalization was the protection of 
the public interest, but it was clear that there was a perception in the back-
ground that the collapse of the bank could cause untold damage to the UK 
banking system as a whole. Thus, capitalization with or without nationaliza-
tion: guarantee for interbank deposits or loans, and wrong tools138. 
An excellent example of capitalization through nationalization is the case of 
the British Northern Rock. The British Parliament passed the Banking (Spe-
cial Measures) Act of 2008, which gave the state 100 percent ownership in 
Northern Rock. The reason for nationalization was the protection of the pub-
lic interest, but it was clear that there was a perception in the background that 
the collapse of the bank could cause immense damage to the entire banking 
system in the United Kingdom.139 Before considering the idea of nationali-
zation in an advanced democracy, let us remember the 1907 Bankers' Panic 
and its secondary effects and its externalities. 
The banking system, or indeed the entire financial market system, can find a 
way to make money from mere speculation. (this is called Value extraction 
and not financing the production economy) 
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So, the money is self-financing: think of the banks that finance mortgage-
backed securities, which in turn are covered by credit derivatives. It would 
not finance ’capital development’ in the economy. There is nothing wrong 
with this, as financial intermediaries 'just' drive demand away from supply. 
If a business is born voluntarily, it creates value for both parties. The specu-
lative and short-term nature of the financial system means that the banker 
today is much more of a problem than a solution, contrary to what Schum-
peter assumed  
Initially, only the tensions in the US mortgage market started to accrue later 
in other leading capital and money markets in the world. Then, in the US, 
more and more unsold or foreclosure properties became available, and bank-
ruptcies of smaller banks and credit institutions increased. And in September 
2008 came the great shock, the collapse of the Lehman Brothers, and with it 
the crisis. The bankruptcy of Lehman Bankruptcy triggered panic sales on 
American stock exchanges and marked the beginning of a lasting global eco-
nomic recession.  
The consequences of the deepening financial crisis have worsened in both 
the US and Europe, and a little later in the Far East. A ’good decade’ has 
passed since the burst of these dramatic events. It is important to consider 
whether the dangers of a decade ago may reappear, or whether we can reas-
sure ourselves that a shock of this type and magnitude is no longer a threat.  
Can we trust that the new safety systems, special brakes and modern fore-
casting mechanisms that have come into play on the international financial 
markets now allow us to see the danger ahead and act in time? Difficult ques-
tions, which unfortunately are clearly and reassuringly answered in all re-
spects, cannot be offered by politics or investors, especially the narrower pro-
fession of finance. 
The state budget is not similar to the household budget, so the emphasis on 
fiscal austerity is mistaken. But what is a good solution140? This question will 
be answered by the next generation of financial experts.  
The most important conclusion is that while both the cyclical conditions and 
the financial systems have stabilized in the most advanced countries of the 
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world economy, it cannot be said with certainty that all risks previously lead-
ing to recession could have been adequately addressed141.  
At the beginning of this century, the subprime mortgage crisis almost cov-
ered the developed side of the world with the darkness of the Great Depres-
sion in 1929-33. The mispriced real estate what bought from cheap (typically 
floating rate) loans, and the asset price bubble causes falling growth and then 
explosion-like falls. As everything in the world strives for balance. The dy-
namics of Newtonian physics can also sometimes model economic pro-
cesses. Even today, there are growing signs of the next crisis, we know it will 
happen, but we do not know when142.  
In any case, the crisis will have (at least) two big group of losers:  
• Those who invested real estate from floating-rate loans in the hope of 
increasing the house price; they are the yield hunters or rent-seekers.  
• And those who have no savings.  
There will be an intersection of the two sets, who will not be helped by the 
capitalist market. “It is therefore recommended to think of crises as the Bud-
dhists do about death: it is not certain when and how they will occur. But it 
sure will happen.” 
Let's look at the tools the state balances worldwide. This is one of the true 
roles of the state: the very visible hand. Here are the Government-funded 
subsidies (as a first-aid), which (with taxpayers’ money) have rebalanced the 
capitalist world. And these are only a few tools for the coordination of effi-
cient markets:  
• capital injection 
• asset finance 
• credit guarantee 
• rate cuts 
• wider hedging need 
• narrower discount gap 
• federal exchange 
• suspension of transactions at market price 
• dividend suspension 
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• setting payment limits 
Sustainable and balanced growing; and ethical economics is away from the 
money manager capitalism or casino capitalism behaviour. The excessive 
growth of fund managers and investment funds, in which case the financial 
sector is gaining more from serving and speculating on other financial firms 
than the goals of the real economy, and does not bring any significant added 
value 143. Therefore, following the Anglo-Saxon tradition, you should: fix the 
roof when the sun is shining. 
For example, only a few years ago, as a result of the 2008 crisis, the Bank of 
England acknowledged that it is not deposits that create loans, but, con-
versely, that loans issued by banks trigger deposits 144. 
The financialization of the real economy, that is, the phenomenon of ulti-
mately distorting the concept of value often results in industrial and service 
companies generating higher revenues and profits from financial operations 
than from their core business 145. 
Sharply criticizes Milton Friedman's principle that the only task of compa-
nies is to maximize shareholder value - it favours short-term thinking over 
the long-term, supports speculation, discourages productive investment, and 
ignores the fact that not only owners are considered to be a relevant group 
for the company, but also employees, business partners, the host community, 
civil society, i.e., all stakeholders. According to Friedman, shareholders are 
kűey players because they bear the risks of the business and are therefore 
entitled to profit 146. 
In addition to banks, the large "innovators" and "startups" known today in 
the innovation industry also, in most cases, also show annuities as profits. 
The basic problem is that the mainstream approach does not take into account 
that innovation is a collective and cumulative process. 
In the current system, the risks are borne by the community and the profits 
are shared by some of the distinguished players in the private sector. The 
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theory of innovation in Silicone valley garages is clearly wrong and mislead-
ing. They have decades of meticulous scientific work behind them, financed 
by someone else. The situation is complicated by the fact that these basic 
researches are typically carried out by public institutions and not by private 
companies, as the high capital requirements and risks involved are not borne 
by the private sector. 147 
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Szőcs Árpád 
5. Market-based financing of innovation, a 
detailed introduction of primarily market-
based methods of financing 
In recent years the digital economy has given rise to many new forms of 
financing and has added new roles to classic forms of financing. Compering 
to the traditional innovation supporting banking services,148 new and alterna-
tive funding resources have become globally available to all innovative 
startups through online platforms. The privilege of being an investor has sud-
denly become accessible to the average person and is no longer just a play-
ground for wealthy individuals and institutions. In the following, we will 
look at new funding frameworks born in the digital world and try to predict 
their future development: crowdfunding, business angels, venture capital. 
5.1. Crowdfunding  
The increasing penetration of the Internet and digital devices allows new so-
lutions to emerge in traditional sectors such as financing. Crowdfunding has 
recently emerged as a principal force in entrepreneurial finance, fostering 
economic empowerment and a democratic transformation of the financial 
sector149150. Given the difficulties in fundraising via the established ways, 
mainly due to strict lending requirements and limited access to bank loans, 
entrepreneurs opt for alternative sources to fund their ventures. Serving as a 
“bridge” for entrepreneurs and funds, crowdfunding enables fund-seekers to 
overcome those limitations by making use of the Web 2.0 applications. Those 
applications facilitate inexpensive mass appeals to a global crowd, allowing 
fund seekers to reach millions of potential investors, with no costly interme-
diaries such as banks or underwriters151. In this new form of financing, indi-
vidual preferences of investors may also appear, by investing in topics and 
products that they are familiar with. 
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It is important to note, however, that the digital world tends to underestimate 
the background knowledge required by some professions. Financial institu-
tions and venture capital fund managers are typically experts who have 
learned over the years; for example, what aspects of a business are worth 
financing. In light of that, despite its advantages, crowdfunding comes with 
significant risks to the investor. The most significant risks are lending risks 
and counterparty risks, which can be partly mitigated by the platform152. Be-
sides, the typically small amount of investment allows more and more people 
to try themselves as investors and to obtain financing companies that would 
not or would be harder to do with traditional tools. 
5.1.1. A historical perspective  
While some people claim that crowdfunding can be traced back to the 1700s, 
others cite a campaign by Joseph Pulitzer as the first crowdfunding cam-
paign. When the U.S. found itself unable to raise enough money to pay for a 
base for the Statue of Liberty in 1885, Pulitzer used his newspaper, The New 
York World, to raise money to cover the cost from more than 160,000 donors 
in just five months. Crowdfunding as we know it today kickstarted in 1997 
when fans donated $60k online to the British rock band Marillion to fund the 
band’s reunion tour153. Michael Sullivan is credited with coining the term 
crowdfunding back in 2006 with the launch of fundavlog, a failed attempt at 
creating an incubator for videoblog-related projects and events, including a 
simple funding functionality. But the term crowdfunding only really began 
to be used by the masses a few years later with the advent of the platform 
Kickstarter154. 
Subsequently, the process began, resulting in rapidly growing crowdfunding 
platforms. It is important to mention Indiegogo created in 2008, and Kick-
starter established in 2009. Today, Kickstarter is almost the same concept for 
testing new creative ideas and products as Google is for getting information. 
Since its launch, 17 million people have backed a project, $4.7 billion has 
been pledged, and 176,425 projects have been successfully funded155. As-
sisted by the widespread adoption and social acceptance of Web 2.0 technol-
ogies, crowdfunding expanded on a large scale, providing the infrastructure 
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to reach millions of investors and supporters online156 157. Employing plat-
form mediated approaches to collect many small amounts from a large num-
ber of individuals, crowdfunding has diffused from nonprofit projects to en-
trepreneurial funding for innovative new ventures. In entrepreneurial fund-
ing, the prevailing types are reward-based, lending, and equity crowdfund-
ing158. Not only did this new form of funding offer start-ups an opportunity 
to seek funding, but it also provided opportunities for nonprofit donations 
and charitable fundraising. 
5.1.2. How does crowdfunding work? 
The process of crowdfunding begins with the development of a “pitch” that 
gives information to potential funders. The pitches are hosted in crowdfund-
ing platforms that organise and administrate the whole process and act as a 
market for fund-seekers to interact with the crowds159. The pitch information 
can take the form of hard facts such as revenue figures or monthly disposable 
income, or soft claims such as the entrepreneurs’ backgrounds and aspira-
tions or promises. However, only some of the presented facts are validated 
by the crowdfunding platform (for example, some platforms check basic in-
formation like credit score, personal income160. The average amount of suc-
cessful campaigns ranged from a few thousand dollars and thus did not com-
pete with institutional investors. Although crowdfunding platforms have 
grown dynamically in recent years, this new form of funding is not expected 
to replace traditional tools, but rather to complement them.  
Crowdfunding types 
Recently, different types of crowdfunding and their variations have appeared. 
In the following, the four largest, defining types are described.  
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• In donation type crowdfunding, contributors support a project and re-
ceive no or only symbolic rewards in return, as motivation is purely 
intrinsic161. 
• In reward-based crowdfunding, crowd funders receive nonpecuniary 
tangible (prototypes) or intangible (experiences) rewards in exchange 
for their support, being driven by intrinsic (for example, engagement) 
and extrinsic benefits (for instance, the reward)162. 
• In lending crowdfunding, supporters receive a monetary return in the 
form of interest, reflecting the risk and duration of the project163164 
• In equity crowdfunding, supporters receive a shareholding contract 
or a revenue-sharing scheme in return for their contribution165. 
 
The most complex type for backers, requiring their highest involvement, is 
equity crowdfunding, followed by lending crowdfunding and reward crowd-
funding. Donation crowdfunding is significantly less complex and crowd 
funders’ involvement is minimal166 
Largest crowdfunding platforms 
• Kickstarter: The most popular crowdfunding site on the Internet, 
Kickstarter has become a household name. However, it is more for 
funding inventions and creative works and not for helping nonprofit 
organisations or funding somebody’s endeavors without something 
in return. Also, participants do not get to keep the money pledged if 
the Kickstarter goal is not reached. 
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• Indiegogo: While it tends to play second fiddle to Kickstarter, Indi-
egogo has several advantages its counterpart doesn't provide. For in-
stance, Indiegogo has flexible funding that lets participants keep the 
funds they've raised, even when they haven't been able to reach their 
goal. It also lets them buy funded products in the platform's market-
place, so successful projects have another potential source of income. 
• Patreon: Another popular crowdfunding platform, Patreon sets itself 
apart with its subscription model. Instead of being for straight-up 
campaigns, this is more for providing ongoing financial support for a 
creative venture or artist. There's also the option to provide content 
exclusive to patrons who are subscribed to somebody’s Patreon 
through the site itself. 
• GoFundMe: This one is more popular for individuals who need 
money right away. They may often see people asking for crowdfund-
ing for short-term projects and medical emergencies in GoFundMe, 
which is common practice in this platform. 
• Crowdrise: While not as popular as the platforms mentioned above, 
Crowdrise has garnered attention for its focus on crowdfunding "real-
world issues" over funding for-profit ventures. It can also be used to 
fund college scholarships, weddings, and even birthday parties. Due 
to this mostly socially-conscious objective, GoFundMe took notice 
and acquired it in early 2017167 
 
5.1.3. What is the future of crowdfunding? 
In less than a decade, crowdfunding has already been recognized as one of 
the most typical methods of fundraising for innovative products and services. 
It has assisted millions of innovators and startups in bringing their ideas into 
the market. The era of non-regulated crowdfunding platforms had already 
passed, but with the rise of blockchain technology, many new platforms have 
been incorporated into exotic tax-haven destinations without complying with 
their respective regulations. Today crowdfunding is mainly conducted based 
on national legislation, which means that platforms are subject to rules de-
pending on the country where they operate. This makes it difficult for plat-
forms to provide their services beyond borders. The European Union (EU) 
has already established one-stop-shop access to its market, which helps 
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crowdfunding platforms overcome the barriers they face operating cross-bor-
der and gives more opportunities to European investors.168 On the other hand, 
the regulation of crowdfunding in the United Crowdfunding platforms that 
are reward-based or for the collection of donations are mostly unregulated, 
subject only to the prohibitions on fraud and false advertising that apply to 
all commercial transactions169. Internet penetration and the proliferation of 
smart devices are expected to attract more and more regions and entrepre-
neurial candidates to the online world. Against this background, crowdfund-
ing platforms are expected to continue to grow in the future and possibly to 
specialize by topic. 
5.2. Business Angels  
Business angels or angel investors are, according to specialized literature on 
the topic, individuals who invest heavily with their means in young, private 
companies and who during the funding process provide a very high amount 
of their capital, while not being a friend or relative of the company’s found-
ers170 
5.2.1.  A historical perspective  
The application of the term "angel" to a kind of investor originally comes 
from Broadway theater, where it was used to describe wealthy individuals 
who provided money for theatrical productions that would otherwise have 
had to shut down171. In 1978, William Wetzel, then a professor at the Uni-
versity of New Hampshire and founder of its Center for Venture Research, 
completed a pioneering study on how entrepreneurs raised seed capital in the 
US, and he began using the term "angel" to describe the investors who sup-
ported them172 
To understand the benefits of business angels financing, it is necessary to 
investigate BAs’ influential, unique human competences173. Start-up busi-
ness is an essential driver of major innovations in various industries. Despite 
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this, start-ups often struggle for many reasons to ensure adequate financial 
means to keep their operation afloat and ensure their survival in a competitive 
economic environment174. Business angels are natural, informal investors 
that, unlike their VC counterparts, tend to operate in a wider industry sector 
spectrum and who mostly invest during a company’s early stages175.  
5.2.2. How do Business Angels work? 
Angel investors are often wealthy individuals who place their money into 
early-stage entrepreneurial ventures and acting alone or in angel groups. In 
most cases, business angels help startups with not only capital but also man-
agement knowledge, relationship capital, and business advice. We can say, 
angel investments bear the extremely high risk and are usually subject to di-
lution from future investment rounds. As such, they require a very high re-
turn on investment. Because a large percentage of angel investments are lost 
completely when early-stage startups fail and go bankrupt, angel investors 
seek investments that have the potential to return at least ten or more times 
their original investment. Therefore, it is extremely important to have a de-
fined exit strategy, such as plans for an initial public offering or an acquisi-
tion.  
Angel investors are increasingly combining to form and join angel groups. 
During the last 15 years, angel investors have joined different angel groups 
to get access to quality deals. Angel groups are typically organised by geo-
graphic regions in the United States. Top angel groups appear to incorporate 
around 100-200 members. Some focus on a specific group of industries, 
while others are more open176. 
5.2.3. What is the future of angel investments? 
If you think about it, the aforementioned crowdfunding solutions in recent 
years have made it possible for a large crowd to become a business angel. 
These new trends raise the question of whether crowd investing makes the 
crowd become small business angels, generating thin borders between crowd 
investors and business angels. On the one hand, there will be crowd investing 
portals offering minimum investment tickets in the size of angel investments. 
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In this sense, crowd investing and angel finance might be substituted, and the 
former will ultimately drive down the returns of the latter. On the other hand, 
there may be scenarios where crowd investors and business angels comple-
ment each other, in particular, as some of the latest crowd investing portals 
are hybrid. Several portals are now more closely integrated with the financial 
landscape as they work with more traditional investors, including business 
angels177. With the emergence and mutation of digital platforms, we can ex-
pect that a significant portion of business angel activities will move to the 
Internet. However, there is also a part of the classic angel investor role, which 
is to make personal support, advice, and personal network utilization availa-
ble to invested start-ups. The question is how digital platforms will enable 
these very personal roles to be utilized in the online world. 
5.3. Venture capital 
When a business is born and starts, the owner, or their immediate environ-
ment and angel investors tend to provide funding initially. Empirical studies 
demonstrate178 that debt financing is not a viable option for this group of 
companies, the only option for them is (venture) capital financing. At this 
stage, different types of venture capital sources usually enter. 
5.3.1. A historical perspective 
Before World War II, banks and the public would buy shares in or lend 
money to companies with tangible assets or a recurring revenue derived from 
a retailing business. The problem is that technology-focused entrepreneurial 
ventures didn’t fall into either category. They couldn’t borrow from banks 
because their business model was unknown, and they still had everything to 
prove. And they couldn’t raise capital from the public because no financier 
could value them. This gap led to the emergence of private equity and venture 
capital.  
The first self-proclaimed venture capital firm was the American Research & 
Development Corporation (ARD), founded in 1946 by the famous Harvard 
Business School professor Georges Doriot. As a public company, ARD was 
able to attract institutional investors in private equity for the first time. Ven-
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ture capital only emerged as an asset class in the 1970s when it came to fi-
nancing a new industry: personal computing. As personal computing reached 
consumer markets for the first time, venture capital grew tenfold in the fol-
lowing years. It was fortunate because a new competition was about to storm 
onto financial markets: leveraged buyouts—which during the 1980s attracted 
billions when venture capital deals were still counted in the millions. Fortu-
nately, the 1990s tech bubble provided venture capitalists with a new, larger 
platform on which they could grow up and dance: the Internet179. 
5.3.2. How does venture capital work? 
Where venture money plays an important role is the stage when a company 
begins to commercialize its innovation. Venture money is not really a long-
term funding. The idea is to invest in a company’s balance sheet and infra-
structure until it reaches a sufficient size and credibility so that it can be sold 
to a corporation or so that the institutional public-equity markets can step in 
and provide liquidity. In essence, the venture capitalist buys a stake in an 
entrepreneur’s idea, nurtures it for a short period, and then exits with the help 
of an investment banker180. 
The stages of venture capital 
Even within venture capital, there are investors that focus on different stages 
therein.  
• Seed-stage: it is the initial funding used to establishing a business, or cre-
ating a new product or service. Obtaining seed capital is the first stage 
required for a start-up to become an established business. 
• Early-stage: in this stage, venture investors focus on taking a company 
that has successfully proven its concept to accelerate its sales and mar-
keting efforts. It becomes important to scaling commercial manufactur-
ing and sales.  
• Growth-stage: Growth of companies is often exponential by this stage 
and VC funding serves as a tool for enabling expansion to additional mar-
kets and diversification of product lines. 
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There is an extensive literature on the selection and decision-making process 
followed by venture capital investors.181 One element of this process is due 
diligence of financial and taxation issues in the past. In practice since inap-
propriate financial management can make it more difficult for start-ups to 
raise capital and, thus, to continue to grow.182 
The types of venture capital 
Within the venture capital space, the two most typically used structures are 
equity and convertible debt. Equity is issuing common stock or preferred 
stock (with some type of liquidation preference rights). Once invested, equity 
is owned outright until some type of sale or liquidity event of the company.  
Convertible debt, like its name suggests, is a debt instrument that technically 
has a maturity date and does need to be repaid at some point in the future. 
That said, most sophisticated convertible debt investors in venture capital are 
treating their investment like equity and are prepared to "convert" their debt 
into equity of the company, upon the company's next equity round. It is often 
a "bridge" financing to an early stage or growth stage financing, in a way that 
doesn't have to set a formal equity valuation of the company183 
5.3.3. What is the future of venture capital? 
The amount of capital available for investment depends largely on the eco-
nomic cycle. If the outlook is favourable, investors will be more open to risk-
ier investments, but if recession approaches, safer investments will come to 
the fore. However, in the last few years, many changes have taken place with 
the advancement of the digital world, which can bring about significant 
changes in venture capital financing. The emergence of crowdfunding sites 
and blockchain-based platforms are the next steps in this development. They 
will make a significantly larger sample of companies and asset classes avail-
able to a global investor base. It will also be an important challenge to pro-
vide not only capital with the help of the online world but also the knowledge 
and support traditionally provided by venture capitalists to startups. Offer-
ing platform services is the one way that VCs have to enhance their reputa-
tion and enact positive influence upon their investments outside of the board-
room. (examples of VC platform services include recruiting, marketing, de-
sign support, inside sales reps, consulting, accounting services and so forth). 
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The global economy opened up by the Internet is expected to spark more 
startup ideas in the future, and the associated funding sources will have to 
adapt to these trends. 
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6. Theory of Sustainability 
This chapter focuses on the broader context of the management of the natural 
environment, i.e. the theory of sustainability, as well as the related political 
concept of sustainable development, which is an increasingly topical and 
fashionable issue. We have chosen this topic due to the importance of clari-
fying to what extent sustainability is a synonym for environmental and nature 
protection. Politicians, experts, and opinion leaders often use the terms of 
environmental protection and sustainable development interchangeably, as if 
they had the same meaning. We will see that although there are many points 
of contact between the two, there are also significant differences. 
6.1. The Challenges of Sustainability 
We have taken two fundamental problems of the modern socio-economic 
system as our starting point. The first one is the tension between savings/in-
vestments and consumption. Societies often do not allocate enough funds 
from their income to the development of their production factors and re-
sources, and the investment rate is not sufficient for the countries to be able 
to keep up with the performance of other national economies, which are their 
competitors. Another related problem is the composition of the pool of pro-
duction factors: nowadays, such factors do not only include human-made 
capital in the classical sense (e.g. factory buildings, means of production, 
transport infrastructure), but the future production potential and standard of 
life are also largely determined by the quantity and quality of three other 
resources: human, social and natural resources. A common mistake is that 
the different actors of the society (private investors and governments) de-
velop resources that are not critical to increasing future performance and ne-
glect other resources whose improvement could be extremely beneficial. 
Some of these differences between the countries are measured by the Global 
Competitiveness Report/Index of the World Economic Forum, among others. 
At this point, we get to perceive how environmental and nature protection 
and sustainability became connected. It was those noticing the large-scale 
consumption of the natural capital who first pointed out that when the size of 
the natural capital was reduced, its lost yield and the ecosystem services 
would be available in such small quantities or poor quality that it might limit 
the production potential, restrain the growth of welfare or even lead to the 
contraction of the economy. Critics perceiving failures in the maintenance of 
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the natural capital said that that the model of economic growth that resulted 
in the consumption of the natural capital was not sustainable. If we pollute 
our groundwater, we cannot brew good beer; if our rivers and lakes are poi-
soned, there will be no anglers and tourists; if pollinating insects become 
extinct, we will not have fruits and coffee, and so on.   
Later on, the problem of sustainability was given a broader interpretation, 
and it became clear that the future production potential could be limited not 
only by the consumption and pollution of natural resources but also by a pro-
longed decline in the population, high public debt, anarchy (a lack of real 
governance), a lack of confidence affecting the entire society or the accumu-
lation of implicit debt in social security systems. The indebted future has 
many manifestations and many different reasons. 
Another fundamental problem of modern socio-economic systems—one that 
is, in many respects, linked to the problems described above—is the tension 
between the short and long term. Decision-makers—who should make the 
above-mentioned investment decisions facilitating the maintenance of the fu-
ture—are influenced by deformed interests. The rules they follow suggest 
that they should give priority to options that bring substantial benefits in the 
shortest possible time, regardless of their costs in the more distant future. The 
above-listed processes leading to an indebted future are frequent because 
they maximize short-term profit and are able to pass on to the future a large 
part of the costs associated with them. Increasing public debt is a good solu-
tion for politicians because the loans can be used to finance the immediate 
implementation of impressive development projects or welfare measures, 
while the installments will be paid by the next governments. 
In view of these facts, the problem of sustainability raises two questions: 
• What proportion of consumption and investment is required by the 
adequate development of the resources of society and how should in-
vestments be distributed between developments focusing on the dif-
ferent production factors? 
• When making our decisions, in addition to short-term consequences 
(revenues and costs), have we properly taken into account the long-
term consequences of the decisions as well? 
If these questions had always been relevant in the history of humankind, why 
did these problems become so serious during the last fifty years that each of 
them had to be given a separate name? 
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One of the key substantial changes was the emerging scarcity of the natural 
capital. The poor management of natural resources had already caused major 
problems, even the collapse or disappearance of some civilizations (the most 
widely known examples being Angkor Wat or the Easter Island)184, but these 
cases always occurred on a small scale and were separate in space and time 
(marginal from a global perspective). By the second half of the 20th century, 
natural resources were becoming scarce even globally. The extension of hu-
man activities in geographical terms (land take, changes in land use) and in 
terms of the quantity of the materials used (at the beginning of the 20th-cen-
tury average global materials use was approximately 4.5 tonnes per person 
per year, by the end of the century it increased to 9 tonnes, and according to 
the OECD’s forecast, it is expected to rise to 16 tonnes per person per year 
by 2060185) has reached staggering proportions. The first global assessment 
report of the UN Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity 
and Ecosystem Services (IPBES), published in May 2019, presents us with 
the following data.186 
As a result of human activities: 
• 75 percent of the land has been radically transformed; 
• 66 percent of ocean area has changed; 
• 85 percent of wetlands have been lost; 
• 25 percent of plant and animal species are threatened with extinction; 
• over the past 50 years, vertebrate populations have decreased by more 
than 50 percent. 
The report has established that ‘[t]he rate of global change in nature during 
the past 50 years is unprecedented in human history’.  
                                                     
184 Diamond J. (2005): Collapse. How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed, 2005. 
185 OECD (2019), Global Material Resources Outlook to 2060: Economic Drivers and Environ-
mental Consequences, OECD Publishing, Paris, DOI:https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264307452-en. 
and Vértesy L (2010): Gondolatok a fenntartható fejlődésről. in De iuris peritorum meritis 7  - Tanka 
Endre emlékkötet, Károli Gáspár Református Egyetem, 2010.  15-25. 
186 Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services, S. Díaz, 
J. Settele, E. S. Brondízio E.S., H. T. Ngo, M. Guèze, J. Agard, A. Arneth, P. Balvanera, 
K. A. Brauman, S. H. M. Butchart, K. M. A. Chan, L. A. Garibaldi, K. Ichii, J. Liu, S. M. Subra-
manian, G. F. Midgley, P. Miloslavich, Z. Molnár, D. Obura, A. Pfaff, S. Polasky, A. Purvis, 
J. Razzaque, B. Reyers, R. Roy Chowdhury, Y. J. Shin, I. J. Visseren-Hamakers, K. J. Willis, and 
C. N. Zayas (eds.) (2019): Summary for Policymakers of the Global Assessment Report on Biodi-
versity and Ecosystem Services, IPBES secretariat, Bonn, Germany, 
56 pages, https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.3553579.  
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6.2. Resources to Be Sustained 
One of the fundamental theorems of macroeconomics is that welfare prod-
ucts and services, i.e. output (Y) cannot be produced from nothing, because 
they depend on the quantity and quality of the production factors, or using 
our terms, resources (K) available to the society: 
Y = f(Km, Kh, Ks, Kn) 
where Km is human-made physical capital, Kh stands for human resources, 
Ks is social capital, and Kn denotes natural resources.
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Some elements of the resources on which sustainability is 
based 
Physical  
capital 
Human  
resources 
Social  
capital 
Natural  
resources 
Means of produc-
tion, equipment 
Population size and 
its changes 
Quality of the 
governance sys-
tem 
Raw materials, 
energy carriers 
Infrastructural fa-
cilities 
Knowledge Trust between 
the members of 
society and trust 
in the institutions 
Ecosystems, bio-
diversity: carriers 
of ecosystem ser-
vices 
Financial capital Health status Lack of corrup-
tion 
 
 A low degree of in-
equality and pov-
erty, which does 
not hamper social 
mobility 
Social inclusive-
ness 
 
Table compiled by the author 
 
It is important to know that the conditions for the stability of the long-term 
and expanding production of the output underlying social welfare in the 
broad sense depend on space and time, that is, there are no permanent and 
universal rules for improving the quantity and quality of resources or for de-
termining the proportion of investments in the different types of resources. It 
depends on the wisdom and sensibility of a given political community and 
                                                     
187 Based on D. Acemoglu (2011): Introduction to Modern Economic Growth, Princeton University 
Press, 2011 and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995): Economic Growth, McGraw Hill, New York, 
1995. 
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its leaders, whether they recognize the critical resource type whose quantita-
tive expansion or qualitative improvement can contribute most to increasing 
the output. 
However, some features should always be taken into consideration: 
• One of the differences between the natural capital and the other three 
resources is that the natural resources are more difficult to replace, 
and in some cases, the change may be irreversible: for example, ex-
tinct species cannot be brought back to life, and critical changes in 
the climate may lead to irreversible changes. 
• Fairly balanced development is needed (or, in the case of natural cap-
ital, the existing resources must be preserved) because it is not enough 
to have some resource elements that are highly developed even in 
global terms if other resource elements are lacking or are of very low 
quality. A persistently high-quality output requires the satisfactory 
status of all resource elements. 
• There is a strong transverse relationship between many resource 
types. A better-educated society is also generally more health-con-
scious: people tend to smoke less, do more regular physical exercise, 
and are, therefore, healthier. In a healthier society, fewer working 
hours are lost because of sickness-related absence. More highly qual-
ified people tend to be more aware of the environmental impact of 
their consumption, and a society that is richer in knowledge capital 
may be more prone to ensure better protection of the natural capital. 
A society with a constantly shrinking population is also an aging so-
ciety, where it becomes more difficult to maintain health and funding 
problems concerning social security (the maintenance of the pension 
system) may also arise. 
For centuries, the resource management pattern of societies was based on the 
expansion of all resources, but that included the reduction of natural re-
sources. There was a trade-off: the natural capital was reduced (through over-
fishing in the seas, deforestation, exploitation of soil fertility, over-pollution 
of the air or water, biologically active surfaces being covered with concrete, 
etc.), while the other three resources were increased. 
Y = f(Km, Kh, Ks, Kn) 
The emergence of the scarcity of natural resources in the second half of the 
20th century raised the question of whether it is possible to maintain a per-
sistently high level of output if the amount of natural capital falls below a 
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critical level. Has the age of the trade-off of natural resources come to an 
end? Furthermore, if so, is it possible to develop physical, human and social 
resources in a manner that allows for the replacement of the income benefits 
that had been previously generated by the exploitation of the natural capital? 
In this context, two concepts of sustainability have been developed. The 
measure of weak sustainability is the persistent non-declining level of output 
(production potential), where possible. According to the weak sustainability 
criterion, the trade-off between resources is possible, and the natural capital 
can be further reduced. However, according to the strong sustainability cri-
terion, any loss of natural capital that would result in a partial loss of Y is 
prohibited. 
Thus, the criterion of weak sustainability is: 
δK(t)/δt ≥ 0, for all cases of t > t(0), 
where t means time and t(0) is the current moment.188 
The criterion of strong sustainability suggests that a management system 
must be developed in which natural resources are replaced and maintained in 
such a way that, in the long term, the margin of the production potential 
should not be reduced even if the other production factors remain unchanged 
at the same time. With this, substitution is forbidden: natural resources can-
not become scarce even in themselves, and the expansion of the other three 
production factors cannot compensate for the possible reduction of natural 
resources. 
Thus, the criterion of strong sustainability is: 
  δK(t)/δt ≥ 0 and δKn(t)/δt ≥ 0,  
for all cases of t > t(0).189  
In other words, the above (previously weak) sustainability criterion must also 
be fulfilled in terms of the natural capital alone, and substitution is only pos-
sible between non-natural capital types. 
  
                                                     
188 Hanley and G. Atkinson (2003): Economics and Sustainable Development: What Have We 
Learnt, and What Do We Still Need to Learn? in F. Berkhout, M. Leach and I. Scoones (eds.), 
Negotiating Environmental Changes: New Perspectives from Social Science, Edward Elgar, Chel-
tenham, UK 
189 Ibidem. 
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Weak and strong sustainability 
 Weak sustainability Strong sustainability 
Main idea: The maintenance of re-
sources in general 
Natural resources should not 
become scarce even in them-
selves 
Focus of analysis: Supporting decision-making 
through marginal analyses 
Absolute magnitude and ex-
tent of material and energy use 
Method of  
assessment: 
In monetized values In physical and biological val-
ues used in natural sciences 
Discounting: Permitted, but determining 
the adequate social discount 
rate is an issue 
Disapproved due to ethical 
reasons; resources must be 
fairly distributed among gen-
erations 
Pricing of natural 
resources: 
Prices give an efficient indi-
cation of the relative scarcity 
of resources 
Prices are unreliable due to the 
frequency of externalities 
Technological  
development: 
It makes it possible to avoid 
the reduction of future pro-
duction potential even when 
natural resources continue to 
be used.  
It is not a solution because 
new technologies generate 
new environmental problems. 
Extent of govern-
ment intervention: 
Enforcement of internalisa-
tion regulations and the rules 
of private law 
Furthermore, determining the 
maximum size of the econ-
omy and ensuring fair distri-
bution among generations 
Role of economic 
analysis: 
Finding the optimal level of 
natural resource use 
The irreversible processes, un-
certainty and the stability of 
ecosystems should also be 
taken into account. 
Source: Hanley, Shogren and White (2007)190, based on van Kooten and Bulte (2000)191, in 
Bartus and Szalai (2014)192. 
 
                                                     
190Hanley N., J.F. Shogren and B. White (2007): ‘Environmental Economics’, in Theory and Prac-
tice, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, UK – New York, N.Y., US 
191 Kooten G.C. van and E.H. Bulte (2000): The Economics of Nature: Managing Biological Assets, 
Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, UK 
192 Bartus and Á. Szalai (2014): Környezet, jog, közgazdaságtan [Environment, Law, Economics], 
Pázmány Press, Budapest 
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6.3. The Policy of Sustainability: Sustainable 
Development 
According to its classic definition contained in the so-called Brundtland Re-
port193, sustainable development is ‘development that meets the needs of the 
present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their 
own needs’. This not only imposes on us the obligation to pass on a certain 
amount of natural resources to the next generations but also requires us to 
take care of other resources of social existence in the same way.  
The principle of intergenerational equity or the theory of the protection of 
future generations goes further than the concept of sustainable development 
by defining moral—in practice, mostly egalitarian—conditions for the con-
servation of resources for the future. Such conditions would not be strictly 
necessary to ensure sustainability since the resources that will be used to meet 
the needs of future generations at that time do not necessarily need to be 
equal to current resources. According to Brown-Weiss194, intergenerational 
equity comprises three principles: (1) the principle of conservation of equal 
options, (2) the principle of conservation of equal quality, and (3) the princi-
ple of conservation of equal access. 
Thus, it is clear that the concepts of ‘sustainable development’ or ‘sustainable 
society’ do not have a single meaning that is interpreted and accepted by 
everyone in the same way. The different interpretations are classified by 
Bartus and Szalai as follows:195 
• Environmental protection 2.0 – Sustainable development is a higher 
level of environmental protection, where priority is given to the preser-
vation of natural resources for future generations, but the natural capital 
is conserved using not only traditional environmental protection tech-
nologies but primarily by changing the objectives of economic policy 
and social objectives (e.g. by rejecting economic growth). 
                                                     
193 United Nations, Our Common Future (1987). UN General Assembly document A/42/427, 
World Commission on Environment and Development, United Nations, 1987. 
194 Brown Weiss, E. (1992) Intergenerational Equity: A Legal Framework for Global Environmen-
tal Change’, in E. Brown Weiss (ed.), Environmental Change and International Law: New Chal-
lenges and Dimensions, United Nations University Press, Tokyo, 1992. and Brown Weiss E. 
(2008): A nemzedékek közti igazságosság koncepciója mára elfogadottá vált [The Concept of In-
tergenerational Equity Has Become Accepted], Interview, Fundamentum, no. 1, 2008, pp. 31–36. 
195 Bartus G. and Á. Szalai (2014): Környezet, jog, közgazdaságtan [Environment, Law, Econom-
ics], Pázmány Press, Budapest 
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• Potpurri – Certain sustainability strategies, particularly those of the Eu-
ropean Union or its Member States, are elaborated by aggregating or 
merging existing or planned policy strategies. Here, the actual political 
content of the label of sustainable development merely consists of the 
coordination of different policies (climate protection, agriculture, water 
management, education, transport, etc.) and the use of the language of 
sustainability. 
• Humanistic/utopian Swiss knife – It is typical, particularly of intellec-
tuals and some civil society organisations, that they refer to sustainable 
development as a panacea for all the problems in the world. In this case, 
the sustainability policy should include an agreed plan for the solution 
of all kinds of crises and problems. The desired outcome of sustainability 
policy is a world without conflicts, in which all people (including those 
who are not yet born) live in harmony. 
• The lingua franca of urging North-South financial transfer – One of 
the constant elements of the international dialogue on sustainable devel-
opment is that, under this principle, countries that are less developed and 
poorer than average should be given continuous and increasing support. 
Here, sustainable development becomes a phrase whose different ele-
ments become the fixation of groups of countries with different levels of 
development. Given that, today, countries with richer biodiversity are 
generally less developed economically, while rich countries have, in 
many cases, already consumed a large part of their natural capital, the 
protection of the environment (biodiversity) promoted by rich countries 
can mainly be attained in poorer countries. The price of achieving this 
may be financial support. This is how this formula is developed: higher 
level of environmental protection (e.g. green economy) + financial sup-
port for emerging countries = sustainable development.  
• The secret code of anti-capitalism – Following the almost total fall of 
socialism in the 1980–90s, critics of capitalism used the arguments of 
sustainability to reformulate their views. As a result of intergenerational 
equity, the issue of intra-generational equity, or rather, that of redistrib-
utive equality arises.  
• Long-term resource management – It is a response to two key chal-
lenges facing the modern market economy and the democratic institu-
tional system, i.e. shorter time frames for decision-makers and ineffi-
cient management of investments in the future. It focuses primarily on 
the quantitative and qualitative monitoring of resources and, based on 
this, makes institutional or strategic proposals for improving decision-
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making. (As previously analysed, the authors of this publication consider 
this interpretation to be efficient.) 
Therefore, the policy of sustainability (sustainable development) represents 
the set of actions of the political community that establish appropriate insti-
tutional constraints and rules for the conservation and development of re-
sources maintaining their optimum size and proper internal structure. 
The National Framework Strategy on Sustainable Development for the pe-
riod until 2024, was adopted by the Hungarian National Assembly in March 
2013. The Framework Strategy highlights the following theoretical options 
for ensuring sustainability with institutional means: 
‘Therefore sustainability should be defined in a way that any generation 
while striving to create their own well-being, [does not exhaust the conditions 
of individual well-being and the public good,] do[es] not deplete their re-
sources, but conserve and expand them both in terms of quantity and quality 
for future generations. The interests of those unborn, and therefore without 
voting right, may only be protected by current generations limiting their own 
freedom through moral, constitutional or institutional restrictions. Bounda-
ries need to be drawn up, which cannot and should not be crossed, and own 
freedoms need to be limited in order to not succumb to temptations.’196  
The prevailing international tasks targeting sustainability are defined by the 
2030 Agenda of the United Nations, i.e. the so-called Sustainable Develop-
ment Goals.197 
  
                                                     
196 Hungarian National Assembly, National Framework Strategy on Sustainable Development 
2012–2024, Resolution 18/2013 (III. 28.) of the Hungarian National Assembly, 2013.  
197 United Nations, Transforming Our World: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, Res-
olution adopted by the General Assembly on 25 September 2015 (A/RES/70/1), 2015. 
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The 17 UN Sustainable Development Goals (2015–2030) 
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Tamás Pálvölgyi, Olivér Hortay 
7. Modelling Approaches in Environmental 
Integration 
Tamás Pálvölgyi 
7.1. Global, Regional, Multisectoral Modelling 
This point gives an overview of the modelling of the phenomena of the phys-
ical (natural) components of the planetary system (hereinafter referred to 
as global environmental change), with a particular focus on the processes of 
climate change and the way it can be modelled198. We have given special 
emphasis to this aspect because the risk of climate change and its socio-eco-
nomic context are becoming an increasingly inevitable factor in science, pol-
itics as well as in business planning and management. The socio-economic 
‘macro-modelling’ of the human (anthropogenic) components of the plan-
etary system will be discussed later. 
The starting point for the so-called ‘world models’ was the recognition that 
natural phenomena and socio-economic interactions form a single system 
and that no part of this complex interaction system can be designated as an 
area of research on its own. The combination of physical, biogeochemical 
and socio-economic processes is known as the planetary system. 
The processes and interactions of the planetary system cannot be described 
without taking into consideration human activities. The main impact factors 
of human activities (human influences, pressures) are the following: 
• greenhouse gas emissions, 
• land use, 
• use and pollution of waters, 
• emissions of air pollutants. 
 
These impact factors are the cause of global changes and the drivers of the 
following global, regional and local phenomena: 
• climate change, 
                                                     
198 A. Buzási, T. Pálvölgyi and M. Szalmáné Csete (2019): K-faktor: Klíma, gazdaság, társadalom 
[C Factor: Climate, Economy, Society], ISBN 978-963-313-302-6, 2019, https://repozito-
rium.omikk.bme.hu/handle/10890/13144, accessed 20 November 2019. 
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• loss of biodiversity, 
• environmental health problems (human and animal health). 
The main components and processes of the planetary sys-
tem 
 
Source: A. Szöllősi-Nagy (2019): Klímaváltozás: fókuszban a víz [Climate Change: Fo-
cusing on Water], Lecture at the conference of the Association of Climate-friendly Munici-
palities, Esztergom, 24 October 2019. 
 
7.1.1. The Physical Components and Processes of the 
Planetary System – How Does the Earth Work? 
In view of global environmental changes, the fact that the wide-ranging sub-
stance and energy cycles, as well as the food chain, are closed through 
the atmosphere is also of critical importance. With its rapid processes bridg-
ing great distances, the atmosphere ‘cuts short’ feedbacks between other ter-
restrial systems and provides a direct link between remote areas of the Earth. 
The analysis of long sets of data of different climatic characteristics has led 
to the conclusion that, in such quantities, there are simultaneous or lagged 
resonances (so-called ‘teleconnections’) at relatively remote locations of the 
Earth. A typical example of this process is the phenomenon known as ENSO 
(El Niño–Southern Oscillation), in which there is a close link between the 
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recurrent cold water upwelling along the South-American coast of the Pacific 
Ocean and the airflow conditions along the Australian coast (air pressure dif-
ferences, precipitation, extreme weather, etc.). Thus, the atmosphere—due 
to its chemical composition and its role in conveying impacts—has a key 
influence on the state of the other spheres of the Earth. 
A closer look at the current chemical composition of other planets and the 
chemical composition of ‘previous’ atmospheres of the Earth reveals that the 
presence or absence in the atmosphere of certain substances, whose 
quantity is minute compared to the planet as a whole, determines the 
character of the entire global ecosystem. To take an illustrative example, 
if there was no carbon dioxide in the atmosphere of our planet—and the total 
amount of CO2 in the atmosphere is less than the mass of the Mátra Moun-
tains in Hungary—, the average surface temperature of the Earth would be 
around -15 degrees Celsius, and the planet would probably be a frozen world 
without life. Another substance—whose quantity in the atmosphere is even 
smaller—is ozone, which was indispensable for the biosphere to come into 
existence and continue to exist on land areas. The total volume of this sub-
stance in the atmosphere is estimated at approximately one billionth of the 
mass of terrestrial biomass. One of the findings of the past 50 years of air 
observations—an unexpected one—is the existence of a major unidirectional 
change in the chemical composition of the atmosphere. 
Global environmental change and its main form, climate change, consti-
tute one of the most topical socio-economic issues. It has already become 
clear to both economic and political decision-makers and the people con-
cerned about the environment that such changes—which entail natural disas-
ters, hurricanes, drought and rising sea levels in certain parts of the Earth—
pose a serious risk to all the economies of the world. The climate in its broad 
sense—i.e. the spatial and temporal evolution of the state of the air and of the 
terrestrial systems interacting with it—is one of the most complex systems 
ever studied. The climate system is made up of the atmosphere, the sur-
face of the Earth, the oceans, the biosphere, and the cryosphere. It is a 
system of mutually interacting factors, in which the climate of the Earth is 
determined by the complex set of physical and chemical processes taking 
place on different temporal and spatial scales. The climate system can be 
regarded as a physical (natural) subsystem of the planetary system. 
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The components of the climate system 
 
Source: J. Bartholy and R. Pongrácz (eds.), Klímaváltozás [Climate Change], ELTE, Buda-
pest, 2013, bioszféra = biosphere; talajfelszín = soil surface; sugárzás = radiation; légkör = 
atmosphere; felhő = cloud; szél = wind; bio-geokémiai ciklus = biogeochemical cycle; 
üvegházgázok = greenhouse gases; csapadék = precipitation; párolgás = evaporation; óceán-
légkör hőcsere = ocean/atmosphere heat exchange; lefolyás = run-off; tengeráramlatok = 
ocean currents; óceán = ocean; tengeri jég = sea ice; jégtáblák = ice floes; krioszféra = cry-
osphere 
 
From the perspective of climate modelling, the factors and impacts determin-
ing the climate can be divided into three major groups: 
1. The extraterrestrial impacts include changes in the radiation of the Sun, 
which control the climate system, as well as the effect of astronomical bodies 
causing ebb and flow, and the cosmic particles entering the gravitational field 
of the Earth. 
2. The terrestrial impacts consist of the interactions between the four 
spheres of the Earth: 
• Surface of the Earth: It includes the arrangement of the continents, 
plate tectonic movements and the terrain. Soil characteristics, vegetation 
types, and the extension of free water surface are slowly changing fac-
tors, while soil moisture, vegetation cycles, and snow and ice cover are 
factors that change rapidly. 
• Oceans: Besides the atmosphere, the role of oceans is the most signifi-
cant due to the fact that 97% of the Earth’s water resources are located 
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in the oceans, as well as due to their high heat capacity and the charac-
teristics of their fluid mechanics systems. 
• Cryosphere: The snow and ice cover of the Earth is made up of the 
seasonal snow cover of land areas, the ice caps and ice sheets of the con-
tinents, the glaciers of mountains, and sea ice. The heat transfer between 
the cryosphere and the atmosphere, as well as the cryosphere’s capacity 
to reflect radiation, are considerable. 
• Biosphere: The role of flora, fauna and human activities is mainly re-
flected in the CO2 cycle and in the release of various aerosols into the 
atmosphere. 
3. The most important of the factors inside the atmosphere is its capacity 
to absorb and/or reflect radiation, which is closely related to the development 
of the greenhouse effect. Air chemical processes (interactions of ozone, CO2, 
water vapor and different aerosols with the atmosphere and with each other) 
and the dynamics of the atmosphere (creation and development of atmos-
pheric motion systems of different scales from small dust devils to general 
circulation) are also essential. The interactions between the components of 
the climate system can be broken down into positive and negative feedback 
processes: the first ones enhance, while the latter mitigate changes. Feedback 
mechanisms related to heat/ice albedo, water vapor and clouds are the most 
important in terms of global warming. 
7.1.2. The Process and Trends of the Greenhouse Effect – 
A Key Factor in Global Changes 
The world’s population is growing by one billion per decade. In the last two 
centuries, global energy demand has increased by approximately 2% per 
year. The energy and food needs of the developing world grow by 1–2% per 
year, while the population of developed countries is constantly aging. The 
revolution in the chemical industry in the past decades has led to the creation 
of some 5 million synthetic compounds, the use and elimination of which 
(e.g. residues accumulated in the food chain, microplastics) greatly aggravate 
the environmental condition of the Earth. If the current trends remain un-
changed, two-thirds of the species on the Earth could become extinct by 
2100. The drivers of global environmental change are closely related to other 
complex processes, which are also global in nature. 
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System of relations of global environmental change 
 
 
The modelling of the planetary system absolutely requires that the process 
of greenhouse effect be understood from a physical perspective—its causes 
from a socio-economic perspective—and described in mathematical terms. 
It has been known theoretically since the end of the 19th century and through 
reliable measurements since 1958 that the carbon dioxide, methane and ni-
trous oxide content of the atmosphere is rapidly increasing as a result of the 
use of fossil fuels, decreasing forest areas and large-scale agricultural activ-
ities. 
The Physical Background to the Greenhouse Effect 
When the rays of the Sun reach the Earth’s surface, a part of the energy is 
absorbed, thus warming the soil and the oceans. The remaining energy is re-
flected in outer space, but a part of it is absorbed by the atmosphere, thus 
raising further the temperature of the planet. This is known as the ‘green-
house effect’, since the atmosphere behaves like the glass walls of a green-
house, keeping the interior space warm. The greenhouse effect is caused by 
the presence of gases such as water vapor, carbon dioxide, methane and ni-
trous oxide (known as greenhouse gases) in the Earth’s atmosphere. Without 
this natural greenhouse effect, the average temperature of the surface of the 
Earth would be approximately 33 degrees Celsius lower than at present; 
therefore, the greenhouse effect is a natural process that is vital to life on 
Complex impact factors
•climate change
•loss of biodiversity
•environmental load
•land use
Natural resources
•water resources, soil, air
•forests, ecosystems
•landscape; spatial structure
•renewing energy sources;
Socio-economic conditions
•ownership; markets
•human resources; knowledge
•morals; ethics
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employment; quality of life; harmony with nature; 
population retention; security, etc.
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Earth. (This is why these compounds cannot be labeled as ‘harmful sub-
stances’, since it is not their atmospheric presence that causes problems but 
their increasing quantity.) 
The evolution of the quantity of the main greenhouse gases 
in the atmosphere over the past 200 years 
 CO2 
(carbon 
dioxide) 
CH4 
(me-
thane) 
N2O 
(nitrous 
oxide) 
HFC 
(halo-
fluoro-
carbon) 
PFC 
(per-
fluorocar-
bon) 
SF6 
(sulphur 
hexafluo-
ride) 
concentration 
before the indus-
trial revolution 
280 ppm 700 ppb 275 ppb - - - 
current concen-
tration (2014) 
405 ppm 1,830 ppb 350 ppb 0.15 ppb 0.07 ppb 0.05 ppb 
growth rate of 
concentration 
0.4 % per 
year 
0.8% per 
year 
0.3% per 
year 
7% per 
year 
2% per 
year 
? 
average resi-
dence time in 
the atmosphere 
50–
200 years 
8–
15 years  
120 years 50–
200 years 
approx. 
3,000 years 
3,200 years 
global warming 
potential (GWP) 
(on a scale of 
100 years) 
1 23 298 1,400–
15,000 
6,000–
15,000 
22,000 
Source: IPCC, Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report. Contribution of Working Groups I, 
II and III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 
[Core Writing Team, R.K. Pachauri and L.A. Meyer (eds.)], IPCC, Geneva, Switzerland, 
2014, pp. 1–31. 
 
Currently, the carbon dioxide content of the atmosphere is more than a 
third higher than before the industrial revolution, primarily due to the in-
creasing use of fossil fuels and extensive deforestation. Through the natural 
process—through the carbon dioxide absorption processes of plants and 
oceans, among others—, this gas is released into the atmosphere and then 
gets out of it in much larger quantities than those mentioned above. This 
means that human activities have upset the natural dynamic balance (the 
natural circulation of carbon dioxide and other substances) in such a way 
that natural carbon sinks are no longer able to absorb the extra carbon dioxide 
released into the atmosphere by non-natural means. The release into the at-
mosphere of one new methane molecule increases the greenhouse effect 
23 times as much as a carbon dioxide molecule, the release of a nitrous oxide 
molecule 300 times, while some halogenated hydrocarbon molecules tens of 
thousands of times as much. 
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Increased greenhouse gas emissions lead to a change in the thermal system 
of the atmosphere, a so-called radiative forcing. The spatial distribution of 
solar energy and its evolution in time are the primary drivers of all weather 
and climate processes. A part of the energy reaching the outer limits of the 
atmosphere is reflected by clouds, the surface and the solid particles sus-
pended in the atmosphere, and—taking into account the atmospheric absorp-
tion as well—approximately half of the energy reaches the surface of the 
Earth. A part of the infra-red thermal radiation emitted by the warmed-up 
surface is absorbed and reflected by clouds and the greenhouse components 
of the atmosphere, thus ensuring the balance between net incoming radiation 
and outgoing thermal radiation over a long period of time and on the whole 
of the Earth. Thus, considering the Earth-atmosphere system as a whole, 
greenhouse gases do not ‘heat’ our planet but change the structure of the 
vertical distribution of temperature by causing the lower layers of air to warm 
up and the higher ones to cool down. 
Atmospheric radiation transmission and the greenhouse 
effect 
 
Source: IPCC, Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report. Contribution of Working Groups I, 
II and III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 
[Core Writing Team, R.K. Pachauri and L.A. Meyer (eds.)], IPCC, Geneva, Switzerland, 
2014, pp. 1–31. 
 
The exploration of the greenhouse effect mechanism is not the result of the 
past few decades but of nearly one and a half centuries. As early as the 1860s, 
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scientists studying the atmosphere recognized the important role of trace 
gases in the pleasant climate of the Earth. In 1861, the first article by John 
Tyndall199 about the role of water vapor in heating the atmosphere was pub-
lished in the English Philosophical Magazine. The study written by Svante 
Arrhenius in 1896 described the expected atmospheric consequences of the 
increasing concentration of carbon dioxide due to coal burning.200 
Unlike greenhouses used in horticulture, the atmospheric greenhouse effect 
has some ‘special characteristics’: 
• air and cloud particles absorb a large proportion of solar radiation; 
• in a certain range (known as the ‘atmospheric window’), the Earth 
radiation passing through the atmosphere towards outer space is not 
absorbed by greenhouse gases; 
• the winds carrying air masses also play a major role in the free atmos-
phere; 
• the warm air cannot pass through the glass plate, but there is no such 
obstacle in the atmosphere (convection). 
Greenhouse Gas Emission Trends Globally and in Hungary 
Approximately 50% of the anthropogenic CO2 emitted since 1750 was re-
leased into the atmosphere in the last 40 years. Despite climate change miti-
gation policies, global CO2 emissions doubled from 1975 to 2015. The con-
tribution of CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion and industrial pro-
cesses to the overall increase of greenhouse gas emissions amounted to 
nearly 80% from 1975 to 2015. 
Anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions depend basically on population, 
economic activities, lifestyle, energy use, land use, technologies, and climate 
policy. There are several emission reduction pathways, which are probably 
able to keep the level of warming below 1.5 °C compared to pre-industrial 
levels. These pathways would all require substantial cuts in emissions over 
                                                     
199 J. Tyndall (1861): ‘On the Absorption and Radiation of Heat by Gases and Vapours, and on the 
Physical Connexion of Radiation, Absorption, Conduction.–The Bakerian Lecture’, The London, 
Edinburgh, and Dublin Philosophical Magazine and Journal of Science, series 4, vol. 22, pp. 169–
194, 273–285. 
200 J. Bartholy and R. Pongrácz (eds.) (2013:, Klímaváltozás [Climate Change], ELTE, Budapest, 
2013, http://elte.prompt.hu/sites/default/files/tananyagok/Klimavaltozas/index.html, accessed 
20 November 2019. 
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the next few decades as well as the reduction of CO2 and other greenhouse 
gases with a long residence time to almost zero by the 2050s. 
Without further efforts going beyond the current reduction in greenhouse gas 
emissions, as a result of global population growth and the increasing eco-
nomic activities, global emissions are expected to continue to grow. Accord-
ing to the baseline scenarios—which do not include emission reductions ex-
ceeding the cuts achieved so far—, by 2100, the global average temperature 
is expected to increase by 3.7–4.8 °C compared to the average temperature 
of the period from 1850 to 1900. 
The evolution of CO2 concentration and the required emission cuts 
Measurement data of atmospheric CO2 concentration (past) 
 
NOAA, https://www.esrl.noaa.gov/gmd/ccgg/trends/full.html, accessed 20 Nov. 2019. 
 
The quantity of CO2 in the atmosphere is rising steadily, and it has already 
reached the highest level of the last 800,000 years. The scientists agree that 
the most dangerous irreversible consequences of climate change can be 
avoided if the increase in the global average temperature does not exceed 
1.5 °C. However, for this to happen, GHG emissions should be reduced by 
at least 55% worldwide by 2030, and net-zero emissions would be the target 
for 2050. 
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Potential CO2 emission pathways limiting global warming to 
1,5 °C (future) 
 
IPCC, ‘Summary for Policymakers’, in Global Warming of 1.5°C. An IPCC Special Report 
on the impacts of global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and related global 
greenhouse gas emission pathways, in the context of strengthening the global response to 
the threat of climate change, sustainable development, and efforts to eradicate poverty, 
2018, https://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/special-reports/sr15/sr15_spm_final.pdf, accessed 15 No-
vember 2018. 
 
In 2017, Hungary’s greenhouse gas emissions amounted to approximately 
64 million tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent201, which constitutes a nearly 
40% fall compared to the early 1990s. 6 tonnes per capita emissions are rel-
atively low in Europe (the EU average is 9 tonnes per capita). The most im-
portant greenhouse gas is still carbon dioxide, which accounts for 78% of 
total emissions. The main source of carbon dioxide emissions is fossil fuel 
combustion in power stations, households and transportation. Methane ac-
counts for 12% of Hungary’s total GHG emissions, while nitrous oxide for 
approximately 7%. The main sources of these two compounds are agriculture 
                                                     
201 NIR (2019): National Inventory Report for Hungary 1985–2017, Hungarian Meteorological Ser-
vice and National Food Chain Safety Office, 2019, https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/re-
source/hun-2019-nir-15apr19.zip, accessed 20 November 2019. 
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and chemical production. The analysis of emissions per sector reveals that 
the energy sector accounts for exactly three-quarters of the total emissions. 
Agriculture accounts for 12.1%, industrial processes for 12.3% and the waste 
sector for 5.8% of greenhouse gas emissions. From the 1990s to the early 
2010s, GHG emissions were continuously decreasing, mainly due to the 
transformation of the structure of the economy (the decline of the energy-
intensive heavy industry). However, since 2013 GHG emissions in Hun-
gary have been increasing by 3–5% per year, which draws attention to the 
importance of measures concerning energy efficiency and transportation. 
GHG emissions and the index of GDP (2000–2017) 
 
Source: edited by the author on the basis of data from NIR, National Inventory Report for 
Hungary 1985–2017, Hungarian Meteorological Service and National Food Chain Safety 
Office, 2019, https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/hun-2019-nir-15apr19.zip, ac-
cessed 20 November 2019. 
pozitív szétcsatolás = positive decoupling; fenntartható = sustainable; GHG index = GHG 
index; GDP index = GDP index 
7.1.3. Climate Modelling 
Climate modelling, i.e. the mathematical description of the climate system 
on the basis of physics, plays a key role in the modelling of the planetary 
138 
system.202 Climate may be one of the most complex phenomena ever studied; 
therefore, climate research requires cooperation between geophysics, atmos-
pheric physics, oceanography, astronomy, and according to the most recent 
views, even biology, as well as the synthesis of their findings. 
Studies of recent decades have demonstrated that changing climate is the nat-
ural state of the climate system, which is comprised of the atmosphere, the 
oceans, the continents, the polar ice caps, and the biosphere (see above). This 
feature, characteristic in both space and time, is what creates the diverse 
global climate, including tundra and the tropics, as well as ice ages and warm 
periods between them. One of the causes of climate variability lies in the 
nature of the interactions within the climate system: it can be assumed that 
our climate environment is a so-called chaotic dynamic system, in which 
processes changing the state of the system can take place, within certain lim-
its, ‘by themselves’, without any external influence. The other cause of cli-
mate variability is forced variability. In this perspective, changes in the state 
of the climate system are caused by oscillations and trends in the chemical 
composition of the atmosphere, the extent of solar and volcanic activity and 
the polluting activities of technical civilization. This double nature of tem-
poral climate behaviour raises the question of whether the climate of the 
future can be known at all. 
The time scale selected for the examination of climate change is crucial for 
finding an answer to this question. If we opt for the geologic time scale and 
put the question of what the climate of our planet will be like in 50 million 
years’ time, the answer is clearly ‘no’: we cannot adequately describe either 
the future of these forced processes or the unpredictable, chaotic variability. 
However, if the question refers to how the climate will evolve in a few dec-
ades (perhaps centuries), we can give a probable answer, because it is 
fairly unlikely that in the next century a chaotic phenomenon comparable to 
the climatic consequences of the greenhouse effect and possibly neutralizing 
it will occur. In other words, if the pace and extent of unidirectional changes 
in the greenhouse trace gases of the atmosphere to be expected in the coming 
decades were known precisely, then theoretically, it would be possible to 
give a probable forecast for the (forced) changes in the climate. The tool 
used for this ‘if-then’ type of climate studies is the climate model. These 
mathematical models based on physics are only capable of taking into con-
                                                     
202 J. Bartholy and R. Pongrácz (eds.) (2013): Klímaváltozás [Climate Change], ELTE, Budapest, 
2013, http://elte.prompt.hu/sites/default/files/tananyagok/Klimavaltozas/index.html, accessed 
20 November 2019. 
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sideration a relatively narrow (albeit growing) range of interactions. We can-
not disregard the fact that the causal relationships identified (including 
‘model forecasts’) are surrounded by scientific uncertainty that is difficult to 
estimate, which is aggravated by the practical impossibility of testing the vi-
ability of these models. 
The purpose of climate models is to describe the interactions of the pro-
cesses of the climate system; they simulate the movements in the atmos-
phere and oceans and estimate the expected evolution of temperature, den-
sity, and air pressure. They describe the elements of the hydrological cycle 
as well as the expansion and melting of polar ice caps and glaciers. They 
provide approximations of cloud and precipitation formation processes. 
An important issue in climate forecast is to establish to what extent a model 
is able to give an accurate description of the average behaviour of the climate 
system (e.g. the atmosphere or oceans), regardless of the prediction of the 
occurrence of specific weather events. In practice, this refers to how much 
the simulated climate changes compared to the average (mostly compared to 
a reference climate). Climate can thus be characterized by statistical in-
dicators: multi-annual monthly average, average annual precipitation levels, 
etc. However, the atmosphere is highly sensitive to the baseline conditions 
due to its non-linear, turbulent and locally chaotic nature, which means that 
small initial errors in the model can lead to major forecast and simulation 
errors. Therefore, a single categorical forecast alone has limited validity, 
since the forecast should be completed with the probability of its viability in 
order to ensure that as much information is available to users as possible. 
Rough model results, generally, cannot be used directly; therefore, they must 
be subject to additional statistical and/or dynamic adaptation procedures or 
post-processing operations. 
All modern climate models include the atmosphere, land surface, oceans 
and sea ice as sub-models. The atmospheric and ocean modules are general 
circulation models containing both a thermodynamic and a hydrodynamic 
description, which explicitly simulate the fluid mechanics of the given me-
dium. 
Atmospheric General Circulation Models (AGCM) 
Generic circulation models describing atmospheric processes are computer 
programs that can be used to simulate the temporal evolution of the three-
dimensional state of the atmosphere (i.e. of the fields of different state indi-
cators). This requires the definition of the conservation laws that can be ap-
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plied to the hydro-thermodynamic processes of the atmosphere, or more pre-
cisely, their approximation using mathematical equations (partial differential 
equation system). The state indicators used are temperature, air pressure, 
fluid motion rate (a three-dimensional vector quantity), and the density of the 
various phases of water vapor and water (cloud and precipitation elements). 
The models define the state indicator fields, considered to be continuous, us-
ing a multi-layer grid. The grid resolution is usually determined by computer 
capacity. As the whole atmosphere can be regarded as a single thin spherical 
layer, the vertical distance between grid lines is usually two orders of mag-
nitude smaller (~0.1 to 1 km) than the horizontal distance (~10 to 100 km). 
Some of the processes determining atmospheric movements (which are gen-
erally at least one order of magnitude larger than the distance between grid 
lines) can be described well using this grid, while others cannot. The latter 
are known as subgrid-scale processes.  
The overall impact of such processes is represented in the model by parame-
terizations. Today, practically all AGCMs are based on this parameterization 
approximation, which can only manage the convectional upstream and 
downstream processes (e.g. cumulus clouds, thunderstorms, organised con-
vection) by means of parameterization. Each AGCM must include a so-called 
radiation module describing the short- and long-wave radiation transmission 
processes in the atmosphere. These processes are determined by the absorp-
tion, dispersion and emission of atmospheric gases and aerosol particles. 
Each AGCM contains parameterization for the description of subgrid-scale 
processes. The spatial and temporal scales of these processes—taking into 
consideration local cumulonimbus clouds or giving an approximation for the 
heat exchange between the soil and the atmosphere—are too small to be de-
scribed directly using the model’s grid. 
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The impact of the resolution of the models on the evolution 
of estimated precipitation fields and of the observed annual 
precipitation 
 
Source: J. Bartholy and R. Pongrácz (eds.), Klímaváltozás [Climate Change], ELTE, Buda-
pest, 2013, http://elte.prompt.hu/sites/default/files/tananyagok/Klimavaltozas/index.html, 
accessed 20 Nov. 2019. megfigyelések = observations; rácsfelbontás = grid resolution 
Ocean General Circulation Models (OGCM) 
Similarly to the atmosphere, the World Ocean’s water circulation models 
(OGCMs) are based on an approximation of the mathematical formulae of 
conservation laws. The fundamental difference between the two flowing me-
dia, i.e. the atmosphere and the ocean, is that while the atmosphere can be 
compressed, the ocean is essentially incompressible. However, the water 
of the World Ocean – which is approximately 3–4 km deep on average – can 
not be regarded as totally incompressible. One reason for this is the pressure 
of 300–400 bars deep down in the ocean, which significantly alters the den-
sity of water. The second reason, which plays a much more important role in 
the development of the ocean circulation system, is the fact that if the tem-
perature and salinity change, the density of seawater also changes. This is 
why the global water circulation of the ocean is called thermohaline cir-
culation. In the attached climate models, OGCMs – similarly to AGCMs – 
constitute only a sub-module of the entire coupled model. The couplings con-
sist of the balance of momentum, heat and water vapor flows between the 
atmosphere and the ocean, and of the heat flows and salt concentration be-
142 
tween the ocean and sea ice. Similarly to the atmosphere, the horizontal di-
mensions of the ocean are also three orders of magnitude larger than its ver-
tical dimensions. However, as the density of seawater is three orders of mag-
nitude higher than the density of the atmosphere, the forces and mechanisms 
determining horizontal and vertical flows are less separated than in the at-
mosphere. With its three large ocean basins, the continents as impenetrable 
barriers, narrow straits and significant differences in the terrain of the seabed; 
the geometry of the ocean is completely different from the geometry of the 
atmosphere, which should be taken into consideration by modelling. Due to 
the salinity-related differences in density, the thermodynamics of the 
ocean is very complex, and we only have approximate knowledge of the 
seawater’s equation of state. 
Similarly to the large-scale eddies of an average size of a few thousand kilo-
meters (cyclones and anticyclones) in the atmosphere, the ocean also has its 
geostrophic ring eddies of 10 to 100 km, which transfer a significant amount 
of energy. They are usually located along frontal zones separating cold and 
warm water masses (e.g. the border zone between the Gulf Stream and the 
Labrador Current), just like their counterparts in the atmosphere. However, 
ocean eddies are not included explicitly in any of the current ocean models, 
only in a parameterized form. Currently, their integration into OGCMs in a 
direct form is the biggest challenge in the field of ocean modelling, since this 
would significantly reduce uncertainties concerning the mixing and transpor-
tation processes. 
Sea Ice Models 
Each AOGCM contains a sea ice sub-model even though, in most models, 
the continental ice sheet is included only as a constraint. The models include 
the elements of sea ice dynamics and thermodynamics alike: the physics of 
ice movements, heat and salt transfer processes within the ice as well as be-
tween the ice and the surrounding seawater. While in reality, sea ice is made 
up of floes that are 10 to 10,000 m wide and only a few meters (<10 m) thick, 
the models regard sea ice as a single ice sheet. The descriptions rely on the 
appropriate exact physical theory, known as rheology, which studies the re-
lationship between shear stress and the movements and deformation caused 
by it. Ice models greatly vary in terms of their thermodynamic description. 
The models divide the sea ice cover into different parts horizontally (e.g. 
shore-fast ice, drift ice, etc.). The grid network of sea ice models is usually 
the same as the grid network of the underlying ocean model (i.e. it is based 
on ocean models, just like biosphere models are based on soil models). The 
albedo of snow and ice surfaces—the proportion of the solar radiation they 
143 
reflect—plays a very important role in the climate system; therefore, the sci-
entists developing the models strive to parameterize this mechanism ever 
more precisely. 
 
Olivér Hortay 
7.2. Macroeconomic Models 
The core task of macroeconomics is to identify the main processes underly-
ing the long-term growth of economies, to explore their complex mecha-
nisms of action and to forecast their future evolution. As climate change is 
expected to have a significant impact on economic output in the future, both 
globally and regionally, it should be considered in growth models. The great-
est difficulty concerning implementation is that chemical and physical pro-
cesses affecting climate change must be added to the social processes consti-
tuting the main focus of economics, which requires a complex, interdiscipli-
nary approach. 
The foundations for the integration of two large and rather complex areas, 
i.e. economic growth and climate change, were laid by William D. Nordhaus, 
who received the shared Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences in 2018 for his 
scientific work in this field. The model developed by Nordhaus in the 1990s 
allows for the integration of climate change caused by human activity into 
previous growth models. The purpose of this subchapter is to present 
Nordhaus’s basic model. The background to the model—previous growth 
models serving as a starting point and the evolution of the integration of cli-
mate change—will be described briefly. This will be followed by a detailed 
discussion of the basic regional model and its global extension, including its 
simplifications and constraints. The sub-chapter will conclude with the 
presentation of the results of Nordhaus’s early model and its policy implica-
tions. The sub-chapter draws heavily on the book of Nordhaus and Boyer, 
published in 2000203, in which the original DICE model (Dynamic Integrated 
model of Climate and the Economy)—improved continuously by Nordhaus 
in the 1990s—and its regional version, the RICE model (Regional Dynamic 
Integrated model of Climate and the Economy) are described by the authors 
in detail. 
                                                     
203 W.D. Nordhaus and J. Boyer (2000): Warming the World: Economic Models of Global Warm-
ing, Cambridge, MA, The MIT Press. 
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7.2.1. The Background to Models Integrating Economic 
Growth and Climate Change 
An event of outstanding importance in terms of resource management was 
the 1973 oil crisis (and the preceding report by the Club of Rome204), which 
directed the attention of a large number of economists to the natural re-
sources, which could potentially limit economic growth. In an article pub-
lished in 1974, Robert M. Solow—whose thesis written in the 1950s205 had 
played a decisive role in the growth theory of that period—expanded his orig-
inal model with the use of exhaustible natural resources, following the rule 
previously proposed by Harold Hotelling206. In the same year, William D. 
Nordhaus gave a graphic description of the changes in economic thinking, 
which is perhaps the most important antecedent to the model presented in 
this sub-chapter.207 In his famous example, Nordhaus stated that while pre-
viously a kind of ‘cowboy’ approach had been prevalent in economics, which 
regarded natural resources to be inexhaustible compared to the extent of their 
use, economic growth had already reached a level where economists had to 
switch to a ‘spaceship’ approach, according to which resources were exhaust-
ible and had to be appreciated. 
With the progress of ecological research in the 1970s and 1980s, in addition 
to the fear of the exhaustion of resources, other factors that could affect long-
term economic growth also emerged and had to be addressed by economists. 
Climate change is one of the global problems, and it continues to be very 
relevant. The problem poses two main challenges for economists: firstly, 
they have to analyse the potential impacts of climate change on economic 
growth, and secondly, as the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions—which 
are the reason for climate change—is costly, they have to make a proposal 
on the types and timing of the required interventions. One of the first inte-
grated macroeconomic models used for assessing the economic impacts of 
climate change was the DICE model, whose partial results were presented by 
Nordhaus on several fora from 1990 onwards, and he also published them in 
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a single framework, in a summarised form in 1994208. The model integrated 
a number of innovations in economic thinking, but it also received technical 
criticisms. The RICE model, in which the global model is made up of various 
regional modules, was created on the basis of such criticisms, and later on, it 
was the starting point for the work of several researchers involved in the 
study of the economic impacts of climate change and the possible interven-
tions. 
Although the DICE model was published earlier than the RICE model, the 
first one faded into the background after the publication of the latter. One 
reason for this is that the world’s regions are very different; therefore, the 
economic impact of climate change can be assessed more precisely—which 
is the main objective of these models—by considering them separately and 
then aggregating the results. The other reason is that the separation of regions 
allows for addressing the issues concerning the optimal use of fossil fuels—
whose concentration is geographically different—and the optimal allocation 
of carbon dioxide emission allowances between countries and periods. In 
general, the DICE model is a simplified version of the RICE model and is 
more of historical importance. Accordingly, the following section will pro-
vide a detailed description of the RICE model. 
7.2.2. Specification and Global Extension of the RICE 
Model 
From a mathematical perspective, the RICE model is an optimization algo-
rithm, whose objective function is the maximization of the prevailing social 
welfare of the region considered, and its limiting factors are the equations 
describing economic and natural relationships. Since the model is intended 
to capture very complex interrelationships with many components that are 
difficult to define mathematically, simplifications and assumptions have to 
be applied. These will be discussed at a later point, together with the specifi-
cation of the model. The equations of the model can be divided into four 
groups: relationships concerning the objective function, the economic rela-
tions and the impacts of climate change, as well as the optimum in the market 
of fossil fuels. This section describes the model’s equations in this order. 
Objective Function 
The first problem that arises with regard to the objective function is the def-
inition of social welfare. One part of the problem is a static measurement 
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difficulty regarding how welfare can be quantified, while the other part—
which derives from the fact that the model examines long time spans and 
several periods—concerns the question of how the conversion of values be-
tween periods can be managed, i.e. how the model can be dynamized. The 
RICE model addresses the measurement-related difficulty of the first prob-
lem using the concept of ‘generalized consumption’, which is commonly 
used in macroeconomics. This means that the model assumes that the opera-
tors of the economy can produce and consume a single type of goods; thus, 
investments can also be used to increase the production of the good con-
cerned. In this way, the changes concerning this single good provide an indi-
cation of the changes in social welfare. 
From an economic perspective, the question of the trade-off between differ-
ent periods is one of the key problems of the efforts aimed at reducing climate 
change. The main dilemma refers to the number of goods that society should 
renounce in order to ensure that the production potential of future generations 
is preserved. Each generation in each period has to decide what proportion 
of the goods meant to be invested is used to increase productivity and how 
much is used to mitigate climate change. The first group of goods produces 
a larger amount of consumable goods but greater climate risks in the next 
period, while the latter leaves an unchanged amount of goods and lower cli-
mate risks for future generations. The RICE model includes a so-called dis-
count factor for addressing the problem of intertemporality, which represents 
the society’s willingness to make trade-offs between periods. On this basis, 
the objective function of each region considered can be described with the 
following formula: 
𝑊𝐽 =∑𝑈[𝑐𝐽(𝑡), 𝐿𝐽(𝑡)]𝑅(𝑡)
𝑡
 
𝑊𝐽 stands for the social welfare of region 𝐽, which needs to be maximized 
during the optimization process. 𝑐𝐽(𝑡) represents the per capita consumption 
of region 𝐽 during period 𝑡, while 𝐿𝐽(𝑡) is the size of its population. 
𝑈[𝑐𝐽(𝑡), 𝐿𝐽(𝑡)] is the utility of consumption, while 𝑅(𝑡) stands for the dis-
count factor, which is the same for all regions. The model aims to maximize 
the sum total of discounted utilities over all the periods of the entire time 
span considered, in a regional breakdown. With regard to the utility function, 
the RICE model assumes that higher levels of consumption generate greater 
utility and that there is the diminishing marginal utility of consumption as 
consumption increases. The utility function of consumption—also known as 
the economic value of welfare—is obtained by multiplying the size of the 
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population of the given period [𝐿𝐽(𝑡)] by the utility of per capita consump-
tion, which can be interpreted as follows: 
𝑈[𝑐𝐽(𝑡), 𝐿𝐽(𝑡)] = 𝐿𝐽(𝑡)
𝑐𝐽(𝑡)
1−𝛼 − 1
1 − 𝛼
 
In this equation, parameter 𝛼 is the elasticity of the marginal utility of con-
sumption, i.e. the selection of this parameter determines the curvature of the 
utility function. The empirical DICE and RICE models assume a limit value 
of 𝛼 = 1, which yields the following utility function, the so-called Bernoul-
lian utility function: 
𝑈[𝑐𝐽(𝑡), 𝐿𝐽(𝑡)] = 𝐿𝐽(𝑡){𝑙𝑜𝑔[𝑐𝐽(𝑡)]} 
The key parameter of the utility function is the population, whose future evo-
lution is calculated by the model on the basis of the initial population of the 
region [𝐿𝐽(0)] and the rate of population growth [𝑔𝐽
𝑝𝑜𝑝(𝑡)] as follows: 
𝐿𝐽(𝑡) = 𝐿𝐽(0)𝑒𝑥𝑝 (∫ 𝑔𝐽
𝑝𝑜𝑝(𝑡)
𝑡
0
) 
When the RICE-99 model was elaborated, population forecasts predicted a 
declining growth rate, therefore, choosing it as a constant proved to be inef-
fective. For this reason, the model calculates the growth rate on the basis of 
an initial growth rate [𝑔𝐽
𝑝𝑜𝑝(0)] and a constant rate of decline [−𝛿𝑗
𝑝𝑜𝑝
], which 
varies from one region to another, as follows: 
𝑔𝐽
𝑝𝑜𝑝(𝑡) = 𝑔𝐽
𝑝𝑜𝑝(0)𝑒𝑥𝑝(−𝛿𝑗
𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑡) 
In the empirical model, the initial growth rate was 1.5% and the maximum 
global population, also known as the population limit of the given period, 
was 11.5 billion. 
According to the assumption related to the discount rate, taking the same 
population size and per capita consumption, the marginal social utility of 
consumption is higher. The original empirical model operates in periods of 
ten years, in which flow variables are reported as flows per year, while stock 
variables are measured at the end of the period. The discount rate depends on 
the pure time preference of society [𝜌(𝑣)] as follows: 
𝑅(𝑡) =∏[1 + 𝜌(𝑣)]−10
𝑡
𝑣=0
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Due to the long time period considered, the selection of the pure time prefer-
ence (or discount rate) has a significant impact on the results of the model. 
In the first DICE model, Nordhaus used a constant discount rate of three per-
cent, but later this was strongly contested by other researchers. Many re-
search results on the human perception of time show that the social discount 
rate declines as the time span increases. Accordingly, one of the improve-
ments made to the model was the dynamization of the discount rate with a 
constant rate of decline [−𝑔𝜌𝑡]; thus the corrected version uses the following 
equation: 
𝜌(𝑡) = 𝜌(0)exp⁡(−𝑔𝜌𝑡) 
In the empirical model of 1999, the discount rate [𝜌(0)] starts at 3 percent in 
the initial year of 1995 and declines to 2.3 percent in 2100 and to 1.8 percent 
in 2200. 
Economic Relationships 
The RICE model calculates the economic output of the region using the 
Cobb-Douglas production function, which is the most commonly used func-
tion in traditional growth models. One of the innovations of the model is that, 
in its production function, the output [𝑄(𝑡)]—in addition to the capital stock 
[𝐾(𝑡)], labour [𝐿(𝑡)] and technology [𝐴(𝑡)], which are traditionally taken 
into account—is also affected by energy services from the combustion of 
fossil fuels [𝐸𝑆(𝑡)], as well as their unit costs [𝑐𝐽
𝐸(𝑡)]. Another innovation of 
this model is the integration of a so-called ‘damage coefficient’ [Ω𝐽(𝑡)] into 
the production function, which represents the impact of climate change on 
economic output. The production function can, therefore, be formulated as 
follows: 
𝑄𝐽(𝑡) = Ω𝐽(𝑡){𝐴𝐽(𝑡)𝐾𝐽(𝑡)
𝛾𝐿𝐽(𝑡)
1−𝛽𝐽−𝛾𝐸𝑆𝐽(𝑡)
𝛽𝐽 − 𝑐𝐽
𝐸(𝑡)𝐸𝑆𝐽(𝑡)} 
The production function has three parameters that can be calibrated: 𝛾 is the 
elasticity of output with respect to changes in capital and 𝛽𝐽 is the elasticity 
of output with respect to changes in energy services. In this model, techno-
logical progress is reflected in two different ways: in productivity growth and 
in the improvement of energy conversion efficiency. 𝐴𝐽(𝑡) indicates the ex-
ogenously increasing productivity, whose future evolution—similarly to 
population—is influenced by a region-specific and time-varying parameter 
reflecting the growth rate [𝑔𝑗
𝐴(𝑡)] as follows: 
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𝐴𝐽(𝑡) = 𝐴𝐽(0)⁡𝑒𝑥𝑝 (∫ 𝑔𝐽
𝐴(𝑡)
𝑡
0
) 
There is significant uncertainty concerning the projection of the future evo-
lution of productivity. The RICE model assumes that the improvement of 
productivity will slow down. The growth rate for the period considered can 
be calculated on the basis of its initial value [𝑔𝑗
𝐴(0)] and a constant rate of 
increase [−𝛿𝑗
𝐴𝑡] as follows: 
𝑔𝑗
𝐴(𝑡) = 𝑔𝑗
𝐴(0)𝑒𝑥𝑝(−𝛿𝑗
𝐴𝑡) 
Another type of technological development is related to the improvement of 
energy conversion efficiency. The energy service [𝐸𝑆(𝑡)] included in the 
production function is calculated by multiplying the amount of fossil fuels 
used [𝐸𝐽(𝑡)] by their conversion factor [𝜍𝐽(𝑡)]. 
𝐸𝑆𝐽(𝑡) = 𝜍𝐽(𝑡)𝐸𝐽(𝑡) 
In this model, the growth of energy generating technologies that do not pro-
duce carbon dioxide emissions is taken into account through the increase of 
the conversion factor. Similarly to the population and productivity, the con-
version factor is predicted with the following equation including a time-var-
ying growth rate parameter [𝑔𝐽
𝑍(𝑡)] and a constant rate of increase [−𝛿𝑗
𝑍𝑡]: 
𝜍𝐽(𝑡) = 𝜍𝐽(0)⁡𝑒𝑥𝑝 (∫ 𝑔𝐽
𝑍(𝑡)
𝑡
0
) 
𝑔𝐽
𝑍(𝑡) = 𝑔𝐽
𝑍(0)⁡𝑒𝑥𝑝(−𝛿𝑗
𝑍𝑡) 
The main difference between the DICE and RICE models is that while the 
DICE model considers the entire world economy and its emissions to be a 
single agent, in an aggregate manner, in the RICE model, regions can trade 
their carbon dioxide emission allowances. In growth models that assume a 
traditionally closed economy—due to the generalized consumption con-
cept—the region considered uses one part of the economic output (or the 
GDP produced) [𝑄𝐽(𝑡)] for consumption [𝐶𝐽(𝑡)] and the other part for in-
vestment [𝐼𝐽(𝑡)]. In the RICE model, potential revenues and costs deriving 
from the trading of carbon dioxide emission allowances are added to the 
available emission allowances. The model does not examine other types of 
commercial activities. Therefore, the budgetary constraint of the region con-
cerned is as follows: 
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𝑄𝐽(𝑡) + 𝜏𝐽(𝑡)[Π𝐽(𝑡) − 𝐸𝐽(𝑡)] = 𝐶𝐽(𝑡) + 𝐼𝐽(𝑡) 
Π𝐽(𝑡) is the number of allowances allocated to the region and 𝜏𝐽(𝑡) is the unit 
cost of carbon dioxide emissions. It is important to note that the RICE model 
primarily regards energy carriers as fossil fuels, and thus provides the value 
of the parameter 𝐸𝐽(𝑡) on the basis of its carbon content, which means that 
the fuel used is equal to its carbon content. Energy use, therefore, reduces the 
amount of carbon dioxide emissions available to a region. As in this model 
fossil fuels are represented in terms of both quantity and price by a parameter 
each; during the empirical implementation, the estimation of such parameters 
should be done by the weighted aggregation of different technologies. 
Depending on whether the region considered uses more or less carbon than 
it is entitled to, its budgetary constraint may decrease or increase. The 
𝜏𝐽(𝑡) unit cost parameter can be interpreted both as the price of the carbon 
dioxide emission quota and as the Pigovian tax payable for carbon dioxide 
emissions. The RICE model assumes that emission trading between regions 
is efficient, thus the price of carbon dioxide emissions is equalized, and its 
value is at least zero. 
The region’s total consumption can be calculated by multiplying per capita 
consumption by the population size: 
𝐶𝐽(𝑡) = 𝑐𝐽(𝑡)𝐿𝐽(𝑡) 
In order to determine the amount of capital available to the region considered 
during a given period, the capital stock of the previous period must be re-
duced by a depreciation rate 𝛿𝐾. The empirical RICE model assumes that the 
capital depreciates at 10 percent per year, and since investment is measured 
at annual rates, the depreciation should be adjusted to the ten-year period as 
follows: 
𝐾𝐽(𝑡) = 𝐾𝐽(𝑡 − 1)(1 − 𝛿𝐾)
10 + 10 × (𝑡 − 1) 
The production function includes the cost per unit of the region’s energy ser-
vice [𝑐𝐽
𝐸(𝑡)], which is the sum total of the world market price of energy 
[𝑞(𝑡)], which is assumed to be equalized globally, and a markup 
[𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑢𝑝𝐽
𝐸(𝑡)], which is different in each region. In the RICE model, the 
markup captures the costs of energy transportation and distribution, the 
amount of which is assumed to be constant over time. The improvement of 
transportation and distribution technologies is represented by the increase of 
the previously discussed productivity. 
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𝑐𝐽
𝐸(𝑡) = 𝑞(𝑡) + 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑢𝑝𝐽
𝐸(𝑡) 
The first DICE and RICE models used fixed energy costs on the basis of the 
explicit assumption that the available stocks are inexhaustible. However, this 
was strongly criticized in the related literature, as the stocks of fossil fuels—
which are at the center of the model—are limited, and due to the considered 
time period of two hundred years, the depletion of the stocks may have a 
significant impact on world market prices. In the improved models, world 
market prices for energy are determined on the basis of each region’s energy 
demand. The cumulative energy demand [𝐶𝑢𝑚𝐶(𝑡)] related to global eco-
nomic output can be calculated as the sum of the demand registered at the 
end of the previous period and the annual demands adjusted with the 10-year 
period: 
𝐶𝑢𝑚𝐶(𝑡) = 𝐶𝑢𝑚𝐶(𝑡 − 1) + 10 ×∑𝐸𝐽(𝑡)
𝐽
 
As the RICE model focuses on fossil fuels, which are available to a limited 
extent, the model expects that, in the future, at a certain amount of global 
demand [𝐶𝑢𝑚𝐶∗], there will be an inflection point in the extraction costs of 
energy carriers, beyond which their marginal costs will begin to rise. Accord-
ingly, the world market price for energy is calculated with the following 
equation: 
𝑞(𝑡) = 𝜉1 + 𝜉2 [
𝐶𝑢𝑚𝐶(𝑡)
𝐶𝑢𝑚𝐶∗
]
𝜉3
 
𝜉1, 𝜉2 and 𝜉3 are fit parameters, whose modification allows for the energy 
supply curve to be estimated on the basis of empirical observations and ex-
pectations. Due to the overall growth framework of the model, operators ef-
ficiently allocate their use of energy sources, thus the empirical model con-
firms the intuition, and low fossil fuel prices increase over time.  
7.2.3. Modelling the Impacts of Climate Change 
The main difficulty in defining the damage coefficient [Ω𝐽(𝑡)] of the produc-
tion function is that there is very limited experience concerning the interac-
tion between climate change and economic output (during the elaboration of 
the models, this problem was aggravated by the limited data available). For 
this reason, during the development of the DICE and RICE models, the way 
greenhouse gases were addressed changed significantly. The early version 
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was intended to model all greenhouse gas emissions in an endogenous man-
ner. However, reactions to the initial model led to improvements: industrial 
carbon dioxide emissions became the exclusive focus of the model, thus the 
1999 RICE model described herein considers the emissions of other types of 
carbon dioxide (e.g. related to land use) and other greenhouse gases to be 
exogenous. 
Another major change—between the initial and the improved DICE and 
RICE models—in terms of the modelling of climate change is the more com-
plex consideration of the carbon cycle. The first models used an empirical 
approach to estimating the flows related to the dispersion and absorption of 
carbon dioxide, but the critics pointed out that the dispersion properties of 
carbon dioxide are different in each reservoir. Therefore, the 1999 model ex-
amines three different reservoirs for carbon: the atmosphere, the upper 
oceans and the biosphere, and the deep oceans. The empirical model assumes 
that each of the three reservoirs are well-mixed in the short run, while the 
mixing between the upper reservoirs and deep oceans is assumed to be slow 
in the long run. In the RICE model, the increase of the concentration of car-
bon dioxide and its mixing between the reservoirs can be described with the 
following equations: 
𝑀𝐴𝑇(𝑡) = 10 × 𝐸𝑇(𝑡 − 1) + 𝜙11𝑀𝐴𝑇(𝑡 − 1) + 𝜙21𝑀𝑈𝑃(𝑡 − 1) 
𝑀𝑈𝑃(𝑡) = 𝜙22𝑀𝑈𝑃(𝑡 − 1) + 𝜙12𝑀𝐴𝑇(𝑡 − 1) + 𝜙32𝑀𝐿𝑂(𝑡 − 1) 
𝑀𝐿𝑂(𝑡) = 𝜙33𝑀𝐿𝑂(𝑡 − 1) + 𝜙23𝑀𝑈𝑃(𝑡 − 1) 
𝑀𝐴𝑇(𝑡) is the end-of-period mass of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, 
𝑀𝑈𝑃(𝑡) is the mass of carbon dioxide in the biosphere and the upper oceans, 
while 𝑀𝐿𝑂(𝑡) is the mass of carbon dioxide in the deep oceans. 𝐸𝑇(𝑡) is the 
total global carbon dioxide emissions in the period considered, which not 
only includes the endogenous industrial emissions discussed in the previous 
sub-chapter but other exogenous emissions as well. Coefficients 𝜙𝑖𝑗 are the 
transfer rates from emitting reservoir 𝑖 to sink 𝑗, where 𝑖⁡𝑎𝑛𝑑⁡𝑗 =
𝐴𝑇, 𝑈𝑃⁡𝑎𝑛𝑑⁡𝐿𝑂. 
In the improved model, the impact of the increased concentration of carbon 
dioxide on climate change is addressed by introducing ‘radiative forcing’ 
F(t), which depends on the amount of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere and 
the effects of other greenhouse gases and aerosols [𝑂(𝑡)], as follows: 
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𝐹(𝑡) = 𝜂 {
𝑙𝑜𝑔 [
𝑀𝐴𝑇(𝑡)
𝑀𝐴𝑇
𝑃𝐼 ]
log⁡(2)
} + 𝑂(𝑡) 
𝑀𝐴𝑇
𝑃𝐼  is the pre-industrial level of atmospheric concentration of carbon diox-
ide, which is assumed to be 280 ppm (parts per million) in the empirical 
model. The model uses the change in the global mean temperature [𝑇(𝑡)] to 
represent climate change and calculates it with the following equation: 
𝑇(𝑡) = 𝑇(𝑡 − 1) + 𝜎1{𝐹(𝑡) − 𝜆𝑇(𝑡 − 1) − 𝜎2[𝑇(𝑡 − 1) − 𝑇𝐿𝑂(𝑡 − 1)]} 
𝑇𝐿𝑂(𝑡) is the mean temperature in the deep oceans in the period considered, 
and it is calculated as follows: 
𝑇𝐿𝑂(𝑡) = 𝑇𝐿𝑂(𝑡 − 1) + 𝜎3[𝑇(𝑡 − 1) − 𝑇𝐿𝑂(𝑡 − 1)] 
In these two equations, 𝜆 is a temperature feedback parameter, while 𝜎𝑖 is the 
transfer coefficient reflecting the thermal capacities of the different reser-
voirs. Nordhaus illustrates the role of the two parameters through the exam-
ple of a warming container. The container is heated by a light source from a 
specific point above (in the equation, this force is 𝐹(𝑡)), and the heat reaching 
the surface of the substance in the container (e.g. water) gradually diffuses to 
the lower parts. The lags in the warming of the lower layers are determined 
by thermal inertia. 
The next task in producing the damage coefficient of the model is to quantify 
the economic damage [𝐷𝐽(𝑡)] caused by the change of the global mean tem-
perature, for which Nordhaus uses the following simple quadratic polyno-
mial, whose parameterisable coefficients are 𝜃1,𝐽 and 𝜃2,𝐽. 
𝐷𝐽(𝑡) = 𝜃1,𝐽𝑇(𝑡) + 𝜃2,𝐽𝑇(𝑡)
2 
The use of the quadratic polynomial is motivated by the assumption that the 
effects of the change in the global mean temperature are not linear, i.e. the 
increment of the rising mean temperature causes even greater damage. Fi-
nally, the economic damage caused by climate change becomes the following 
damage coefficient, thus it can be integrated into the production function. 
Ω𝐽(𝑡) =
1
1 + 𝐷𝐽(𝑡)
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We can see that the economic value of the damage is in the denominator, 
therefore, its increase reduces the value of the coefficient. The reason for this 
is that the impact of climate change appears as a negative factor limiting the 
production potential. 
7.2.4. Equilibrium in the Market of Fossil Fuels 
One of the important issues of the model is the amount of fossil fuels ex-
tracted by each region in each period. The equations described above did not 
address extraction decisions made between periods that are of key im-
portance due to the exhaustible nature of energy carrier stocks, nor the quota 
prices achieved in the market of carbon dioxide emission allowances. For 
that to happen, in addition to the previously described variables, an ℎ(𝑡) pa-
rameter is introduced to represent the costs related to the timing of extraction 
under the Hotelling rule209, along with the previously obtained quota price 
[𝜏𝐽(𝑡)]. On this basis, a rearrangement of the production function can be used 
to describe the equilibrium as an equation, with the left side representing the 
demand for fossil energy and the right side representing energy costs. Re-
garding the latter, the costs related to the timing of extraction and the costs 
of the carbon dioxide emitted during the combustion of energy carriers will 
be added to the market prices previously considered. 
𝛽𝐽Ω𝐽(𝑡)𝐴𝐽(𝑡)𝐾𝐽(𝑡)
𝛾𝐿𝐽(𝑡)
1−𝛽𝐽−𝛾𝐸𝑆𝐽(𝑡)
𝛽𝐽−1 = 𝑐𝐽
𝐸(𝑡) +
ℎ(𝑡)
𝜍𝐽(𝑡)
+
𝜏𝐽(𝑡)
𝜍𝐽(𝑡)
 
As we have already seen, the energy service [𝐸𝑆𝐽(𝑡)] can be calculated by 
multiplying the fuels used by the conversion efficiency [𝜍𝐽(𝑡)]. By inserting 
these terms into the above equation and then transforming it, we can calculate 
the equilibrium fossil energy use of the region and period considered. 
𝐸𝐽(𝑡) = [
1
𝜍𝐽(𝑡)
]
{
 
 𝑐𝐽
𝐸(𝑡) +
ℎ(𝑡)
𝜍𝐽(𝑡)
+
𝜏𝐽(𝑡)
𝜍𝐽(𝑡)
𝛽𝐽Ω𝐽(𝑡)𝐴𝐽(𝑡)𝐾𝐽(𝑡)𝛾𝐿𝐽(𝑡)
1−𝛽𝐽−𝛾
}
 
 
1
𝛽𝐽−1
 
The first term of the equation shows that the energy demand can be reduced 
by increasing the conversion parameter (i.e. by improving efficiency). Since 
the elasticity parameter 𝛽𝐽 can be in the range between 0 and 1, the exponent 
                                                     
209 H. Hotelling (1931): The Economics of Exhaustible Resources, Journal of Political Economy, 
vol. 39, no. 2, 1931, pp. 137–175. 
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of the second term of the equation will be negative. Accordingly, increasing 
costs reduce, while growing demand increases equilibrium fossil energy use. 
7.2.5. Results and Conclusions of the Model 
Compared to the DICE model, the main innovation of the RICE model is 
that—in addition to the macroeconomic effects of climate change—it is also 
able to forecast the impact of carbon dioxide emissions reduction policies. 
Accordingly, three types of scenarios can be created on the basis of the re-
sults: a scenario without interventions (where regions do not apply a carbon 
dioxide reduction policy), a non-cooperative scheme (where regions set their 
policies with the aim of maximizing the welfare of their region), and a coop-
erative approach (where the regions’ optimization efforts aim to maximize 
global welfare)210. 
The results show that the policy interventions aimed at reducing carbon di-
oxide emissions lead to greater welfare, but their impact varies widely across 
regions. The carbon tax is most effective in developing countries, whose wel-
fare increment by 2100 will be close to USD 50 billion under the non-coop-
erative scenario or USD 350 billion under the cooperative approach (using 
USD values of 1990). Scenario runs show that co-operation leads to a higher 
optimal carbon tax (or an equilibrium quota price), which will exceed 
USD 20 per tonne after 2050 and will reach USD 30 per tonne by 2100 (un-
der the non-cooperative approach, it will not reach USD 2 by 2050 any-
where), and it will significantly improve global welfare growth. Policy inter-
ventions are the least profitable for the US, which is the only region whose 
interests are not furthered by co-operation. The model represents climate 
change through the increase of global mean temperature, which will be close 
to 3 degrees Celsius by 2100, and the choice between the three scenarios has 
a relatively small influence on it. Developing countries have the most press-
ing need for interventions. In those countries, in the period from 2030 to 
2050, annual cumulative discounted consumption without a carbon tax will 
be more than 40 percent less than the same consumption calculated with co-
operative interventions. 
Therefore, the main conclusions of the original RICE model suggest that alt-
hough in the period considered the carbon tax (or the equivalent tradeable 
emission allowance) could only reduce global warming, its economic im-
pacts are highly positive both globally and in most of the regions considered. 
                                                     
210 W.D. Nordhaus and Z. Yang, ‘A Regional Dynamic General-Equilibrium Model of Alternative 
Climate-Change Strategies’, The American Economic Review, vol. 86, no. 4, 1996, pp. 741–765. 
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An important conclusion is that climate change affects each region differ-
ently, and it has the strongest impact on countries that are lagging behind in 
terms of economic development. Finally, the coordination of the policy in-
terventions of the different regions can greatly increase social welfare both 
in most regions and globally; therefore, there is huge potential in successful 
international negotiations and agreements. 
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Gábor Bartus 
8. Environmental Economics  
Maintaining the output level requires natural resources and their ecosystem 
services as well. For a long time, until the middle of the 20th century, envi-
ronmental resources seemed to be infinite and inexhaustible, i.e. not requir-
ing any sort of management. However, humanity had to face the limits of 
nature ever more frequently as it turned out that natural resources were in-
deed finite, and their scarcity made itself increasingly felt. In the 20th cen-
tury, environmental economics emerged as a new school of economics. The 
intellectual starting point for the representatives of this school is The eco-
nomics of welfare, a monograph by Arthur Cecil Pigou, first published in 
1920, or more specifically, one or two paragraphs of this book, where the 
well-known English economist argues that, in order to ensure optimal and 
efficient output, taxes must be imposed on products that generate external 
costs through environmental pollution. In other words, environmental eco-
nomics deals with the different aspects of the management of natural re-
sources, particularly, of the use of the yields of the natural capital in eco-
nomic management and of the emissions into the natural environment (waste 
and pollution). 
It must be emphasized that, on this theoretical basis, it becomes evident that 
the problem of environmental pollution and the overexploitation of natural 
resources is not just an ecological issue but an economic problem as well and, 
in most cases,, the cause of losses.  
8.1. The Subject and Methodology of Environmental 
Economic Analysis 
Environmental economics is the study of border offenses in the interactions 
between society and the environment. When the starting point and the end 
result of an interaction, as well as all elements and effects of the process, 
remain within the ecosystem, these phenomena constitute the subject of bi-
ology, ecology, and natural sciences in general. If the interactions take place 
within the society, they will be studied by social sciences, such as economics. 
However, there are processes in which the society and the natural environ-
ment are connected as a result of our activities. 
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Input-side connections occur when the society uses the elements of nature as 
raw materials, resources, and the material flow goes from nature towards so-
ciety. Environmental economic analysis, therefore, considers nature as a cap-
ital and the yields of this capital as an ecosystem service. This analytical part 
is called the economics of natural resources. It also addresses issues that con-
stitute a major problem today, such as: To what extent does the practice of 
intensive agriculture exhaust soil fertility? How many trees in a forest can be 
felled? Can the forest coverage of the Earth be reduced? (Let us think, for 
example, of the protests against forest burning in Brazil in 2019.) Will the 
lithium stocks of the Earth be sufficient to allow for a total transition of mo-
bility to electric vehicles using batteries? 
Output-side connection occurs when the material flow goes from society to-
wards nature. This part of environmental economics is called the economics 
of pollution. Should climate change be stopped? On what scale and at what 
speed should greenhouse gas emissions be reduced? What kind of deteriora-
tion of health is caused by high levels of nitrogen oxide or solid particles in 
urban air? What are the risks of high-level radioactive waste (spent fuel of 
nuclear power stations), i.e. what is the reasonable cost of building an appro-
priately safe depot for such waste?  
8.1.1. Environmental Economic Analysis  
Environmental economics studies the connections between the economy and 
its environment (use of natural resources in the economy, discharge of the 
by-products and waste of the economy into the environment) and analyses 
them on the basis of the axioms and with the analytical methods of econom-
ics.211 
Characteristics of environmental economics 
 Environmental economics 
As a discipline part of the paradigm of economics; extension of the 
methodology and theses of economics to the relation-
ship between the economy and the environment 
Methodology methodological individualism, analytical approach 
(marginal analysis, equilibrium models) 
Management of natu-
ral resources 
the conservation of resources is necessary to improve 
and maintain the welfare of individuals 
Assessment based on individual preferences, anthropocentric, in-
strumental 
                                                     
211 G. Bartus and Á. Szalai (2014): Környezet, jog, közgazdaságtan [Environment, Law, Econom-
ics], Pázmány Press. 
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Scarcity Ricardian relative scarcity  
Maintenance of the 
natural capital 
‘weak’ sustainability: the natural and human capital 
can generally be substituted 
Biogeochemical limits 
of the economy 
marginal role 
Technological devel-
opment 
innovational optimism: technical progress contributes 
to the solution of environmental problems 
Source: Venkatachalam, 2007212, in: Bartus-Szalai 2008. 
 
8.1.2. The Approach of Ecological Economics  
Ecological economics is a methodologically and normatively separate ap-
proach to the economic analysis of environmental issues. In many respects, 
it can be regarded as a part of environmental economics, while from another 
perspective, it can be viewed as a school that is in dispute with the approaches 
of environmental economics.213 The initial aim of ecological economics was 
to create an integrated theory providing a framework for describing and ex-
plaining the phenomena of the economy in their context, taking into account 
all their interplays with the environment. In other words, ecological econom-
ics intended to achieve a systematic integration of ‘traditional’ economics, 
the economics of pollution, the economics of natural resources, and ecol-
ogy.214 According to ecological economics, these four analytical methods 
and theories—which have been isolated so far— should be integrated so that 
the issues of the economy and its environment can be considered as parts of 
a whole. 
Ecological economics places a clear emphasis on the fact that the economy 
is only a part of the natural system, i.e. the truths and constraints of natural 
sciences necessarily apply to the economy as well. Therefore, a key issue of 
ecological economics is the aggregate size of the economy and the establish-
ment of the maximum possible level of economic activity. 
                                                     
212 L. Venkatachalam (2007): Environmental Economics and Ecological Economics: Where They 
Can Converge?’, Ecological Economics, vol. 61, 2007, pp. 550–558. 
213 Sub-chapter 3.1.2 is practically based on one of my previous articles: Bartus, 2008.  
G. Bartus: Van-e a gazdasági tevékenységeknek termodinamikai korlátja? [Do Economic Activities 
Have a Thermodynamic Constraint?], Közgazdasági Szemle, vol. 55, November 2008, pp. 1010–
1022. 
214 R. Costanza (1989): ‘What is Ecological Economics?’, Ecological Economics, vol. 1, 1989, 
pp. 1–7. 
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As the creation of a theoretical framework integrating the different sub-dis-
ciplines as well as the integration of ecology and economics suffered a set-
back, during the development of this methodological difference, the expres-
sion of the criticism of economic growth as a normative difference was given 
more emphasis. The approach of ecological economics also attaches greater 
weight to the analysis of the links and correlations between environmental 
problems and inequalities in terms of income, wealth and access to natural 
resources. 
Characteristics of ecological economics 
 Ecological economics 
As a discipline partial rejection of the paradigm of traditional eco-
nomics, intention to integrate ecology and economics 
Methodology methodological pluralism, holistic view, transdiscipli-
nary and horizontal approach 
Management of natural 
resources 
resources are valuable in themselves; other species 
have the same right to survival as man 
Assessment it seeks to give an approximation of the intrinsic value 
of the individuals and elements of the ecosystem 
Scarcity Malthusian absolute scarcity 
Maintenance of the 
natural capital 
‘strong’ sustainability: the stock of natural capital 
cannot decrease 
Biogeochemical limits 
of the economy 
a central role in terms of analysis and theory 
Technological devel-
opment 
technological skepticism: new technologies generate 
new environmental problems 
Welfare and equality commitment to egalitarian views, equal access to re-
sources—in addition to size and efficiency—is a fun-
damental issue 
Source: Venkatachalam, 2007, in: Bartus, 2008. 
 
Ecological economics underlines that the current economic system is unable 
to distinguish between changes in size and growth, on the one hand, and qual-
ity improvement and development, on the other. Furthermore, it is also una-
ble to adequately address two fundamental issues: allocation (equality) and 
the establishment of the optimal size of the economy in its entirety.  
In general, the representatives of the ecological school argue for interpreting 
sustainability in its strict sense, underlining that the substitution of natural 
capital goods for knowledge or technological capital leads to the devaluation 
of natural assets. They believe that the conservation of natural capital is a 
prerequisite for the proper maintenance of human capital since man cannot 
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live without their biological environment. Maintaining biodiversity is, there-
fore, a priority. For this reason, determining the economic value of the ‘ser-
vices’ provided by the environment constitutes an important area of research. 
8.2. Efficient Level of Environmental Use 
The overexploitation of the natural capital—either on the side of the use of 
natural resources as inputs or on the side of material flows going from the 
economy towards the environment in the form of pollution and waste—has 
now become well documented as a result of regular ecological assessments 
and examinations, which have been going on for decades.215 The reason for 
the inefficient use of the environment is that most effects (benefits or costs) 
related to the use of nature appear outside the market. The effects outside the 
market are, however, generally ignored by economic operators in their deci-
sions, as they do not appear as a value (price signal) for them. 
Externalities occur when216 the exchange of a given good in the market af-
fects not only the two parties involved in the exchange, i.e. the seller and the 
buyer (e.g. the power station generating electricity and the consumer using 
electricity at home), but other parties as well (the acid rain caused by the 
sulfur dioxide emissions from the power station reduces the yields of a forest 
holding), and such third parties derive additional benefit or damage from the 
production, market sale, exchange or consumption of the given good. In this 
case, the society’s benefit is not only what the buyer and the seller gain, but 
it should also include the benefit and damage of the said party not taken into 
consideration (the so-called third party).  
The results (benefits or costs) ignored in market transactions distort market 
allocation. Market allocation is, in principle, the most efficient way of per-
forming the basic task of economic management: allocating scarce resources 
to production and consumption options in a way that ultimately ensures that 
the sum total of the utility of such resources for individuals is as high as 
                                                     
215 Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services, S. Díaz, J. 
Settele, E. S. Brondízio E.S., H. T. Ngo, M. Guèze, J. Agard, A. Arneth, P. Balvanera, K. A. Brau-
man, S. H. M. Butchart, K. M. A. Chan, L. A. Garibaldi, K. Ichii, J. Liu, S. M. Subramanian, G. F. 
Midgley, P. Miloslavich, Z. Molnár, D. Obura, A. Pfaff, S. Polasky, A. Purvis, J. Razzaque, B. 
Reyers, R. Roy Chowdhury, Y. J. Shin, I. J. Visseren-Hamakers, K. J. Willis, and C. N. Zayas (eds.), 
Summary for Policymakers of the Global Assessment Report on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Ser-
vices, 2019, IPBES secretariat, Bonn, Germany, https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.3553579.  
216 In this chapter, externalities and the efficient level of environmental use are explained following 
the argumentation of one of our previous textbooks, see in detail Chapter 5 of Bartus and Szalai, 
2014.  
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possible. However, such efficiency can only be achieved if all the factors 
affecting social welfare become price signals. The producer (seller) is faced 
with all production costs, and their marginal willingness to accept is defined 
by such costs together. At the same time, the consumer (buyer) is faced with 
all the costs related to consumption, which define their marginal willingness 
to pay. Finally, the willingness of many sellers and many buyers creates a 
dynamic balance between supply and demand, thus establishing the quantity 
of goods being exchanged in the market and the transaction price. 
In the previous example of electricity put on the market in the exchange be-
tween the power station and the consumer, several costs of electricity gener-
ation appear as part of the supply function, such as the price of energy carriers 
and the wages of the employees of the power station, but—unless there is 
government intervention, e.g. a tax on Sulphur dioxide emissions—the loss 
of the forest holding caused by the Sulphur dioxide emissions of the power 
station is not included therein. Thus, it will not be part of the willingness to 
accept, i.e. the supply function. The existence of acid rains—which are 
caused by Sulphur dioxide emissions—will probably not affect electricity 
consumers’ willingness to pay and, thus, the demand function. In this way, 
there will be a cost related to the exchange of a good in the market that is not 
included either in the supply or in the demand function, which means that the 
equilibrium quantity and price will be determined without taking into ac-
count this cost. 
The following figure shows the social loss, thus caused by externalities and 
the efficiency drop in market allocation. The independent variable (Q) is usu-
ally the physical quantity of a given good, while the dependent variable (P) 
is the price. Neither the demand function (D) nor the supply function (S) 
includes the cost incurred by the third party, i.e. the externality. The diagram 
also includes the hypothetical supply function S’, whose difference from S is 
T, which is the size of the externality. This function would include the cost 
of sulfur dioxide emissions, either as the cost of the desulfurization equip-
ment or as the compensation paid to the forest holding. (Let us imagine, for 
example, that the company that owns the power station acquires the forest 
holding, and the management of the holding company realizes that they incur 
losses due to their own activities. Then, probably, they will find a solution to 
maximize the profits of both companies; thus the supply of the power station 
may change.) 
The welfare loss caused by externalities can thus be seen in the diagram. The 
quantity that changes hands will be Q’, instead of Q*, and the price to be paid 
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will be only P*, instead of the P+ equilibrium price. The negative external-
ity—i.e. one that causes damage to the third party—generates overproduc-
tion: we produce and use more electricity than what would maximize social 
benefits. 
The impact of negative externalities on the market of a 
product 
 
The bigger externalities linked to the market of a given product are, the 
greater the social loss resulting from misallocation. Externalities, however, 
may also be positive: in this case, the third party does not incur a loss but 
benefits from the effects not taken into account in the market. Environmental 
pollution is usually a negative externality. 
That is why we mentioned in the introduction to this chapter that environ-
mental pollution was not only harmful to nature and to nature-lovers but to 
everyone. Even if there may be people who are not annoyed by forests dying 
as a result of acid rains, everyone is affected by inefficient market allocation 
and the fact that, due to the misuse of resources, economic performance will 
be lower than its potential. The damage caused by the externality is randomly 
distributed among the members of society, generally reducing welfare. 
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Increasing pollution can lead to increasing damages, but reducing damage is 
costly. If we do not want to spend money on avoiding or reducing pollution, 
the damage caused by it may rocket. A totally pollution-free world can only 
be a theoretical idea because the costs of achieving zero emissions would 
probably be infinite. How much pollution is allowed, then? 
As we have seen in the previous diagram, welfare loss is described as the 
difference between Q’ and Q* (Q’-Q*) and not between 0 and Q* (0-Q*). 
This means that if environmental pollution is also taken into consideration, 
the optimal level of emissions will be Q’, instead of zero. 
Environmental economics and, particularly, its main branch based on welfare 
economics consider that the solution to the problem lies in the optimal level 
of environmental pollution.  
Setting aside the situation in which externalities are ignored, there are two 
ways to achieve lower environmental costs: either by reducing market equi-
librium quantity from Q* to Q’ (by generating and consuming less electric-
ity), or by disconnecting the generated quantity and the pollutant emissions 
(i.e. generating the same amount of electricity with less sulfur dioxide emis-
sions through a technological change). 
In the next model, the MEC (marginal external cost) function will be used 
for measuring the damage caused by pollutants. This function measures the 
damage caused by sulfur dioxide emissions—in the form of acid rains—in 
the tree stock of the forest holding. If we want to achieve the optimal level 
of environmental pollution by reducing the produced quantity, its cost will 
be the lost profit of the output – if we sell less electricity, we will get less 
revenue (although our costs will also be lower), thus, altogether, what we 
will lose is our profit that could have been generated by the withheld quan-
tity. The profit loss caused by decreasing economic activity is measured by 
the MNPB (marginal net private benefit) function. The independent variable 
of the functions (horizontal axis) is the physical size of the activity (Q), i.e. 
the quantity of the electricity that we produce and consume, while the de-
pendent variable (vertical axis) is the economic value (P), i.e. the price in 
euros, for example. 
Withholding the output (its initial level is Q*) is a good solution as long as 
the net benefit (MNPB) that we lose due to the reduction is less than the loss 
incurred by the third party (MEC). The production volume ensuring the effi-
cient level of environmental pollution (Q’) will be the produced quantity (Q) 
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where MNPB = MEC. Reducing the production further than Q’ does not gen-
erate social benefit because, moving from Q1 towards 0, the values of MNPB 
are consistently higher than the values of MEC (this is true for all Qs between 
0 and Q’). 
Attaining the efficient level of externalities by reducing pro-
duction 
 
Let us now examine the other option, where the market equilibrium quantity 
does not change, but the associated pollution is reduced by using an addi-
tional environmental technology (in the case of the power station, for exam-
ple, by adding desulfurization equipment to the existing technology and pur-
chasing coal with significantly lower sulfur content at a slightly higher price). 
Reducing pollutant emissions in this way, evidently, comes with a cost. In 
environmental economics, this is measured by the MAC (marginal abatement 
cost or, more generally, the marginal cost of the abatement of externalities) 
function. 
It is advisable to reduce pollution from level Q* to Q’, as long as the values 
of MAC are consistently below the values of MEC. The efficient level of 
pollution is defined by the equality MAC = MEC. Emissions below Q’ are 
not efficient because the cost of attaining them is higher than the amount of 
damage that emissions would cause. 
P 
MEC – marginal cost of the 
externality 
MNPB – marginal utility of the good 
Q (good) Q* Q’ 
T 
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Attaining the efficient level of externalities by reducing 
pollution 
 
Therefore, the optimal level of pollutant emissions is either the size of eco-
nomic activity (Q [product]) where the marginal net private benefit (MNPB) 
of the activity is equal to its marginal environmental cost (MEC), or the level 
of pollution (Q [pollution]) where the marginal abatement cost (MAC) of the 
pollution is equal to its marginal environmental cost (MEC). 
Although we know, in theory, where the socially efficient (optimal) level of 
pollution would be, it is not established automatically because of externali-
ties. Therefore, government intervention is needed, which will set an addi-
tional rule forcing or encouraging polluters to take measures to approach the 
efficient level. 
8.3. Environmental Policy Interventions 
Although environmental interventions have a long history, they became 
widespread and generally used in the second half of the 20th century, in re-
sponse to the environmental problem that became obvious in the 1960s. The 
explosion of environmental interventions is well evidenced by the fact that, 
within the EU acquis, the corpus of environmental legislation is one of the 
corpora with the largest number of legislative acts. 
P 
MEC – marginal cost of the externality 
MAC – marginal abatement 
cost  
Q (pollution) Q*(p) Q’(p) 
T 
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Environmental policy interventions are essentially based on two economic 
theories. One of them is the theory of A.C. Pigou, according to which the 
main reason for environmental problems is the fact that they constitute ex-
ternalities; therefore, the solution is to eliminate (internalize) externalities.217 
Pigou’s original idea was to impose a tax on pollution, more specifically, on 
the product causing pollution. The imposition of the tax solving the problem 
of externalities (Pigovian tax or economic incentives) requires that the gov-
ernment know (calculate) the efficient level of environmental use. If, how-
ever, the government knows what the efficient level of pollution is, it cannot 
only impose an incentivizing tax but also prescribe the efficient level of pol-
lution by means of a kind of technological instruction (command and con-
trol). 
Forty years after this theory had been published, R.H. Coase proposed a dif-
ferent solution.218 What Coase realized is that the internalization proposed by 
Pigou entails considerable transaction costs: the government needs to collect 
data, explore the relationship between the producers’ marginal utility (calcu-
late the MNPB function), know exactly how much external cost (MEC) the 
different pollutions cause, and at what cost (MAC) these emissions can be 
reduced. According to Coase, if we let the efficient level be defined by way 
of an agreement between the polluters and the victims of pollution, that 
would require less calculation and data collection, since the parties concerned 
are aware of their own benefits and costs. Coase identified the problem of 
environmental pollution as the lack of a clear definition of pollution-related 
rights in the different legal systems. It is unclear whether it is polluters that 
have the possibility (right) to use the environment without restrictions or the 
victims that would have the right to an unpolluted environment. The solution 
proposed by Coase was that the state should define clear dispositive rights 
concerning environmental use, and then the parties concerned—aware of 
their rights and interests—would be able to reach an agreement on the effi-
cient use of the environment if such coordination is not hindered by high 
transaction costs. The Coase theorem today is implemented in practice in the 
form of allocation of rights and liability rules.  
                                                     
217 Pigou, A.C. (1920): The Economics of Welfare, Macmillan and Co., London 
218 Coase, R.H. (1960): ‘The problem of social cost’, The Journal of Law and Economics, vol. III, 
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Possible ways of resolving market failures according to the 
theories of Pigou and Coase 
 According to the Coase theorem According to Pigou’s 
theory 
 By allocation of 
rights 
By compensation By command and con-
trol or Pigovian tax 
Who should 
find the opti-
mum? 
The cooperation 
and agreement of 
polluters and 
victims 
The court Calculation by the 
government or munici-
pality 
What is the 
task of the 
government? 
Facilitating the 
cooperation and 
agreement by 
creating an ap-
propriate legal 
environment 
Setting civil law 
rules in advance 
(legislation) 
Calculation of the opti-
mum, introduction of a 
corresponding regula-
tory tool and enforce-
ment of compliance 
What are the 
obstacles to 
such regula-
tion? 
If transaction 
costs cannot be 
reduced 
If the institutional 
cost is too high 
(the court cannot 
obtain the infor-
mation needed for 
decision-making) 
If the optimum cannot 
be calculated or if the 
regulatory tool based 
on it is not efficient 
Source: Bartus and Szalai, 2014, p. 129. 
 
Today, environmental economics generally distinguishes four major types of 
environmental policy intervention based on the two above-mentioned theo-
ries:219 
(1) Allocation of rights: property (rights) and contracts. Externalities or 
public goods, jointly used (free) goods, are generated by high transaction 
costs, but the magnitude of transaction costs depends on the legal sys-
tems. There are various ways of reducing them: Pareto-efficiency may 
emerge in accordance with the Coase theorem if we turn something into 
a property if we define who has the right to make decisions about some-
thing, or if we allow parties to bargain (we do not ban bargaining but 
even facilitate it by reducing transaction costs). 
(2) Liability rules, compensation. Where transaction costs cannot be re-
duced, the legal system will be responsible for properly allocating deci-
sion rights—since the parties will not be able to transfer them to others—
                                                     
219 The list follows the description included in Bartus and Szalai, 2014. 
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and for protecting such rights. The latter is done by means of compensa-
tion, where the party violating the rights of others is obliged to pay com-
pensation, with the aim of preventing the violation of the rights of others. 
This basic scheme of compensation is called objective liability. How-
ever, the so-called fault liability is often more important. It means that 
the party causing the damage does not necessarily have to pay, but only 
‘if it did not act as expected in the given situation’. When, in the case of 
a specific incident of damage, the court defines what it considers to be 
expected conduct, it practically establishes the same kinds of standards 
as those that appeared in the previous analysis as emission or pollution 
limit values.  
(3) Command and control. Command-and-control is a set of physical, 
technological and sometimes financial instructions in a legal form, 
which are binding on everyone. Command-and-control instructions lay 
down rules for the users of the environment concerning: 
(a) the materials or procedures they are allowed or not allowed to use 
during production or consumption, 
(b) their maximum permitted environmental load (actual pollutant emis-
sions), 
(c) the conditions (authorization, impact assessment, obligation to give 
a deposit or guarantee) that they must meet before commencing their 
activities. 
(4) Economic incentives. Similarly to liability rules and compensation (ob-
jective liability), economic incentives are tools that are suitable for the 
‘pricing’ of environmental use and for making the actors concerned di-
rectly face the costs of externalities. They include taxes, fees, contribu-
tions (market-based instruments). When economic incentives are ap-
plied, the regulator does not prohibit any action, nor does it oblige the 
users of the environment to do something, yet it makes users pay for the 
use of the environment in some way. Thus, environmental use is re-
flected in the costs of the producer or the consumer, which encourages 
the users of the environment to look for alternative solutions. As opposed 
to objective liability, however, this cost can be applied not subsequently, 
i.e. after the damage caused by environmental pollution occurred, but 
already in earlier phases of the pollution process (at other points of the 
pollution chain).  
 
Although the adoption of environmental intervention is a logical conse-
quence of the need to deal with market failures that become manifest in the 
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form of environmental pollution or the overexploitation of natural resources, 
it merits further consideration. Besides market failures, there are also gov-
ernment failures, where the action of the intervener increases social losses, 
because the cost of an inadequate intervention may be higher than the value 
of the externalities it eliminates (which is the benefit of the intervention). 
There may also be cases where it is not worth dealing with the external im-
pact because there is no intervention that would have a positive benefit/cost 
relationship. Another important aspect is that the type of environmental pol-
icy instrument (intervention form) used for dealing with a recognized envi-
ronmental problem makes much difference. The reason for this is that the 
costs and the benefits of the intervention (e.g. reduced pollution) depend on 
the type, scope and severity of the instrument selected (e.g. if the efficient 
instrument is a limit value, it must also be decided what that limit value 
should be). 
The design of environmental policy interventions according 
to Bartus and Szalai 
 
G. Bartus and Á. Szalai, Környezet, jog, közgazdaságtan [Environment, Law, Economics], 
Pázmány Press, Budapest, 2014. 
Are transaction 
costs an obstacle?
No
Property, contract; 
market of pollution rights
Yes
Who should establish the 
expected level?
Court
Will the company assets 
be sufficient for paying 
compensation?
Yes
Compensation 
No
Compensation 
+ financial 
guarantee
Authority
Marginal 
damage/marginal 
utility relationship
The slope of marginal 
damage is steeper
Command and 
control: quantitative 
regulation, limit 
values
The slope of marginal 
damage is flatter
Taxes: emission 
charge, product 
charge
Institutional costs 
are too high
It won’t be tackled, 
it remains an 
externality
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The figure presents a simplified scheme that gives guidance on the aspects to 
be considered when choosing between different environmental policy instru-
ments. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, we have demonstrated that—concerning the inefficient use of 
the environment—environmental economics is in possession of theoretical 
knowledge and practical solutions to mitigate the adverse effects of external-
ities. The fact that the almost century-long history and results of the research 
on environmental policy interventions have not led to the effective and wide-
spread adoption of such interventions is the consequence of the indifference 
and lack of courage of political communities. Therefore, the degradation and 
overexploitation of our natural resources is a reality, although we have the 
means to avoid it. 
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9. Behavioural Environmental Economics and 
Green Nudges 
The assumption of perfect rationality, which is the solid basis of traditional 
economic thought, began to waver ever more in the second half of the 20th 
century. This was partly due to the large number of experimental results 
showing that rational behaviour can be used to describe the behaviour of eco-
nomic operators only to a limited extent. The main problem lies in the irra-
tional behaviour patterns that are systematic, i.e. generally characteristic of 
people. Over the last few decades, many researchers have argued that tradi-
tional economic models and policy tools should be adapted to these distor-
tions. The purpose of this subchapter is to briefly describe the main behav-
ioural anomalies that have a significant impact on the findings of traditional 
environmental economics and to introduce the so-called green nudge tools, 
which make use of distortions for environmental purposes. 
9.1. Endowment Effect 
It can be observed through experiments that, for people, the function of mar-
ginal utility of obtaining a given product is convex, while the function of 
negative marginal utility of giving up a product is concave, which means that 
the difficulty of giving up a product exceeds the happiness of obtaining it. 
This systemic asymmetrical behaviour pattern is known as the endowment 
effect. The most important consequence of this effect in terms of environ-
mental economics is that, in the case of certain goods and under certain ne-
gotiation circumstances, the Coase deal does not lead to a Pareto efficient 
state220.  
9.2. Status Quo Effect 
People tend to hold on to their established practices: in their decisions, there 
is a kind of inert conservatism, which is called status quo bias. Experience 
has shown that companies’ preference for old, less efficient, but familiar 
technologies over new ones, even if the use of new technologies would pay 
off, constitutes a significant constraint on their decisions about investments 
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increasing environmental performance. Most of the time, such bias is ex-
plained by loss aversion. Companies attach more weight to the potential risks 
of new technologies than to their future benefits, which hampers the expan-
sion of solutions and, thus, the improvement of environmental perfor-
mance221. 
9.3. Bandwagon Effect 
In repeat experiments, it is often observed that there is an interplay between 
the participants’ strategies; for example, the kindness of a participant is af-
fected by the kindness of the others. Man is a social being; therefore, people 
are often willing to ‘divert’ their behaviour from what is rational in order to 
achieve more efficient inclusion in a given community. This distortion is 
called group effect or bandwagon effect. It is a new type of coordination 
mechanism in environmental policy since the drivers that move people to act 
are different: in public interventions, the driver is an external incentive, in 
market mechanisms, it is self-interest. In contrast, in the setting of a group 
effect, the main drivers are the norms of a given community. Separate waste 
collection is a good example of this phenomenon: in many countries, there 
are no consumer-level public incentives (there is no tax on traditionally col-
lected waste, and no benefits are granted to those collecting their waste sep-
arately) or market incentives (separate waste collection requires an extra ef-
fort and does not generate any extra benefits), but the number of people par-
ticipating in this system is increasing because they feel that such behaviour 
makes them more responsible members of the community. 
9.4. Green Nudge 
In addition to clarifying models that capture the impacts of ‘hard’ public in-
terventions (regulations, taxes, subsidies), systematic behavioural distortions 
have also opened the way to a new ‘soft’ intervention, known as ‘nudge’. 
The representatives of this trend suggest an incentive that does not limit the 
choice of actors but—taking advantage of the behavioural distortions de-
scribed above—creates a decision-making context in which participants are 
more likely to select the option chosen by the regulator (or ‘choice architect’) 
over others. This kind of ‘soft’ policy approach is called ‘libertarian pater-
nalism’, with reference to free choice and the patronizing leadership of the 
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2005, pp. 1556–1560. 
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choice architect. The choice architecture includes the description of the op-
tions, the establishment of their structure and the creation of the context (or 
framing)222. Green nudge is different from the traditional nudge type of in-
centive. Both of them are interventions that are different from the preference 
of the person making a choice, but while the latter aims to increase the wel-
fare of the choosing person, the first one promotes the welfare of the com-
munity. Of all the distortions described above, the majority of green nudge 
tools used in practice build on the bandwagon effect and the status quo bias. 
In the following sections, some practical examples will demonstrate how 
they are used. 
9.4.1. Green Nudge Techniques Based on Group Effect 
Over the last few decades, plenty of examples have shown that people can be 
greatly influenced by reminding them of certain social standards. In the 
1980s, in Texas, a campaign called ‘Don’t Mess with Texas’ was launched 
to reduce the quantity of waste thrown out of cars. The campaign’s slogan 
was written on billboards alongside motorways. The witty reference became 
a great success: in a few years, the quantity of roadside waste was reduced to 
less than a third. The key to the success of the measure was strengthening 
group identity223.  
Another frequently cited example of the use of group norms is the Opower 
program launched in the US, which achieved an average reduction of house-
hold energy use of over two percent simply by indicating on consumers’ 
household energy reports not only their own consumption but their neigh-
bors’ energy consumption as well224. Solutions based on group effect can 
often result in a status competition, which can be exploited by decision-mak-
ers. The driving force behind the early proliferation of electric vehicles and 
solar cells was that, by using them, owners could show their acquaintances 
that they were more responsible members of the community than others. This 
effect has enormous additional potential since any indication or symbol can 
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be a good incentive through which users can show to their community that 
they are environmentally conscious225. 
9.4.2. Green Nudge Techniques Based on Status Quo 
In addition to constituting a constraint when it comes to technological tran-
sition, status quo bias can also be used as a nudge-type incentive in cases 
where consumers have to make minor decisions. In such cases, people tend 
to choose the ‘default’ option. This may be an important tool for queries 
about social preferences, on the one hand, and may be used for incentivizing 
specific choices, on the other. For example, on the registration platform of 
an increasing number of scientific conferences, the cost of travel-related ‘car-
bon offsetting’ is included in the registration fee by default. Since this cost 
item is low compared to the total cost of participation, which is usually not 
borne by the applicants themselves, the relevance of choice is also low; there-
fore, few people choose another option.  
9.4.3. Ethical Issues Associated with the Green Nudge 
There may be several ethical concerns about nudge-type incentives. Firstly, 
while the objective of classic public interventions and the tools used to attain 
them can be easily monitored, in the case of a nudge, this is way more prob-
lematic. Secondly, these tools can reduce people’s autonomy because if eve-
ryone knows that a choice design is optimized, individuals will be less moti-
vated to seek information. Thirdly, as nudge is often easier than providing 
information, this can easily result in a negative trend whereby regulators in-
creasingly turn to nudge tools even when informing the society would be the 
better option. Finally, the diffusion of nudge tools and the fact that such so-
lutions build on instinctive behaviour patterns can reduce people’s auton-
omy. Due to the ethical concerns related to the green nudge, in these cases 
the need for transparency is even more pronounced than in the case of tradi-
tional incentives: it is important to call people’s attention to the fact that their 
choice has been designed with nudge tools, because, in this way, a large part 
of the ethical concerns can be resolved, since people identify with the objec-
tives of their community and the program’s efficiency will not decrease ei-
ther. 
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10. Corporate Social Responsibility and 
Sustainability 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is an increasingly popular and well-
known concept throughout the world. In this chapter, we will review the rea-
sons for this, along with the importance of CSR; then, after a brief historical 
review and the explanation of related concepts, we will discuss relevant top-
ical issues in this field, particularly the role of CSR in the European Union. 
For reasons of space, our objective is not to discuss the subject exhaustively 
but to give some basic ideas about this complex and increasingly topical is-
sue. 
10.1. The Importance of CSR 
The responsibility of companies is justified by the fact that they hold and 
control a very significant portion of both natural and human resources. 
Furthermore, a considerable part of research, development, and innovation 
expenditure is incurred in the corporate sector, which also contributes to their 
important role in addressing sustainability. 
Companies also play a key role in individuals’ quality of life, both as em-
ployers, since we spend a large part of our productive life in our workplace, 
and as producers of products and services, since the range and quality of 
available products and services also have a significant impact on the quality 
of life. Over-consumption and other anomalies of the consumer society are 
also becoming ever more popular areas of discussion and research. Can the 
artificial generation of needs be regarded as responsible behaviour? Do com-
panies always serve real consumer needs, or are there any ‘unnecessary prod-
ucts’, as Gergely Tóth calls them?226 Consumer needs, of course, are con-
stantly evolving, and the welcome rise in the standard of living as well as the 
free flow of information also leads to growing ‘average consumer expecta-
tions’. (The movement of ‘voluntary simplicity’, which calls for the volun-
tary reduction of consumption on environmental and ethical grounds, can be 
seen as a counterweight to this.) 
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While apart from ensuring their own welfare, contributing to the prosperity 
of future generations (children, grandchildren) also ranks high among an in-
dividual’s objectives—sometimes it is even regarded as more important than 
their own personal interests—, many people think that today’s ‘frantic’ de-
velopment, paradoxically, jeopardizes the possibilities of future genera-
tions. While, traditionally, having more resources or having the possibility 
of consuming them used to reduce risks and increase the chances of prosper-
ity and survival, this is not necessarily the case today. (A prosaic example is 
obesity and overweight, which constitute a disease of civilization that re-
duces the quality of life and the chances of survival of many people.) 
The responsibility of companies in addressing sustainability challenges 
is an extremely complex issue for several reasons. 
It is difficult to identify the role that companies can play in addressing the 
different challenges. (For example, in the fight against famine, food dona-
tions appear to be a logical step on the part of food companies. However, due 
to its negative effects on local farmers and food industry companies, for ex-
ample, this is not always recommended.) Partly for this reason—i.e. the fact 
that companies do not necessarily know how to respond to environmental 
and social challenges—, cooperation between businesses and non-govern-
mental organisations has become popular since the 2010s, in which com-
panies cooperate with civil society organisations that are highly familiar with 
the nature of the environmental and social problem in question. (For relevant 
experience in Hungary, see e.g. Harangozó and Zilahy, 2015227.) 
The operation of companies is complex, and so are their internal processes 
as well as their impact on their operating environment, which are also diffi-
cult to measure and analyse. This is one of the reasons for the great variety 
of approaches to and interpretations of corporate responsibility and sustain-
ability, as well as the large number of tools developed to improve corporate 
environmental and social performance.228 
Companies are diverse in terms of size, sector, ownership, among others. 
Accordingly, considerable research is carried out into the sustainability or 
CSR efforts of companies operating in different sectors. Within a given sec-
tor, the areas and instruments of responsibility can be better defined. For 
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example, the sector-specific guidelines of the Global Reporting Initiative 
(GRI), which analyses companies’ sustainability reports, are useful tools for 
the companies of the sectors concerned. At the same time, cooperation within 
the sectors is often stigmatized and regarded as a concerted action of compa-
nies for the purpose of exerting pressure on regulators and also for ‘softening 
regulation’ in order to improve their own possibilities of operation. Another 
area, which is popular because of the diversity of companies, is the analysis 
of the corporate social responsibility or sustainability practices of small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)229 230, which is more similar in character 
to individual responsibility than the traditional social responsibility typical 
of large companies. 
In relation to CSR, the issue of consumer responsibility—i.e. whether, in 
certain cases, consumers are able to make decisions beyond their own self-
interest—also emerges. There is extensive literature on sustainable and re-
sponsible consumption231 232 as well. However, in a globalizing world, whose 
population is still growing and where the consumer base of traditional market 
products is dynamically expanding, it is unfortunately unlikely that environ-
mentally conscious consumers in developed countries can achieve a signifi-
cant change in production patterns. Furthermore, the ‘gap’ between the envi-
ronmentally conscious approach and the truly conscious consumer behaviour 
(e.g. product choice) is also a popular area of research, with good reason. 
This is one of the reasons for which the responsibility of companies is beyond 
question, as it is unlikely that consumer expectations can make companies 
switch to sustainable operation and production on a large scale in the near 
future. 
A large number of definitions of CSR include a reference to its voluntary 
nature. This is partly due to the fact that companies can be expected to take 
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a proactive approach, as they are most aware of their own capabilities and 
possibilities. Another reason for the importance of voluntary nature is that 
regulations are not always able to keep pace with technological or even social 
development processes. In addition, regulations are not everywhere equally 
stringent; for example, companies operating in several countries and loca-
tions around the world can be expected to follow the best practice even in an 
environment where the requirements of environmental protection or work 
safety are less stringent and sophisticated. However, voluntary practices en-
tail the risk of focusing on areas that fit in well with a company’s scope of 
activities or offer market advantages, instead of the most important sustain-
ability issues. In the case of corporate social responsibility, voluntary nature 
brings benefits in several respects, but companies must be aware of the risks 
that it entails and try to reduce them. 
Is it a problem if a company’s responsibility is motivated by self-interest? 
Probably, it is not a problem; in fact, in this case, the company’s real com-
mitment is less questionable. Nevertheless, the truth about companies is re-
vealed in the market. This is what Milton Friedman expressed with the fol-
lowing and still often quoted sentence in the 1970s: ‘the business of business 
is business’.233 A sad example demonstrating that responsible operation does 
not necessarily contribute to long-term success is Nokia, which had won sev-
eral CSR awards in Hungary, but in the end, it was forced to reduce its pro-
duction capacity and relocate it to Asia gradually. (In this respect, CSR 
awards are like fair play awards or prizes for the best-dressed competitors at 
sporting events, where the real result is still the best possible ranking.) 
Companies are able to maintain their operation in the long run; they of-
ten ‘survive’ different systems. (It is disputable, of course, whether a com-
pany can be considered to be the same company after changes in its scope of 
activities, ownership structure or places of business.) It is undeniable, how-
ever, that the decades-long history and, frequently, the charismatic and crea-
tive personality of the founder(s) are integral parts of the identity of many 
large companies. Often, the objective of the founding engineer or inventor is 
to solve a current problem or improve people’s quality of life with a product 
that is innovative at that moment. From this perspective, long-standing or 
even recently founded innovative companies have more competences and 
possibilities to address sustainability challenges than leaders at different lev-
els, elected for short periods of time. 
                                                     
233 Friedman, M. (1970): The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits”, New 
York Times Magazine, 13 September 1970. 
181 
In addition to approaches focusing on the responsibility of ‘conventional 
companies’, new trends that redefine the basic corporate objectives have 
also emerged. The main goal of ‘entrepreneurs with a different objective’ or 
‘social enterprises’ is not to generate profits but to address a social or a com-
bined social and environmental problem. The concept of social enterprise has 
become so widely accepted in the European Union that, in 2011, the Euro-
pean Commission issued a communication entitled ‘Social Business Initia-
tive. Creating a favourable climate for social enterprises, key stakeholders in 
the social economy and innovation’234. The concept of really responsible 
companies, created by Gergely Tóth, can also be mentioned here: it means 
that a really responsible company aspires to achieve fairness (e.g. fair trade 
and working conditions), reduce transport distances and the associated envi-
ronmental externalities, and to achieve an optimal size, instead of becoming 
as large as possible. For such a company, profitability is important but is not 
the main objective. Furthermore, it pursues activities or manufactures prod-
ucts that are actually needed and whose ‘existence is justified in a sustainable 
world’235. Unfortunately, in the context of today’s complex supply networks 
and products, these requirements are extremely difficult to measure and to 
meet. The concept of ‘sustainable business models’236 is also a promising 
new approach. 
Nevertheless, the responsibility of companies following the traditional model 
remains an important issue. The next section gives a brief summary of the 
history of CSR and the related concepts. 
10.2. A Brief History of CSR 
A large number of researchers237 refer to the American Howard Bowen’s 
book entitled ‘Social Responsibilities of the Businessman’238, published in 
1953, as the first significant work on the responsibility of companies and 
business leaders. The issue, i.e. the role of companies in the society, was not 
completely new, of course. There had always been companies and business 
leaders that, besides market position and profitability, had also taken into 
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account other roles of the company. These include measures implemented at 
the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century to improve 
the living conditions of workers, or corporate donations239, among others. 
The stakeholder theory and stakeholder management, which began to gain 
ground in the 1980s, are also closely related to the scope of CSR. This is also 
confirmed by the European Commission’s definition of CSR as ‘a concept 
whereby companies integrate social and environmental concerns in their 
business operations and in their interaction with their stakeholders on a 
voluntary basis’240. 
The essence of the stakeholder approach is that companies (or, in a broader 
sense, any entity) should take into consideration not only the interests of their 
owners, such as shareholders but also the interests of and the effects on all 
the parties that are affected by the objectives, operation and impacts of the 
company. According to the most widely accepted definition, ‘stakeholder is 
any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement 
of the organisation’s objectives’241. 
These stakeholders can be grouped on the basis of different criteria, for ex-
ample, whether they are market or non-market stakeholders, external or in-
ternal actors. Regarding the grouping of stakeholders, Csigéné and 
Pálvölgyi242 introduced the concepts of quasi-internal and potential stake-
holders, besides conventional internal and external stakeholders. ‘Quasi-in-
ternal stakeholders’ are those actors that are more affected by the operation 
of the company than external stakeholders and have more influence on cor-
porate processes, but in a strict sense, they are not considered to be internal 
stakeholders. They may be suppliers in a close relationship with the company 
(e.g. service providers performing tasks that used to be internal processes but 
were later outsourced) or investors that have not become owners, yet con-
stantly monitor the company’s operation. These may include the operators 
entrusted by the company with facilitating its operation in certain areas. Con-
sultancy firms—which are important actors in the area of social responsibil-
ity and corporate sustainability—have more insight into the operation of a 
company than external stakeholders, they need to better identify with the 
company’s target system and can propose certain improvements as ‘insiders’. 
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Therefore, they share the features of internal stakeholders in some respects, 
but the effectiveness of their activities also comes from the fact that being 
outsiders, they have a different view of the company’s operations than the 
management. They also introduced the concept of ‘potential stakeholders’, 
i.e. stakeholders that are ignored by a number of companies and are difficult 
to manage. This group includes the natural environment—which is not con-
sidered by all companies as a stakeholder, or whose interests are taken into 
account through the mediation of other stakeholders, e.g. NGOs, regula-
tors—as well as ‘future generations’, which have a key role to play in the 
approach of sustainable development. 
One of the reasons why the stakeholder concept has become widespread and 
popular in business circles is probably the fact that, as part of their manage-
ment activities, business leaders can deal with general, abstract social prob-
lems to a limited extent, since the expectations of stakeholders are more prac-
tical and manageable243. As early as the 1990s, Clarkson concluded that com-
panies, in practice, deal with the expectations of stakeholders rather than 
with social expectations244; therefore, a distinction must be made between 
the demands of stakeholders and social issues. For this reason, external 
stakeholders also have a major responsibility in better communication of 
social needs to the company and in ensuring that they focus on the most im-
portant problems. 
Each stakeholder is affected by the activity of the company to a different 
extent, and vice versa, i.e. they can influence the company’s operations dif-
ferently. The power/interest grid illustrates the differences between 
groups.245 Freeman and Velamuri246 suggested that corporate social respon-
sibility should henceforth be called ‘corporate stakeholder responsibility’, 
since—in their opinion—that would provide a more precise expression of the 
direction and real content of responsible corporate behaviour. With regard to 
stakeholders, it is important to note that stakeholder groups are not neces-
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sarily homogeneous and the interest and power relations may change contin-
uously, thus, it is worth re-identifying the stakeholders of a company from 
time to time. 
A concept related to CSR is CSP, which stands for corporate social perfor-
mance: it dates back to the 1970s and aims to identify societal needs and the 
possible responses in order to strengthen the social legitimacy of compa-
nies.247 248 249 Initially, CSP models were considered to be equivalent to CSR 
in the relevant literature; however, from the 1990s, the emphasis of CSP has 
shifted towards the measurement of the performance of responsible activi-
ties. The CSP approach aims to encourage companies to become familiar 
with the social needs and expectations related to their activities and to address 
them proactively250. Such demands are also expressed by stakeholders, which 
means that this approach is closely related to the stakeholder theory. 
The first researchers focusing on the concept of ‘corporate conscience’ were 
Goodpaster and Matthews in the early 1980s251. They consider that the ex-
tension of the concept of a person assuming social responsibility to legal per-
sons will lead to the ideal of a responsible company. They interpret respon-
sibility in the context of decision-making, i.e. the consequences of decisions 
on others must also be taken into consideration. 
Within corporate social responsibility, the so-called corporate citizenship 
(CC) approach initially regarded companies as ‘good citizens’, which are ac-
tive in society252 and voluntarily carry out some socially positive philan-
thropic activity. From the 1990s, globalization has given a great boost to the 
expansion and development of this theory, thus, the corporate citizenship ap-
proach, which initially focused only on local communities, has acquired an 
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international orientation and interpretation. At the 2002 World Economic 
Forum, representatives of 46 multinational companies signed the statement 
entitled ‘Global Corporate Citizenship: The Leadership Challenge for CEOs 
and Boards’253. In that document, business leaders declared that they would 
endeavor to do business in a manner that obeys the laws, produces safe and 
cost-effective products, creates jobs and wealth, and reflects international 
value-based standards, integrating all this into core business strategy. They 
underlined that the relationships with stakeholders were fundamental to the 
internal and external success of companies, that business leaders played a 
key role in making the company a good citizen, and that assuming such per-
sonal responsibility was essential for the company’s long-term success. 
Since the 2000s, a large number of authors have sought to clarify the dis-
course on corporate citizenship and to identify different approaches. Accord-
ing to Matten et al.254, the corporate citizenship theory includes three ap-
proaches:  
• a limited view, which focuses only on the companies’ philanthropic ac-
tivities;  
• an equivalent view, which is most commonly associated with CSR and 
suggests that companies should assume responsibility for a better quality 
of life of the members of society;  
• an extended view, according to which corporate citizenship becomes ac-
tive when the government fails to protect the interests of citizens.  
The last view clearly demonstrates that the concept goes beyond the discus-
sion of the role of companies and can be interpreted in a broader context. 
Carroll’s pyramid model255 is one of the best known and most cited con-
cepts of corporate responsibility. The essence of the model is that there are 
different levels of responsibility, which basically build upon each other. The 
lowest level is ‘economic responsibility’, which is the absolute basis and a 
decisive factor in the company’s current and continuous future operation; 
therefore, it is a fundamental requirement set by the owners. The second level 
is ‘legal responsibility’, which refers to compliance with the regulations, 
thus representing the fundamental, formally expressed and widely accepted 
                                                     
253 WEF (2002): Global Corporate Citizenship: The Leadership Challenge for CEOs and Boards, 
World Economic Forum, Geneva 
254 D. Matten, A. Crane and W. Chappel (2003): Behind the Mask: Revealing the True Face of 
Corporate Citizenship’, Journal of Business Ethics, vol. 45, no. 1-2, 2003, pp. 109–120. 
255 A.B. Carroll (1991): The Pyramid of Corporate Social Responsibility: Toward the Moral Man-
agement of Organisational Stakeholders, Business Horizons, July–August 1991, pp. 39–48. 
186 
expectations of society in this respect. As current regulations are unable to 
cover all the expectations that are important from an ethical perspective, the 
next level is ‘ethical responsibility’, i.e. the fulfillment of requirements that 
are not codified into legal regulations, yet are fundamental from an ethical 
point of view. Finally, the highest level is ‘philanthropic responsibility’, 
which means the fulfillment of the higher than average expectations of cer-
tain groups, instead of the expectations of the society as a whole. The model, 
which was popular in the early 1990s, has been used, analysed or reconsid-
ered by many. Some have pointed out that in certain countries, due to weak 
regulation and enforcement, philanthropic responsibility comes before legal 
responsibility256. Csigéné257 suggests that there is an additional level of re-
sponsibility, which could be called orientational responsibility. It means that 
companies can direct their customers and consumers, and shape their expec-
tations, for example, towards sustainable consumption. 
Matten and Moon258 introduced the concepts of implicit and explicit CSR, 
analysing and comparing the conditions and corporate practices of CSR in 
Europe and the United States. The starting point for their analysis is that, in 
the United States, explicit reference to CSR is more frequent in corporate 
communication than in Europe. The reason for this is that in Europe, due to 
the high level of environmental and work safety standards, companies have 
less responsibility beyond regulatory compliance. Explicit CSR activities are 
understood as deliberate, voluntary activities, which tend to stem from the 
company’s strategy, while implicit CSR means compliance with regulatory 
requirements. 
Corporate sustainability has also been defined and interpreted in various 
ways since the 1990s. The International Institute for Sustainable Develop-
ment, Deloitte & Touche and the World Business Council for Sustainable 
Development (WBCSD) defines sustainable development for companies as 
follows: ‘adopting business strategies and activities that meet the needs of 
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the enterprise and its stakeholders today, while protecting, sustaining and en-
hancing the human and natural resources that will be needed in the future’259. 
According to Málovics260, corporate sustainability is a paradoxical concept, 
since, in principle, the concept of sustainability cannot be interpreted at a 
corporate level. According to Csigéné261, corporate social responsibility 
starts at the micro-level, from one of the causes of problems, while the sus-
tainability approach looks for solutions starting from macro-problems (ef-
fect). The advantage of the concept of corporate responsibility is that the re-
sponsible subject, i.e. the company, is clearly identified, while in the case of 
sustainability, the task of each actor is difficult to define in the pursuit of ‘one 
major common goal’. For more information on the role of CSR in achieving 
strong sustainability, see the article by Málovics, Csigéné and Kraus262. 
A relatively new concept, which has given new impetus and direction to the 
discourse on corporate social responsibility, is creating shared value 
(CSV)263. The main idea is that companies can create value not only for their 
owners but also for all stakeholders, for example, by meeting societal needs. 
We have already discussed in detail the importance of taking into considera-
tion the interests of stakeholders. As the role of external stakeholders in-
creases, logically, external communication also becomes more important. 
A key tool in this process is the publication of reports under different names 
(e.g. sustainability report, CSR report) in order to present the evolution of the 
company’s social and environmental performance. 
The Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) is an initiative that was launched in 
1997 as a result of the cooperation between CERES (Coalition for Environ-
mentally Responsible Economies) and UNEP (United Nations Environmen-
tal Programme). In 2001, it became a separate institution, independent of 
CERES, and has been active ever since. In 2000, GRI issued its first guide-
line entitled ‘Sustainable Reporting Guidelines’, on the basis of which ap-
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proximately fifty sustainability reports were published. The number of cor-
porate reports drawn up worldwide using the GRI’s guidelines has exceeded 
10,000. As a result of a constant relationship with stakeholders and the de-
velopment of corporate practice, the content of the guidelines is updated con-
tinuously. This process is well demonstrated by the fact that G3.1 contained 
79, while G4 some 150 suggested indicators. Furthermore, additional sector-
specific guidance documents have also been elaborated for some sectors, 
which are significant in terms of their environmental and social impacts, with 
the involvement of business actors representing the sectors in question. Un-
der GRI 4, such sectors included the electricity sector, business services, 
mining and metal processing, the NGO sector, as well as the oil and gas in-
dustry. As of 19 October 2016, G4 guidelines have been replaced by the GRI 
Standards. 
In 2010, the International Organisation for Standardization issued a standard 
called ISO 26000, Guidance on social responsibility. Unlike the standards 
for quality management systems (ISO 9001) and environmental management 
systems (ISO 14001), the CSR standard does not include the possibility of 
certification for organisations. Nevertheless, a large number of companies—
of different sizes and activities—around the world regard this standard as a 
point of reference, thus, it is worth outlining its content in brief. The standard 
contains the key concepts and principles of CSR, as follows: 
• accountability: the organisation must be accountable for its impacts, 
• transparency: the organisation’s decisions and activities must be trans-
parent if they affect the environment and society, 
• ethical behaviour: behaviour based on the values of honesty, fairness 
and integrity, 
• respect for stakeholder interests, 
• respect for the rule of law, 
• respect for international norms of behaviour, 
• respect for human rights, recognition of their importance and universal 
nature. 
It aims to support the integration of responsibility into the company’s target 
system and processes as well. It covers the areas of CSR (human rights, 
labour practices, environment, fair operating practices, consumer issues, 
community involvement and development), the importance and methods of 
stakeholder identification, as well as communication. The importance of the 
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standard lies in the fact that it gives a comprehensive overview of the in-
terpretation of CSR, although some experts consider it to be too general 
and permissive. 
10.3. CSR in the European Union 
Corporate social responsibility has already become a widespread and 
widely accepted concept in the European Union as well. It was in the 
1990s that this concept started to gain ground within the EU and became the 
subject of substantive technical discourse. In the historical background, a ma-
jor step was the appeal that Jacques Delors, then President of the European 
Commission, made in 1993 to businesses in Europe, asking them to get in-
volved in the efforts for social cohesion and eventually to assume social 
responsibility. In 1995, the predecessor of the non-profit organisation ‘CSR 
Europe’ was established. CSR Europe—which has members in the EU Mem-
ber States (including Hungary) and in some other European countries—still 
plays an important role in promoting corporate social responsibility, in the 
exchange of experience, in providing a professional forum, organising con-
ferences, and awarding companies that deliver outstanding performance (Eu-
ropean CSR Award). 
In 2000, the European Commission published a green paper entitled ‘Pro-
moting a European framework for corporate social responsibility’, which 
contains the EU’s position and principles concerning CSR. The document 
describes the ‘internal’, ‘external’ and practical dimensions of corporate so-
cial responsibility with the aim of presenting all that CSR encompasses. The 
internal dimension includes human resources management (e.g. ensuring 
equal opportunities in terms of selection and employment to all workers, in-
cluding people at a disadvantage; training; supporting lifelong learning), 
health and safety at work, adaptation to change, the management of environ-
mental impacts and natural resources, as well as resource use and the reduc-
tion of waste. The external dimension includes the relations with local com-
munities as well as business partners, suppliers and customers, respect for 
human rights and involvement in the solution of global environmental prob-
lems. The practical dimension includes the tools associated with corporate 
management activities (codes of conduct, management systems, green ac-
counting). Tools affecting consumers are labels (e.g. eco-labels), while so-
cially responsible investment (SRI) is a tool affecting investors. The Euro-
pean Multi-Stakeholder Forum on Corporate Social Responsibility was es-
tablished, offering an opportunity for stakeholders to hold a continuous dia-
logue. 
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In 2002, the European Commission’s first communication about CSR was 
published, the title of which also reflects the typical approach to corporate 
social responsibility in that period: ‘Communication from the European 
Commission concerning Corporate Social Responsibility: A business contri-
bution to Sustainable Development’. The Communication states that some 
form of standardization is needed emphasizes the European Union’s efforts 
to promote the social responsibility of small and medium-sized enterprises 
and underlines that CSR should be integrated into different policies. 
The RARE project—a project funded by the Sixth Framework Programme 
of the EU in the field of R+D, in which the Department of Environmental 
Economics of the Budapest University of Technology and Economics was 
also involved (2004–2007)—included a comprehensive analysis of European 
corporate social responsibility practices. In order to compare rhetoric and re-
ality, the international research group analysed some selected sectors: the ex-
tractive industry was represented by the oil sector, the manufacturing indus-
try by the fish processing sector, and the services sector by the banking in-
dustry. Furthermore, a separate part was dedicated to the specificities of the 
responsibility of SMEs and the impact of EU enlargement on companies’ 
CSR activity.264 
In 2006, a new communication on ‘making Europe a pole of excellence on 
corporate social responsibility’ was published265. It is enough to see the title 
to grasp the ambitious approach of the communication, which is in line with 
the Lisbon objective (making Europe ‘the most competitive [...] knowledge-
based economy in the world’). It implies a major change of approach, which 
was criticized by some NGOs: while the first communication considered 
CSR to be primarily an important tool for achieving sustainability, the new 
document focuses on its role in increasing competitiveness and employment. 
In addition to emphasizing the primary role of companies, it also highlights 
that NGOs can also play an important role in ensuring the effectiveness of 
CSR. The communication explains that CSR can also contribute to sustaina-
ble economic development and the achievement of the objectives of the Eu-
ropean Growth and Jobs Strategy. It also addresses the need for raising 
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awareness of CSR as well as the importance of the dissemination and pro-
motion of best practices, the cooperation between Member States, consumer 
information, research and education. It underlines the need to strengthen the 
social responsibility of SMEs further and to address the international dimen-
sion of CSR266. 
In March 2006, the European Alliance for Corporate Social Responsibil-
ity was established by the European Commission. In this context, Günter 
Verheugen, then Commission Vice-President responsible for enterprise and 
industry policy, said: ‘Europe needs a public climate in which entrepreneurs 
are appreciated not just for making good profits but also for making a fair 
contribution to addressing societal challenges”.267 
Shortly afterward, the European Parliament adopted its ‘resolution of 
13 March 2007 on corporate social responsibility: a new partnership’ 
(2006/2133) on the proposal of British MEP Richard Howitt. The Howitt 
report emphasizes that an EU-wide CSR regulation should take into consid-
eration the significant differences between Member States (European Parlia-
ment, 2007). It is promising that the resolution points out that ‘CSR should 
tackle new areas such as lifelong learning, the organisation of work, equal 
opportunities, social inclusion, sustainable development and ethics’268, be-
cause by doing so, it has connected CSR to a number of important social 
policy objectives. 
At the beginning of the renewed EU strategy 2011–14 for Corporate Social 
Responsibility, it is stated that CSR is now in the interests of enterprises, 
since it reduces risks, facilitates access to capital, increases stakeholders’ 
confidence, and it is also in the interests of society as a whole, as it can con-
tribute to the priorities of the Europe 2020 strategy for smart, sustainable and 
inclusive growth. The document provides an evaluation of the impacts of the 
previous EU policy, indicating a number of positive results, e.g. a significant 
increase in the number of European companies using EMAS (Eco-Manage-
ment and Audit) (from 3,300 in 2006 to 4,600 in 2011) or publishing sustain-
ability reports according to the guidelines of GRI (from 270 in 2006 to 850 
in 2011) or the number of companies that have signed up to the ten principles 
of the Global Compact (from 600 in 2006 to over 1900 in 2011). (However, 
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it is unclear to what extent this is due to the EU’s CSR policy and to other 
global processes.) 
The renewed strategy also provides a new definition, which is very general 
and comprehensive, as it defines CSR as ‘the responsibility of enterprises 
for their impacts on society’. In relation to the theoretical concepts de-
scribed above, we can conclude that the document reflects the approach of 
strategic CSR and also relies on the concept of creating shared value (CSV), 
since it says the following: ‘To fully meet their corporate social responsibil-
ity, enterprises should have in place a process to integrate social, environ-
mental, ethical, human rights and consumer concerns into their business op-
erations and core strategy in close collaboration with their stakeholders, with 
the aim of – maximizing the creation of shared value for their owners/share-
holders and for their other stakeholders and society at large; – identifying, 
preventing and mitigating their possible adverse impacts.’269 
The EU’s CSR policy, therefore, also seeks to integrate the latest scientific 
findings, trends and theories. Since the 2000s, it has constituted an important 
policy area, which covers a number of domains affecting the management of 
the companies’ internal and external stakeholders. It is seen as an important 
tool to support the EU’s strategic objectives. 
10.4. Conclusion 
The concept of corporate social responsibility can be best imagined as a mas-
sive tree with lots of intertwining branch roots stemming from the main root 
at different depths and several small or large branches growing out of its 
trunk. One of the key purposes of this chapter was to clarify these concepts. 
As CSR encourages responsibility beyond mere compliance with regulations, 
it can favour the spreading of an innovative approach in the corporate 
strategies and the companies’ day-to-day operations. It can encourage and 
support proactive corporate behaviour that can contribute to the success and 
competitiveness of companies in the long term as well. There is extensive 
literature on the possible drivers of CSR and its role in competitiveness. 
Such connection is becoming increasingly apparent; according to the survey 
carried out by KPMG in 2013, for example, around one-third of the world’s 
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largest companies gain economic benefits from their CSR activities, mainly 
in the form of additional profits or the acquisition of larger market shares270. 
It is very positive that companies follow with attention and adopt the latest 
CSR trends, at least at the level of rhetoric. At the same time, it is important 
to avoid the phenomenon known as ‘greenwashing’ in the corporate environ-
mental policies, which, in this case, could be called ‘responsible appearance’. 
Many people are likely to encounter mainly the most visible and communi-
cable forms and manifestations of corporate responsibility, such as donation 
or cause marketing. We hope that this chapter has made it clear that there is 
much more to it. CSR is more of a way in which companies try to find their 
place in the management of current complex problems concerning sustaina-
bility. We trust that this brief summary of the relevant trends and scientific 
findings will also help future corporate experts and business leaders succeed 
in this field. 
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11. Green regulatory approaches 
Since credit and equity markets provide economies’ lifeblood, the financing 
conditions available for environmentally favourable or detrimental invest-
ments will ultimately significantly determine how sustainable these econo-
mies can be. However, similarly to non-financial firms, financial institutions 
are unlikely to take into account long-term sustainability considerations in 
their lending and investment decisions to a socially optimal extent without 
regulatory intervention. We, therefore, analyse how financial regulation is 
currently dealing with environmental aspects and how innovative regulatory 
approaches can further help the re-allocation of capital. 
11.1. Why and what to regulate? 
This chapter only focuses on financial regulation, but it is important to note 
that financial regulation can only supplement environmental regulation but 
can no means substitute it. Environmental, social policy can ensure via a 
range of possible measures (e.g. taxation, subsidies, bans and pollution lim-
its) that actors of the real economy (i.e. industrial, agricultural firms, service 
providers etc.) operate in line with environmental or social sustainability ex-
pectations. In contrast, financial regulation can only ensure that banks and 
other financial institutions provide funding or financial risk management ser-
vices to the actors of the real economy in a way that supports sustainability. 
It is a relatively new recognition that “earthly” topics such as climate change 
cannot be dealt with independently of the financial, monetary sphere. Unsur-
prisingly, the recognition is partly coming from the realization of financing 
needs of sustainable development goals and, in particular, the investments 
required for climate change mitigation and adaptation. This has received in-
creasing attention in the past decade, with more and more studies covering 
the topic.271 
                                                     
271See for instance: 
UNCTAD (2014). World Investment Report 2014. Investing in SDGs. Geneva 
Clark et. al. (2018): Bridging funding gaps for climate and sustainable development: Pitfalls, prog-
ress and potential of private finance. Land Use Policy 71 (2018) 335–346.   
European Commission (2019): The European Green Deal. Brussels, 11.12.2019, COM(2019) 640 
final. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/european-green-deal-communica-
tion_en.pdf. Retrieved 16 December 2019. 
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Range of possible environmental regulation approaches 
 
 
Source: Gyura (2019). 
 
While the estimations vary in some of the details, they all point to the fact 
that public funds are unsatisfactory to meet those financing needs, especially 
taking into account the already high indebtedness of governments. In other 
words, the mobilization of private funds is essential, i.e. banks, investment 
funds and other financial institutions need to step-up the financing of envi-
ronmentally beneficial projects, and – at the same time – scale down the 
funding of those activities that are environmentally unsustainable, like fossil 
fuel-based power generation. 
Environmentally unsustainable activities are also likely to have higher finan-
cial risks in the longer term. The so-called transition risk stems from the fact 
that stricter environmental policies, rapid technological changes, or changing 
customer preferences could render these activities unprofitable, thereby also 
impairing loans and equities financing them. Another unique risk related to 
environmental sustainability is the physical risks of climate change. Extreme 
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weather events and acute problems caused by climate change are also drivers 
of credit risk, and possibly also market and liquidity risks272. 
Both the financing needs of sustainable development goals and the financial 
risks driven by environmental factors may call for regulatory intervention. In 
the latter case, the goal of regulation is to maintain financial stability: by 
nudging financial institutions to identify, assess and manage environmental 
driven financial risks, regulation can simultaneously support financial sound-
ness and, at the same time, increase the volume of green financing – as de-
tailed below. 
However, why exactly is there a case for regulation? One might argue that 
banks and other financial institutions are rational, profit-maximizing entities 
with very sophisticated risk management, modeling and business planning 
functions. What could be the main reasons why they do not incorporate en-
vironmental sustainability considerations in their strategies adequately? 
There are many possible reasons, out of which the two main important ones 
are externalities and short-termism. Banks finance firms and economic activ-
ities predominantly on a risk-adjusted return basis. Even if, in some cases 
some other factors (e.g. reputational gains) also come into play, the deciding 
factor determining what kind of financing conditions environmentally sus-
tainable projects receive, is mainly based on the profitability of the potential 
loan. The income generation capacity of the borrower is, in turn, primarily 
determined by the respective economic conditions. Without the externalities 
properly internalized, the sustainability of various economic activities is un-
likely to pay off. In fact, being “green” often costs more (due to costs related 
to waste management, pollution monitoring and control etc.) and therefore 
reduces profitability.  
Many studies have, for instance, highlighted the lack of internalization of 
fossil fuel’s externalities. Irena (2016) estimated that the reduction of pollu-
tion and climate impact through increased use of renewable energy by 2030 
could save up to USD 4.2 trillion per year worldwide273. The external costs 
                                                     
272 NGFS (2019): A call for action. Climate change as a source of financial risk. Available at: 
https://www.ngfs.net/sites/default/files/medias/documents/synthese_ngfs-2019_-
_17042019_0.pdf. Retrieved: 2020.02.27. 
273 Irena (2016): The True Cost Of Fossil Fuels: Saving On The Externalities Of Air Pollution And 
Climate Change. Available at: https://www.irena.org/publications/2016/May/The-True-Cost-of-
Fossil-Fuels-Saving-on-the-Externalities-of-Air-Pollution-and-Climate-Change. Retreved: 
2020.02.28. 
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include pollution and environmental degradation resulting from the extrac-
tion of resources; indoor and outdoor air pollution due directly to fuel com-
bustion as well as non-combustion emissions such as those from industrial 
processes; and the negative impact of extreme weather events caused by 
global warming. Nevertheless, these externalities are only partly built into 
fossil fuel generation’s costs. 
Besides the lack of the internalization of externalities, the other main reason 
why regulation is needed is the time horizon of financial institutions. As EBA 
put it in its report: “it may be questioned if the current financial and strategic 
planning horizons of EU banks are sufficiently tailored to the integration of 
long-term challenges, such as those linked to the transition to a sustainable 
economy”274. According to this study, the time horizon used by European 
banks for defining the business model and setting their strategy is in most 
cases about 3-5 years. This is obviously way shorter than the time horizon of 
large-scale environmental anomalies such as climate change. This problem 
was famously raised the first time by then-Governor of the Bank of England 
Mark Carney, like the Tragedy of Horizons, arguing that the impacts of cli-
mate change will be felt beyond the horizons of those actions now. In other 
words, the current generation is imposing a cost on future generations, and 
thus the current generation has a little direct incentive to fix275. 
Having said that, the next logical question is asking why banks fail to apply 
a longer term orientation in their strategy setting and business planning. 
EBA’s report, as mentioned earlier,276 outlines the following possible rea-
sons:  
• profitability pressures and shareholders’ interest; 
• accounting rules requirements unduly penalize long-term investments – 
at least as argued by banks; 
                                                     
274 EBA (2019): Report on Undue Short-Term Pressure from The Financial Sector On Corporati-
ons, p. 20. Available at: https://eba.europa.eu/file/461440/download?token=gM-ur7b2. Retrived 28 
February 2020 
275 Carney, Mark (2016): Breaking the tragedy of the horizon - climate change and financial stabi-
lity. Available at: https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/speech/2015/breaking-the-tragedy-of-the-ho-
rizon-climate-change-and-financial-stability. Retrieved: 2020.03.01 
276 EBA (2019): Report on Undue Short-Term Pressure from The Financial Sector On Corporati-
ons. Available at: https://eba.europa.eu/file/461440/download?token=gM-ur7b2. Retrived 28 Feb-
ruary 2020 
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• macroeconomic factors might also play a role, for example, uncertainties 
about macroeconomic trends over a more extended period and the effect 
of monetary policies in the current period.277  
To summarize, financial institutions might insufficiently take into account 
sustainability considerations because they have insufficient incentives for 
that (in the lack of internalization of externalities), and because sustainability 
problems are likely to materialize into more tangible problems only in the 
longer term. 
Overview of the logic of key green financial regulatory ap-
proaches 
 
Source: Author’s own illustration 
 
Obviously, there are many ways that regulation can affect financial institu-
tions and capital flows. Some regulations are already in place, some are in a 
relatively mature stage of development, and others are still in a very prelim-
inary phase of discussions, but may become part of the regulatory toolkit in 
the future. One possible categorization of the various regulatory approaches 
is according to their primary goal: whether they mainly aim at maintaining 
financial stability or at helping the financing of sustainability goals. The four 
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of pressure is put on institutions to restrict maturity transformation (difficulties in pricing long-term 
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most important elements within this kind of framework are corporate gov-
ernance, disclosures and capital requirements (targeting either green or 
brown exposures). 
11.2. Key elements of sustainable finance regulations  
11.2.1. Corporate governance measures 
The most logical measure in sustainable finance regulation is to enhance cor-
porate governance so as to make financial institutions incorporate environ-
mental considerations into their business. In the EU, several supervisory au-
thorities have already issued such recommendations. In 2019 the Bank of 
England published its supervisory statement titled “Enhancing banks’ and 
insurers’ approaches to managing the financial risks from climate change”278. 
The statement “describes the two risk factors through which financial risks 
from climate change arise and the distinctive elements which, when consid-
ered together, present unique challenges and require a strategic approach”, 
namely, physical and transition risks. As for this strategic approach, the Bank 
of England expects the following: 
• embed the consideration of the financial risks from climate change in 
governance arrangements;  
• incorporate the financial risks from climate change into existing finan-
cial risk management practice;  
• use (long term) scenario analysis to inform strategy setting and risk as-
sessment and identification; and  
• develop an approach to the disclosure on the financial risks from climate 
change279. 
In Germany, the supervisory authority, Bafin, also issued its guidance, with 
a somewhat broader scope (sustainability risks in general), but with similar 
contents. 280 The “Guidance Notice on Dealing with Sustainability Risks”  
                                                     
278 https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/prudential-regulation/publication/2019/enhancing-banks-
and-insurers-approaches-to-managing-the-financial-risks-from-climate-change-ss 
279 Bank of England (2019): Supervisory Statement - SS3/19 Enhancing banks’ and insurers’ 
approaches to managing the financial risks from climate change., p.4. Available at: 
https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/prudential-regulation/supervisory-state-
ment/2019/ss319.pdf?la=en&hash=7BA9824BAC5FB313F42C00889D4E3A6104881C44. Ret-
rieved: 2020.03.01. 
280 https://www.bafin.de/SharedDocs/Veroeffentlichungen/EN/Meldung/2019/mel-
dung_191220_MB_Nachhaltigkeitsrisiken_en.html 
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provides a detailed description of recommended risk identification, manage-
ment and control processes related to sustainability risk. It also covers stress 
tests and scenario analyses on an entity-specific basis.  
Many other authorities plan to issue similar recommendations and guide-
lines. Similar approaches are expected EU-wide, as part of the EU Sustaina-
ble Finance Action plan (see below). The first such step is the European 
Banking Authority’s Loan Origination Guidelines, which will – among other 
things – also set out expectations as to how environmental considerations 
need to be embedded in lending policies. Accordingly, the new guidelines 
(to be enter into force in 2021) will require that institutions should include 
environmental, social and governance (ESG) factors as well as risks and op-
portunities related to ESG in their risk management policies, credit risk pol-
icies and procedures (European Banking Authority 2019). 
11.2.2. Disclosures 
Disclosures have been an integral part of financial regulation for several dec-
ades now. For public securities, disclosures are key elements to enable in-
formed investor decisions, and also for prudential regulation, for instance, in 
the Basel Capital Regulation’s Pillar III approach281, transparency is required 
so as to facilitate, that capital flows efficiently to the best risk/return targets. 
Taking into account the increasing awareness of how climate change and 
other environmental anomalies drive financial risks (NGFS 2018282), it has 
become a logical step to integrate climate risks into disclosure rules as well.  
Disclosures are needed for two reasons and from two kinds of entities. First, 
firms that are borrowers or receiving equity investments need to disclose cli-
mate-related exposures so that banks and asset managers have information 
about the risks they entail when lending or investing in such companies. Such 
information also allows the financial institutions themselves to disclose how 
exposed they are to climate risks. Transparency is required not only about 
the exposures themselves (e.g. stock of loans to fossil fuel-based companies), 
but also about qualitative aspects such as policies and risk management pro-
cedures about climate risks. 
This is the underlying principle of the Financial Stability Board’s relevant 
recommendations. This standard-setting body published in 2017, through its 
special task force, the so-called TCFD-recommendations on Climate-related 
                                                     
281 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2018): Pillar 3 disclosure requirements – updated 
framework. Available at: https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d455.pdf. Retrieved 20 March 2020. 
282 NGFS (2018): A call for action. 
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Financial Disclosures (TCFD 2017). The recommendations cover four the-
matic areas that represent core elements of how organisations operate: gov-
ernance, strategy, risk management, and metrics and targets. There are rec-
ommended disclosures for each of these with information that will help in-
vestors and others understand how reporting organisations assess climate-
related risks and opportunities. 
Core Elements of Recommended Climate-Related Financial 
Disclosures 
 
Source: TCFD (2017, p. v.) 
 
The TCFD recommendations are non-binding, and, since they were formu-
lated on the global level, logically somewhat general. They are, however, 
also forming the basis for many jurisdictions’ similar initiatives. For in-
stance, in the EU, the European Commission has issued guidelines on cli-
mate-related disclosures, that closely follow TCFD’s policy (European Com-
mission 2019). 
11.2.3. Penalizing measures for brown lending 
Many have also argued to use capital requirements to promote sustainable 
finance. There are two possible ways to do so: one can penalize exposures to 
“brown” (unsustainable) activities, or, alternatively set favourable capital re-
quirements to green loans and investments.  
The first approach is more widely supported by supervisors and regulators, 
as it is easier to integrate into existing prudential regulation and also easier 
to justify from a financial stability perspective. The underlying principle of 
the latter is that the riskier an asset is, the higher its capital requirements 
should be. It can be argued, that there might be firms and activities whose 
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climate- or environmental driven financial risks have not yet been properly 
identified and quantified, and therefore their riskiness is not adequately mir-
rored in capital requirements. Banks are of course sensitive to capital require-
ments, as equity is costly. If they need to hold more capital for a certain type 
of loans, they are likely to scale down such financing, and redesign their 
lending strategies. 
The most logical choice for such assets are those exposed to transition risks. 
Any carbon-intensive industries and activities can depreciate in the long term 
due to higher carbon prices, carbon taxes or simply because becoming obso-
lete due to technological change or new consumer preferences. This kind of 
differentiation can be used in virtually all segments of the economy. For in-
stance, the Dutch supervisor announced that it would look into the possibility 
of applying higher capital requirements to loans financing outdated, non-en-
ergy efficient properties. The latter, of course, consume more energy for heat-
ing and air-conditioning (indirectly also contributing heavier to greenhouse 
gas emissions), and therefore more exposed to rising energy prices and cli-
mate change mitigation policies, in other words, transition risk.283  
11.2.4. Support measures for green financing 
The other alternative is of course to reward loans and investments financing 
green economic activities. The argument is straightforward: by lowering the 
capital requirements of such exposures selectively, regulators can reduce the 
cost of capital for such financing, and make more of the loan decisions prof-
itable. With lower capital requirements, banks can also lower the interest 
rates of green loans (thereby pushing more possible green investments to a 
positive net present value range), or simply earn more profit on these loans 
(which in turn would motivate banks to increase the supply of such lending). 
So far the only central bank in Europe introducing a favourable capital re-
quirement treatment for green loans is the Central Bank of Hungary (MNB). 
Since 2020, banks can make use of lower capital requirements for green 
mortgages and unsecured loans financing energy efficiency renovations in 
residential properties. A green mortgage is defined as an energy-efficient one 
(in line with the EU Taxonomy, see below), with a near-zero energy con-
sumption. The basic idea is that energy-efficient properties come with lower 
utility bills, which in turn leave a higher disposable income with the bor-
rower, a factor that can result in lower probabilities of default (PD). Energy-
                                                     
283 De Nederlandsche Bank (2017): Waterproof? An exploration of climate-related risks for the 
Dutch financial sector. Available at: https://www.dnb.nl/en/binaries/Waterproof_tcm47-
363851.pdf. Retrieved 20 March 2020. 
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efficient properties might also have a more stable collateral value, which 
helps the so-called loss given default (LGD) component of credit risk. The 
combination of better PDs and LGDs can justify lower capital requirements, 
although MNB considers that the aforementioned “green hypothesis” still 
needs to be underpinned by research, and therefore the capital requirement 
discount is only available for a 4 year temporary period at this stage. It should 
be noted however, that existing research appears to support the green hypoth-
esis, although these studies used fairly small samples.284  
Other countries also analyse the option to introduce similar measures. China 
is one of them, and some studies already modelled the possible benefits of 
the approach. As Ma Jun (2018) put it, “according to preliminary estima-
tions, if the risk weight for green loans was reduced from the current 100% 
to 50%, it could reduce the financing costs by about 50 basis points (0.5 
percentage points) for all green projects funded by green loans. Given the 
fact that bank loans are the primary source of funding for green projects in 
China, this measure could lower the financing costs of all green projects by 
0.4-0.5 percentage points in the country. In addition, the “saving” of capital 
requirement for banks with substantial green asset exposure could allow 
these banks to extend more green credit”. Such a favourable treatment could 
be justified by the strong track record of green assets: as of June 2017, the 
non-performing loan ratio (NPL) of green loans was only 0.37%, far lower 
than the NPL ratio of 1.74% for the entire loan portfolio at 21 major banks. 
Statistics from 2013-2016 also showed similar patterns285. 
These four regulatory approaches (corporate governance enhancements, dis-
closures, brown and green exposure capital requirement adjustments) do by 
no means provide an exhaustive list of possible measures in sustainable fi-
nance – yet they are probably the most important ones today. There are many 
other ways financial regulations can help sustainability, some of which will 
be touched upon below, in the description of the frameworks in selected ju-
risdictions. 
                                                     
284 see MNB (2019): Green Retail Lending in Hungary. Available at: greenfinance.hu. Retrieved 3 
March 2020. 
285 Ma Jun (2018): China Should Lower Risk Weights for Green Assets. Available at: 
http://www.gflp.org.cn/index/index/newsdetail/id/22.html. Retrieved: 19 March 2020. 
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11.3. Selected international examples 
11.3.1. European Union 
In Europe, many financial institutions have come up with green financial 
products in the 2010s in the most developed financial markets (France, Neth-
erlands, Nordic countries and the UK). This was largely an organic, bottom-
up development, based on the recognition that customers are increasingly 
concerned about sustainability. As the market grew and deepened, market 
players themselves started to pursue self-regulation: trade associations began 
to develop standards for green finance. Joining forces with other (non-euro-
pean) stakeholders, the International Capital Market Association’s Green 
Bond Principles of 2014286 was a major milestone to reach common ground 
about the green financial segment’s fastest-growing asset class, green bonds.  
Overview of the EU’s Sustainable Finance Action Plan 
 
Source: European Commission (2018).  
 
Similarly, the Loan Market Association (in cooperation with partners) devel-
oped the Green Loan Principles287, with a view to at least partly harmonizing 
green corporate lending. But this market-led self-regulation was not consid-
ered adequate by EU policymakers, which led to a comprehensive regulatory 
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initiative from the European Commission. The EU approach, as outlined be-
low, still very much relies on market forces, compared to China (to be dis-
cussed in the subsequent subchapter). 
Climate change and environmental sustainability has been a high priority 
item on the European Union’s agenda since the early 2000s. At the same 
time, having a Single Market for financial services, based on a common set 
of rules, has also been a key element of EU policy. Therefore, it was a logical 
policy step to combine sustainability and financial regulation in a compre-
hensive strategy. The European Commission published the so called Sustain-
able Finance Action Plan in 2018, comprising three goals and ten actions. 
This Action Plan has the objectives, to (i) reorient capital flows towards sus-
tainable investment in order to achieve sustainable and inclusive growth; (ii) 
manage financial risks stemming from climate change, resource depletion, 
environmental degradation and social issues; and (iii) foster transparency and 
long-termism in financial and economic activity. 
For the purpose of these three objectives the Action Plan builds on ten spe-
cific actions, many of which have already been analysed in this chapter. The 
overarching principle of the Action plan is to decrease the information asym-
metries associated with sustainable finance. Accordingly, many actions tar-
get transparency and disclosures, be them firm-level or product-level. The 
main idea is to allow investors, consumers and also creditors to make in-
formed decisions in a way that they understand how the financial product or 
financing to be provided contributes to sustainability.  
In addition to disclosures, the most important element is the definition for 
sustainable economic activities, the so called taxonomy. As the Commission 
put it, a “unified EU classification system - or taxonomy - will provide clarity 
on which activities can be considered 'sustainable'. It is at this stage the most 
important and urgent action of this Action Plan. Clear guidance on activities 
qualifying as contributing to climate change mitigation and adaptation, en-
vironmental and social objectives will help inform investors. It will provide 
detailed information on the relevant sectors and activities, based on screen-
ing criteria, thresholds and metrics. This is an essential step in supporting 
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the flow of capital into sustainable sectors in need of financing. An EU tax-
onomy will be gradually integrated into EU legislation to provide more legal 
certainty.”288.  
But how would this taxonomy work? A regulatory proposal was published 
in 2018, which was adopted at the end of 2019289. An economic activity shall 
be environmentally sustainable where that activity complies with all of the 
following criteria: 
• it contributes substantially to one or more of the environmental objec-
tives set out in the regulation; 
• economic activity does not significantly harm any of the environmental 
objectives set out in the regulation; 
• carried out in compliance with the minimum legal safeguards; 
• and complies with technical screening criteria. 
This taxonomy regulation defines six environmental objectives areas based 
on which economic activities should be assessed to judge whether it qualifies 
as environmentally sustainable: 
(1) climate change mitigation; 
(2) climate change adaptation; 
(3) sustainable use and protection of water and marine resources; 
(4) transition to a circular economy, waste prevention and recycling; 
(5) pollution prevention and control; 
(6) protection of healthy ecosystems. 
 
In line with the Action Plan, a technical expert group was formulated, that 
published its comprehensive report in 2019, the so-called technical screening 
criteria, as mentioned above. This expert report, therefore, contains the quan-
titative and qualitative criteria to be used to decide what economic activities 
                                                     
288 European Commission (2018): Action Plan: Financing Sustainable Growth, p.4. Available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2018/EN/COM-2018-97-F1-EN-MAIN-PART-
1.PDF. Retrived: 2 March 2020. 
289 Council of the European Union (2019): Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on the establishment of a framework to facilitate sus-
tainable investment - Approval of the final compromise text. 2018/0178 (COD) 
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should be regarded as contributing to climate change mitigation or adapta-
tion.290 This taxonomy is the very heart of sustainable finance, as any regu-
latory measures by Member States or the EU itself, or by financial institu-
tions, will need to be aligned with the taxonomy.  
To wrap up, the EU sustainable finance regulation consists of a comprehen-
sive set of measures. The package’s most important element is clearly the 
taxonomy (from this perspective, the EU regulation is relatively stringent), 
but otherwise the EU still applies a somewhat light-touch approach: the other 
key ingredient, disclosures, rely by definition very much on market forces. 
11.3.2. The Chinese model: green credit policy and other 
measures  
China has one of the fastest-growing green finance markets. By early 2020, 
China has reached some notable achievements, including, but not limited to:  
• the stock of outstanding green loans increased to over 10 trillion yuan 
($1.4 trillion);  
• 900 billion yuan of green bonds has been issued since 2016 (making 
China one of the largest green bond markets);  
• at least 400 green private equity funds were launched291. 
The country became one of the frontrunners of green finance by using a 
unique regulatory way, which is remarkably different from other major econ-
omies’ approach. The Chinese model is based on a top-down, state directed 
mechanism. While the evolution is partly market-driven, but regulation has 
a much more important role than in the EU or in the US. China heavily reg-
ulates the key elements:  
• it has developed three sets of national green taxonomies and dozens of 
green finance product guidelines and standards;  
• introduced many innovative policy incentives for green finance (e.g. the 
central bank’s green relending facility and local government interest 
subsidies for green loans); and  
                                                     
290 Technical Expert Group (2019): Taxonomy Techncal Report. Available at: https://ec.eu-
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291 Ma Jun (2020): Five insights into China’s green finance transformation. Available at: 
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• announced a road map for compulsory environmental disclosure stand-
ards for listed companies292. 
The Chinese approach is based on a recognition that market failures are prev-
alent in environmental and financial issues. Market forces themselves will 
not result in optimal outcomes in green finance: without proper regulations 
in place, banks will inadequately take into account environmental aspects in 
their lending operations, green financial products will not necessarily pursue 
real environmental impacts, nor will green investments enjoy sufficiently 
beneficial financing conditions.  
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12. Green Central Banking 
12.1. Introduction – Central banks mandates and cli-
mate change  
Traditionally, central banks’ mandates embrace three closely inter-
twined areas with a significant emphasis on the first one: price stability 
(inflation), economic growth and financial stability. Different central 
banks have different pre-set goal functions that emanate from the given cen-
tral bank law conveyed by a political body (for example democratically 
elected parliament) depending on the political system of the given monetary 
block. This act provides the framework in which central banks are operating 
independently and set the monetary policy in order to fulfil the goals as men-
tioned above. It should be stressed that within that framework, central banks 
have considerable room to define policies in an idiosyncratic, in theory, 
“technocratic” way.  
This modus operandi simultaneously yields some flexibility and the le-
gitimacy to make decisions pertinent to the socioeconomic structure. 
This field is in no way of a static one, therefore in the last several decades, a 
distinct evolution has been observable triggered by the rapidly changing en-
vironment (like globalisation, new technologies etc.) that should be ad-
dressed by central banks. Along this way central banks have been paying 
constant attention to avoid the situation where the objectives could be se-
verely compromised but changing functional roles throughout history, alter-
nating between price stability, financial stability and support of the State’s 
financing in times of crises have been observable.293  
It is of utmost importance to recognise that central banking is much more an 
art than a science meaning that monetary policy cannot be algorithmized 
blindly: new challenges require new instruments.  
However, many commentators consider central banks’ measures ad-
dressing climate change as a grey area because it could endanger central 
banks’ abilities to fulfil their original mandate and move into the realm 
of political policy. This development could be rather controversial according 
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to the critics because central bankers are not elected by the public; therefore, 
they are not authorised to implement all of the public economic policies (like 
allocation and redistribution)294 per se, only to act strictly according to a well-
specified mandate to stabilise the economy.  
In the following several pages we would like to outline the counterargument 
and to point out that climate change – and on a broader sense many other 
environmental issues like loss of biodiversity etc. – pose significant risks to 
central banks traditional objectives, hence climate change risk could fit en-
tirely into the monetary framework with only some caveats. Consequently, 
for central banks, it is not only an option but a necessity to internalise cli-
mate-related uncertainty, which could be a source of significant systemic risk 
in the long run.  
Besides that, paving the way for the smooth transition from the age of fossil 
energy to the age of sustainable model is also crucial in order to avoid supply-
side price shocks and the risk of becoming “climate rescuers of last resort” 
(to backstop asset price drop and panic, central bank could be forced to buy 
up the liabilities of the fossil-based industry).  
Eventually, lack of any reaction in the present could threaten central bank 
independence in the long term due to the potentially sudden and unexpected 
disastrous effects of climate change that would force the central bank to act 
without any room to manoeuvre.295  
To summarise with the words of NGFS’ (Network for Greening the Financial 
System) First Progress Report (2018): “NGFS Members acknowledge that 
climate-related risks are a source of financial risk. It is therefore within the 
mandates of Central Banks and Supervisors to ensure the financial system is 
resilient to these risks. As set out in the academic literature, climate change 
will affect the global economy and so the financial system that supports it. 
The financial risks it presents are in consequence system-wide and poten-
tially irreversible if not addressed. Exact pathways may be uncertain but it 
is foreseeable that financial risks will crystallise in some form through either 
the physical or transition channel, or some combination of them both. And 
                                                     
294 Brunnermeier, Markus K - Jean-Pierre Landau (2020): Central banks and climate change. 
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while the financial risks may be realised in full over the extended time hori-
zon, the risks call for action in the short-term to reduce impact in the long-
term.”296 
12.2. Monetary policy and macroeconomic effects of 
climate change and climate policies: uncertain-
ties and channels of risks  
First of all, it is important to stress that climate models inherently imply 
a lot of uncertainties and controversies revolve around the accuracy of 
these models.297 Nevertheless, facing this situation does not mean that pol-
luting or altering our environment does not put us in uncharted territory with 
potentially significant consequences. Precautionary principle – our climate is 
a complex system with many nonlinear tipping points that could destabilise 
the climate significantly – dictates actions aiming the build down of CO2 
emission even without accepting the scientific consensus related to the cli-
mate change.  
 
Source: https://www.carbonbrief.org/explainer-nine-tipping-points-that-could-be-triggered-
by-climate-change  
                                                     
296 A sustainable and responsible investment guide for central banks’ portfolio management, Net-
working for Greening the Financial System, Technical document - https://www.ngfs.net/sites/de-
fault/files/medias/documents/ngfs-a-sustainable-and-responsible-investment-guide.pdf 
297 https://www.fooledbyrandomness.com/climateletter.pdf  
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For sure, it does not mean that climate scenarios reinforced by many of the 
well-respected scientists are not plausible sufficiently but strongly underpins 
the necessity of adjustment even with considerable uncertainties in these 
models. The table below shows the potential tipping points of our climate 
that could lead us to an irreversible plight.  
Moreover, the factors as mentioned above are only the direct potential 
causes of climate change and do not regard the multiple nonlinear dy-
namics in the society, economy, technology etc. that interact with each 
other in a complex way that makes almost impossible to predict the fu-
ture. Therefore, the traditional way of calculating the potential financial 
damage would be dangerously misleading as it can be seen in the predictions 
of economists (Nordhaus etc.) that seem suspiciously underestimate the ef-
fect of the climate crisis. For instance, DICE modellers find that a 6C warm-
ing in 22nd century would mean a decline less than 0,1% per annum in GDP 
for the next 130 (The green swans – BIS, 2020) years albeit this warming 
would definitely lead to even a global extension.  
Another frequently cited problem is the arbitrary choice of social cost’s 
discount rate that makes all calculations based on those methods useless 
and frivolous, not to mention the ethical shortcomings of this approach. 
(Next generations may suffer terribly but with a “skilfully” and a bit misan-
thropically chosen high discount rates it could seem negligible for the time 
being.)  It is essential to underline that although these problems with macro-
economic models (like DSGE) are general characteristic but meanwhile the 
potential scale of the damage induced by these models are by, and large re-
versible in case of the operation of the given economy this case is completely 
different. Climate change could be so disastrous for the humankind that real 
decision can be based on these models. As a result, the potential measures 
should target the enhance of system resilience not the fine-tuning of financial 
and economic parameters.  
While the exact calculation of climate risks is almost impossible by virtue 
of the inherent extreme uncertainty, it does not mean that quantifying 
them – for example, with scenario analysis – is completely futile. Firstly, 
risk numbers should not be taken by face value but rather as an orientation 
that is apt to identify a trend or makes a comparison between companies, 
banks possible. Secondly, the need (or requirements) to systematically think-
ing about climate risks itself helps to raise awareness that eventually could 
lead to, thirdly, integrating climate risks into strategies and risk management 
procedures and systemic disclosure of climate-related risk.   
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The main channels through climate change could have an impact on financial 
sector are depicted on the following picture.  
 
Source: The green swan (BIS) – 2020 / DG Treasury 2017 
 
Physical risk: the direct connection between events (extreme weather, 
floods, devastating droughts etc.) caused by climate change and the given 
physical damage induced by it: damage the infrastructure, buildings, lead to 
losses of production in agriculture, low productivity in the labour market, 
mass migration, loss of working hours due to extreme risk etc. It could dis-
rupt the supply chain and the demand side of the economy as well, that can 
induce monetary shocks (for example higher food prices could cause pick up 
in the headline inflation).  
As climate change intensifies, non-insured losses can threaten the solvency 
of many entities (households, business), while insured losses will put contin-
uously rising burden on the insurance sector that could even lead to higher 
insurance costs across the board beyond the fields subject to physical risk. 
Naturally, physical capital that is prone to heighten physical risk should be 
depreciated faster which will be reflected in the financial reporting as well. 
Moreover, the fat-tailed distribution of potential damage function makes the 
pricing of these risks very difficult.  
According to the studies, some regions will benefit from a warmer climate 
but in lack of any functional global mechanism to re-distribute the benefit the 
overall effect expected to be overwhelmingly negative.  
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Transition risk:  impairment of the assets, raw materials and products of 
industries with traditionally high levels of CO2 emission, depreciation of tra-
ditional technologies and together with that, devaluation of equities and debts 
of companies operating in these industries (oil, coal, conventional energy, 
conventional vehicles, etc.). To put it briefly, transition risks are due to reg-
ulatory changes, technological innovations, new taxes associated with cli-
mate change that might have significant negative impacts on the expected 
cash flow of the company’s stranded asset.298  
Managing transition risk requires a holistic approach because too fast 
evolution towards the carbon-neutral economy could lead to considera-
ble short term economic backlash with dangerous social tension (for ex-
ample because of massive scale layoffs from carbon-intensive sectors or 
a rising carbon tax rate could cause inflationary shocks) that would spill 
over to the financial / banking sector as well. As the Bank of England for-
mer governor puts it: “too rapid a movement towards a low-carbon economy 
could materially damage financial stability. A wholesale reassessment of 
prospects, as climate-related risks are re-evaluated, could destabilise mar-
kets, spark a pro-cyclical crystallisation of losses and lead to a persistent 
tightening of financial conditions: a climate Minsky moment”.299 
It is essential to understand the dynamic connection between transition 
and physical risk: the faster the latter is managed, the faster the former in-
tensifies and vice versa. BIS illustrates this concept in the following graph 
that underscores the significance of finding the optimal balancing.  
 
Source: BIS, Green swan (2020), Wyman, O. (2019). Global fleet & MRO market forecast 
commentary 2018–2028. 
 
                                                     
298 Assets that could suffer a “premature” devaluation so it becomes obsolete or non-performing 
like an oil reserve.  
299 Carney, M. (2016). Resolving the climate paradox. Arthur Burns Memorial Lecture, Berlin, 22. 
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Physical and transition risks trigger the following second-round financial sta-
bility risk with many interdependencies and feedback loops:  
• credit risk: the ability to repay debt and the collateral value of the lia-
bilities could deteriorate that might induce higher credit spreads and PD 
/ LGD.  
• market risk: the perception of climate change can change rapidly that 
could lead to a hectic repricing of risks; the implementation of derivates 
and catastrophe bonds to hedge climate risk can be a potential link also  
• liquidity risk: this could stem from the above-mentioned risks as a sec-
ondary effect  
• operational risk: this is not a financial sector-specific risk, but banks 
can also be effected for example by physical risk 
• insurance risk (underwriting risk): due to higher than expected insur-
ance claim payouts 
• business risk: like reputational risk from investing brown asset  
Physical and transition risk could endanger not only the financial but macro-
economic stability.  
12.3. Climate change as source of monetary instabil-
ity 
Central banks have the experience and knowledge to react normal, cy-
clical shocks in by and large successful manner; nonetheless climate 
change is a completely different phenomenon than an economic shock. 
For example, climate related disaster could be a negative supply shock that 
push up inflation and reduce output. If inflation and output move in the op-
posite direction this poses a dilemma for a central bank as it has to decide 
whether priority should be given to output or inflation.300 The problem is that 
climate change is not cyclical in nature but a persistent and more and more 
frequent shock that is impossible to predict exactly. The general attitude to-
ward one-off shocks was the “look through” stance with closely monitoring 
possible second-round effect. This won’t work with climate change so the 
traditional “reactive” attitude is no longer tenable. Therefore, actively sup-
porting the transition could be deemed as a preemptive policy measure that 
is, per definitionem, part of the mandate. Later in this paper, we enumerate 
                                                     
300 Breitenfellner, A., Pointner, W., & Schuberth, H. (2019). The Potential Contribution of Central 
Banks to Green Finance. Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung/Quarterly Journal of Economic 
Research, 88(2), 55-71.  
221 
the potential tools that could fit predominantly into the recent operational 
framework of the central banks.   
As it can be seen, both the macroeconomic and financial risks of climate 
change mean considerable uncertainty that should be addressed by cen-
tral banks. Therefore, in opposite to many experts’ views, it would not 
mean an “overstepping” of their mandate to incorporate explicitly and 
implicitly climate change in their monetary policy. Nonetheless, it is un-
deniable that any measures related to this topic will have an impact on the 
society, so need to be examined in the sociopolitical context in order to 
achieve fairness in burden / benefit distribution. (It is important to note that 
every activity of central banks has this angle regardless of the field, not the 
only climate-related ones.)  Sociopolitical viability of the measures – e.g. 
compensation mechanism within the society – requires instruments beyond 
the reach of the central banks so they can play one element in a bigger strat-
egy. Consequently, cooperation and coordination with other arms of the 
governments / international organisations is not only an option but a 
fundamental necessity.  
Climate risk and international central bank initiatives - What is the 
NGFS 
When discussing central banks involvement with green investments, one 
organisation in particular needs to be mentioned. The Central Banks and 
Supervisors Network for Greening the Financial System (NGFS).301 Cur-
rently, this is the only forum worldwide bringing together central banks and 
supervisors committed to understand better and manage the financial risks 
and opportunity of climate change. The network was launched in December 
2017. As of June 2019, 36 members participating in three different 
workstreams: supervision, macro-financial and mainstreaming green fi-
nance.  
It is a group of Central Banks and Supervisors willing, on a voluntary basis, 
to exchange experiences, share best practices, contribute to the development 
of environment and climate risk management in the financial sector, and to 
mobilise mainstream finance to support the transition toward a sustainable 
economy. Its purpose is to define and promote best practices to be imple-
mented within and outside of the Membership of the NGFS and to conduct 
or commission analytical work on green finance. 
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12.3.1. Embracing uncertainty – scenario analysis  
As we already discussed the traditional models and approaches might 
have a strong limitation in determining the long term impacts in the fu-
ture. (“Today’s macroeconomic models may not be able to accurately pre-
dict the economic and financial impact of climate change” – NGFS) It could 
not only lead to inferior results but could encourage the decision makers to 
do nothing or much less than would be necessary. Therefore, policies should 
mainly focus on enhancing the system resilience in lieu of trying to calculate 
a potential nominal loss. Yet, as the saying goes “you can manage that you 
can measure”.  
The central bank can resolve this discrepancy by setting reference cli-
mate scenarios – while identifying and disclosing the principal sources 
of uncertainty attached to each scenario – for the participants of the fi-
nancial sector.302 Those scenarios could serve as a basis for a stress test. It 
is important to understand that scenarios are hypothetical constructs and not 
designed to deliver precise outcomes or forecasts.  
In the corporate sector TCFD (Task Force for Financial Disclosure) will 
develop voluntary, consistent climate-related financial risk disclosures 
for use by companies in providing information to investors, lenders and 
other stakeholders. TCFD recognises the use of scenarios in assessing cli-
mate-related issues and their potential financial implications are relatively 
recent but believes such analysis is important for improving the disclosure of 
decision-useful, climate-related financial information. This table shows the 
positive implications and supporting reasons for using scenario analysis that 
is also valid in the financial industry:  
 
  
                                                     
302 The green swan (BIS) – 2020 / DG Treasury 2017 
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Reasons to Consider Using Scenario Analysis for Climate 
Change  
1 Scenario analysis can help organizations consider issues, like climate 
change, that have the following characteristics: Possible outcomes that 
are highly uncertain (e.g., the physical response of the climate and eco-
systems to higher levels of GHG emissions in the atmosphere) Outcomes 
that will play out over the medium to longer term (e.g., timing, distribu-
tion, and mechanisms of the transition to a lower-carbon economy) Po-
tential disruptive effects that, due to uncertainty and complexity, are sub-
stantial  
2 Scenario analysis can enhance organizations' strategic conversations 
about the future by considering, in a more structured manner, what may 
unfold that is different from business-as-usual. Importantly, it broadens 
decision makers' thinking across a range of plausible scenarios, including 
scenarios where climate-related impacts can be significant.  
3 Scenario analysis can help organizations frame and assess the potential 
range of plausible business, strategic, and financial impacts from climate 
change and the associated management actions that may need to be con-
sidered in strategic and financial plans. This may lead to more robust 
strategies under a wider range of uncertain future conditions.  
4 Scenario analysis can help organizations identify indicators to monitor 
the external environment and better recognize when the environment is 
moving toward a different scenario state (or to a different stage along a 
scenario path). This allows organizations the opportunity to reassess and 
adjust their strategies and financial plans accordingly.  
5 Scenario analysis can assist investors in understanding the robustness of 
organizations' strategies and financial plans and in comparing risks and 
opportunities across organizations. 
Source: TCFD, Final report – 2017 
 
Central Banks can use both their soft powers as well as their regulatory capabilities 
to encourage better disclosure in the financial sector that would then filter through 
into other sectors as well.  
12.4. Policy responses – instruments and opportuni-
ties to increase system resilience  
There is no well-defined framework for how central banks should react to 
climate change and the negative consequences.  
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As we already emphasised due to the fat-tailed distributed potential ef-
fects of climate change, the uncertainty related to time horizon, the gen-
eral unpredictability of a complex system like our climate central banks 
need to increase the resilience of the financial system gradually in the 
near future rather than of reacting the materialisation of the first big 
shocks. Therefore, supporting already the transformation process might be 
the primary way of how the precautionary principle could be appropriately 
reflected in the monetary policy.   
Some central banks already embarked on green programs others are 
still weighing their options. Because of the above-mentioned controversies 
central banks have to find the equilibrium between the much needed – but 
politically sensitive – measures and being too proactive that would create an 
illusion that central banks can solve this issue alone.  
In terms of integration, the instruments into policies the next main ref-
erence points could be outlined that could serve as an orientation.303 It is 
very important to note that many of the below-listed instruments are only 
hypothetical at this stage. Many of them are controversial because of the 
sometimes vague boundaries in central banks mandates we discussed previ-
ously.    
12.4.1. Green quantitative easing (G-QE) – asset side:  
Targeted purchases of green financial assets, such as green bonds, green ABS 
etc., in order to reduce the financing cost of the underlying green projects. 
Generally, during QEs, central banks strive to be market neutral304 to mini-
mise the impact of relative price movements between different sectors, coun-
tries etc., i.e. to be impartial. Except for some serious contradictions in out-
comes (like the potential increase of social inequality), QE worked through 
portfolio rebalancing channel and put upward pressure on asset prices regard-
less whether the given asset was part of the QE program or not. The problem 
of the QEs’ intended neutrality in connection with climate change is evident: 
those central banks that also purchased private sector assets, also acquired 
assets of high-carbon emitting sectors. Due to the higher weight of these sec-
tors within the economy, and in particular, the relatively high amount of their 
outstanding market traded debt means that central banks (ECB) overweight 
carbon-intensive sector at clean sectors’ expense. A possible solution could 
                                                     
303 The potential contribution of central banks to green finance – Andreas Breitenfellner, Wolfgang 
Pointner, Helene Schubert, 2019.  
304 For example, ECB has already purchased green bond in respect of neutrality principle, i.e. its 
holding mirrors the general market share of green bonds.  
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be to limit the carbon intensity of the given asset purchase program, never-
theless, it could hamper the effectiveness of the program due to relative scar-
city of low carbon industries’ bonds.   
There is an open debate to implement a targeted G-QE program as well in 
which central banks would purchase only green bonds. Green bonds / ABSs 
should meet the prescribed standards (for example the ICMA’s Green Bond 
Principle or the new European Green Bond framework that should ensure 
that the proceeds came from the bond issuances are used only for eligible 
green criteria etc., besides that some ESG filter could be implanted as well) 
in order to avoid green washing. Providing ample liquidity for these bonds 
can propel the whole green bond market with potential positive spillover ef-
fect to the real economy (more green investments, decreasing stranded asset 
risk etc.). G-QE may accelerate the transition to a low-carbon economy.305 A 
G-QE can also have a strong signalling effect that could drive other market 
participants attention and investable cash into this area.   
It is essential to note that the main obstacle in executing a normal size G-QE 
program is the limited volume of available green bonds in the investment-
grade category. The other widespread objection against G-QE is the direct 
intervention in the capital allocation process that would distort the otherwise 
effective market forces and hurt competitiveness. Apparently, this plea is 
deeply entrenched in the view of some mainstream circles, nevertheless most 
of the experts acknowledge the problem with market allocation process 
(short termism, principal agent problem, “climate change is the biggest mar-
ket failure” etc.) and G-QE can partly resolve these issues. As we already 
emphasised, central banks should not be the only player in the green game 
yet could be one of the main driving forces in the process.  
A consensus-based proposal might be that central banks should buy only 
green bonds issued by development banks or supranational institutions that 
could use the proceeds according to their specific mandate; hence central 
banks would abstain from the direct capital allocation decision and retain 
market neutrality.  
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12.4.2. Green credit easing and green collateral framework 
– asset side 
In 2012, Bank of England launched the Funding for Lending Scheme that 
provided banks with stable term funding at a very favourable interest rate in 
order to revive the lending after the credit crunch in 2008-09. Commercial 
banks had to meet the requirements in order to be eligible for the funding 
(e.g. lending growth targets). Central Bank of Hungary introduced a similar 
structure (Funding for Growth Scheme – Növekedési Hitelprogram) aims to 
refinance commercial banks’ SME loans (on the condition that commercial 
banks provide these loans with a low, capped interest rate level). ECB’s 
TLTRO instruments also fit into this line. To sum up, providing targeted 
funding in order to refinance commercial banks loans with premeditated con-
ditions attached to it already belongs to the monetary policy toolkit.  
Thus, a targeted green credit program with lower rates could fit mainly into 
the existing frameworks with an additional condition, namely the given credit 
alignment with a well-defined taxonomy. Undoubtedly, the arguments 
against G-QE (neutrality, distorting capital allocation etc.) are partly valid 
here as well, because green credit would get preferential treatment compared 
to normal loans. However, green credit easing would not be completely iden-
tical to G-QE because credit risk would remain in the balance sheet of the 
given commercial bank in the first round, although other structure could be 
considered, too. Against this backdrop, green credit easing could be an in-
strument in the transition period.  
The collateral framework defines the type of eligible asset and the given hair-
cut that can be used for monetary operation by commercial banks. Central 
banks could modify the eligibility criteria to consider green aspects. Basi-
cally, the option to refinances asset by central banks could encourage the 
issuer to create such an asset, therefore, for example, to implement higher 
haircuts on carbon-intensive asset – making the refinancing more expensive 
– can have a real impact in the real economy as well.  
12.4.3. Differentiated capital requirements /prudential in-
struments/  
Some central banks also have regulatory powers over capital requirements. 
Changing the capital requirements for specific exposures in order to either 
supporting the green lending or penalising the brown one. It is noteworthy 
that the first priority in determining capital requirements is the credit risk of 
the exposure in question, and there is a widely shared consensus that this 
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principle needs to be maintained. In length and details, it will be discussed in 
the next chapter of this book.  
12.4.4. Other instruments – guidelines, soft power, signal-
ling effect  
Central banks can issue green guidelines for encouraging and helping com-
mercial banks to provide green credit. Lack of comprehensive green stand-
ards and/or vaguely defined metrics might cause difficulties and misunder-
standing whether a given loan is green or not. It could lead to reputational 
risk and loss of the credibility that could hamper the further spread of green 
finance. Aligning with these standards can be voluntary, nonetheless in the 
future compulsory disclosures pertaining to the standards and green ade-
quacy could be the only way to develop. There are many green taxonomy 
and frameworks (initiated by the private sector like GBP or CBI, or as a result 
of private-public cooperation like EU taxonomy, EGB etc.)  globally with 
different requirements but some convergence would be benign to ensure the 
comparability of green assets. Without standards, the work of determining 
what is green would fall on the investors.  
By dealing with climate challenges, implementing green measures (like in-
troducing green bond portfolio) the central bank can signal the importance of 
this topic. It could raise awareness not only in the financial sector but in a 
wider sense in the whole society, too.  
Establishing global networks (like NGFS), organising awareness-raising 
events also reflect this intention; furthermore they could push other agendas 
that could culminate into global actions as well: promoting greater integra-
tion of climate and sustainable dimension within corporate and national ac-
counting frameworks; can call for an increased role for fiscal policy in sup-
port of the ecological transition; increase cooperation on ecological issues 
among international monetary and financial institutions.306   
The green transition of the operation of the central banks like efforts to lessen 
ecological footprint and continuously improving their green disclosure to 
show example and best practices.  
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12.5. Sustainability in reserve management  
In the first step laying down the basic and general principles is essential. 
What is the difference between ESG and SRI? Investors are often con-
fused over what “sustainable” investing actually is because there is no con-
sensus on the definition. This is especially the case with socially responsible 
investing (SRI). SRI was originally developed to allow investors to avoid 
companies they disliked for ethical or values-based reasons. This original 
form of SRI is now called “exclusions” or “negative-screen” investing. Other 
SRI strategies have been developed, including positive screen or thematic 
investing, where only companies aligned to the investors’ values are bought. 
More recently, impact investing has become popular; here investors provide 
capital to innovative companies working to solve social problems like en-
demic unemployment, housing or education. SRI has expanded so much that 
some have relabeled it from socially responsible investing to sustainable, re-
sponsible and impact’ investing. Many use these terms interchangeably. Be-
low is an infographic that attempts to make meaningful distinctions between 
ESG, SRI and impact strategies. 
 
Source: Vert Asset Management https://www.advisorperspectives.com/arti-
cles/2018/12/17/the-difference-between-sri-and-esg-investing  
 
There is, of course, a spectrum of funds with varying focuses on financial 
and social returns. Which of the two is prioritised differentiates ESG from 
SRI. ESG integration is the explicit inclusion of environmental, social and 
governance risks and opportunities into the traditional financial analysis 
based on a systematic approach and appropriate research sources, ESG is 
about economic value. SRI is an attempt to incorporate ethics and social con-
cerns into portfolios. SRI is about individual/organisational values. 
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12.6. Green reserve management / ESG integration – 
Central banks to walk the talk 
Central Banks may have different objectives for climate-related SRI in-
tegration, which makes its application unique for every central bank and 
each portfolio. The two main objectives that may be pursued are (1) finan-
cial risk reduction and (2) reducing climate change, so an active contribution 
to the transition towards a low carbon economy seem to be the least contro-
versial and valid objectives for central banks. The financial risk reduction 
objective may include enhancing the risk-return profile of the portfolio or 
mitigating the climate risk of the portfolio. An environmental objective may 
focus on decreasing the negative climate impact of the portfolio or to achiev-
ing a positive impact in the portfolio (reduction of greenhouse gas emis-
sions). These goals are by no means comprehensive, and central bank’s port-
folios may try to achieve several different goals at the same time. Portfolio 
objectives may vary substantially, and it is at the discretion of each central 
bank to decide their goals. 
Moreover, the adoption of SRI practices by central banks is important as they 
can lead by example and demonstrate this approach to other investors and at 
the same time mitigate material exposures in their asset portfolios stemming 
from various environmental, social or governance risks as detailed above. As 
public institutions, central banks are subject to public scrutiny if they fail to 
address stakeholders’ concerns related to climate change. This is especially 
true if a central bank calls upon the financial sector to take account of cli-
mate-related risks, but fails to appropriately address these risks in its own 
operations. The second part of this chapter below is dedicated to this topic 
and builds to a large extent on the NGFS technical document entitled: “A 
sustainable and responsible investment guide for central banks’ portfolio 
management”307Central banks are large asset holders as they typically hold 
different portfolios with various goals, depending on their respective man-
dates. In general: (1) policy portfolios are determined by the mandate, can be 
either currency reserve portfolios for potential currency interventions or the 
execution of an asset purchase program or other monetary policy objective 
(2) own portfolios generally are expected to help cover operating expenses 
and generate returns (3) pension portfolios, and (4) third-party portfolios. 
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The specific portfolio objectives and characteristics determine the extent to 
which SRI objectives can be adopted.  
However, they are not comparable to other institutional investors as their in-
vestment practices are (to a large extent) dictated by the respective policy 
objectives. Consequently, central banks face specific challenges in the pur-
suit of SRI:  
• Sticking to the legal policy mandate. The vast majority of holdings are 
dictated by a policy objective. It is up to each central bank to determine 
whether an SRI objective could be adopted without prejudice to its man-
date.  
• Investing responsibly while preserving liquidity. Central banks’ bal-
ance sheets largely consist of supranational and high-grade sovereign 
debt in many cases with short duration. The adoption of SRI is less 
straightforward for these asset classes.  
• Safeguarding independence and preventing conflicts of interest. 
Since central banks act as independent agents, any conflicts of interest 
arising from their investment practices should be prevented.  
12.6.1. Strategies 
The section below gives a general overview of the various SRI and ESG 
strategies that are now employed in the financial sector.308 While these gen-
eral approaches are not new, their implementation and integration into central 
banks’ reserve management practices still face some challenges. Some of 
these challenges have already been discussed above and are related to the 
definition of sustainable investment goals, that are in line with central banks 
traditional objectives and are the least controversial. Identifying the most im-
pactful strategies may also depend on the envisioned timeline. An instant de-
carbonisation goal will lead to different strategies than if the central banks 
aim for a more significant, more profound impact over a longer period of 
time. Choosing the most impactful strategies as well as selecting the relevant 
metrics for measuring the impact and choosing among the various data pro-
viders are all part of the implementation process.  
Negative screening  
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2018 
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Negative screening refers to restricting the investment universe on the basis 
of pre-selected criteria (or screens). Negative screening entails systematically 
excluding controversial companies, sectors or countries from the investment 
universe and thereby helps to address reputational risks. These exclusions 
can be based on global norms or values and cover companies’ products 
and/or conduct. This strategy can be tailored to a climate-specific, environ-
mental-specific approach. Negative screening is often seen as a first step in 
the adoption of SRI. This strategy may be considered by central banks with 
an additional objective as disinvestment signals that some business practices 
are deemed unacceptable and should thus not be financed. This type of strat-
egy eliminates the possibility to engage with a company and strive for posi-
tive change. Moreover, excluding a large part of the investment universe (e.g. 
an entire sector) lowers diversification benefits and thus may negatively im-
pact the risk-return profile of the portfolio. Central banks can consider exclu-
sions based on violations of widely accepted global norms or local regula-
tion. Exclusionary screening based on values or products may be more chal-
lenging, as these considerations tend to be subjective and often vary over 
time.  
Best-in-class 
Best-in-class is a broad strategy that involves either positive screening or in-
dex-adjusted weighting (ESG tilting) by comparing the ESG characteristics 
of a firm to those of its peers. Firms can be selected or reweighted based on 
(1) a best-in-sector approach (ESG leaders within the same sector), (2) a best-
in-progress approach (also referred to as ESG momentum), or (3) a best-in-
universe approach (only the highest-ranking firms, regardless of the sector). 
On the one hand, a best-in-sector approach allows for mitigation of ESG risks 
without hampering sectoral diversification within the portfolio, thus benefit-
ing financial returns. On the other hand, lagging companies are motivated to 
improve their conduct. Various best-in-class strategies are already widely 
pursued by private investors, and they can offer a relatively straightforward 
solution for central banks as well. Depending on the selection or reweighting 
criteria, the strategy can be tailored to specific goals e.g. a climate-specific 
scope (e.g. a low-carbon index) as well as a broader ESG scope. In addition, 
a best-in-class approach may also be considered for passive investment 
styles. A point to consider is that the strategy is highly dependent on ESG 
scores or ratings which tend to vary a lot by rating provider.  
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ESG integration 
ESG integration enhances traditional financial (risk) analysis by systemati-
cally including all financially material ESG-criteria in the investment analy-
sis to improve the risk-return profile of the portfolio. Identification of finan-
cially material ESG criteria is not straightforward, as these tend to vary 
across industries, geographical locations and over time. As a result, ESG in-
tegration requires a continuous reassessment of the underlying criteria. This 
strategy is common amongst equity investors, who include ESG criteria in 
the quantitative analysis to determine whether a sufficient premium is offered 
for underlying (ESG) risks. Within the fixed income space, however, ESG 
integration is still in its infancy, partly because the extent to which ESG cri-
teria impact credit ratings is not straightforward. This strategy is suitable for 
all central bank portfolios. It explicitly accounts for ESG risks without nec-
essarily curtailing the investment universe. The case study by the central 
bank of Italy provides an example of ESG integration for central banks’ eq-
uity investments. 
Impact investing 
Impact investing aims to generate an intentional and quantifiable positive 
impact alongside financial returns. Impact investing309 can range from “tra-
ditional” impact investments, which consist of smaller, private allocations to 
social enterprises and project-type investments, to “listed” impact solutions 
such as equity impact funds, green infrastructure funds, even direct green 
infrastructure investments310 and green bonds311. Supranational debt instru-
ments could also be part of an impact investing strategy, as the proceeds are 
often used for economic or sustainable development. Impact investors gen-
erally employ a holistic perspective in which both environmental and social 
objectives are targeted. 
Green bond investments 
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Green bonds are fixed-income instruments that carry a green label. The pro-
ceeds of these bonds are explicitly used to finance or refinance new or exist-
ing green projects, such as those related to renewable energy. Apart from 
green bonds, ICMA (the International Capital Market Association) also rec-
ognises SDG bonds and social bonds. Multiple frameworks and labels exist 
to validate proper use of proceeds, with the Climate Bonds Standards312 and 
the Green Bond Principles (established by the ICMA in early 2014) most 
commonly known. The European Commission’s Technical Expert Group 
recommends the European central banks and members of the NGFS consider 
promoting the greening of the financial system by expressing and implement-
ing a preference for EU labelled green bonds. Green bond investors aim to 
generate an explicit environmental impact by supporting companies with 
credible green investment propositions. While the green bond market is 
growing rapidly, the total estimated market size is still small and largely con-
centrated in Europe. Corporates and financial institutions are well-repre-
sented in the market.313 Moreover, central banks may want to take into con-
sideration that (1) the credit risk profile of the issuer remains the same re-
gardless of whether the investor is holding a green or an unlabelled bond, (2) 
climate risks are not necessarily mitigated via green bonds, and (3) the green 
bond market is still in its infancy, which may add to potential pricing, liquid-
ity and diversification concerns. 
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Mónika Kuti 
13. Responsibility and Sustainability in Finance 
Manufactured (economic), human, social and natural wealth as a portfolio 
contributes to economic growth. Natural capital is an ecosystem, i.e., “a dy-
namic complex of plant, animal and micro-organism communities and their 
non-living environment interacting as a functional unit”.314 Liquidating nat-
ural assets to build other forms of capital undermines the well-being of na-
tions. Natural capital accounted for 47% of low-income countries of their 
wealth and 30% for high-income – oil and gas producing – non-OECD coun-
tries in 2014, while in high-income OECD countries, human capital is dom-
inant.315 In Hungary, the produced, human and natural capital types account 
for 38%, 58%, and 4%, respectively, as calculated from the appendix to 
World Bank Group’s (2018) ‘The Changing Wealth of Nations’ publication.  
Natural capital 
Provisioning Ser-
vices 
Regulating Services Cultural Services 
Products obtained 
from ecosystems 
• Food 
• Freshwater 
• Fiber 
• Biochemicals 
• Genetic re-
sources 
Benefits obtained from 
the regulation of ecosys-
tem processes 
• Climate regulation 
• Disease regulation 
• Water regulation 
• Water purification 
• Pollination 
Nonmaterial benefits 
obtained from ecosys-
tems 
• Recreation and eco-
tourism 
• Aesthetic 
• Inspirational 
• Educational 
• Sense of place 
• Cultural heritage 
Supporting Services 
Services necessary for the production of all other ecosystem services 
• Soil formation 
• Nutrient cycling 
• Primary production 
Source: Millenium Assessment Report (2003) p. 57 
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nomics. London: Earthscan Publications. 69 
315 World Bank Group (2018): The Changing Wealth of Nations. Building a Sustainable Future.  
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The supply of natural capital has become more and more limited over the 
past decade, while the demand for ecosystem services has increased substan-
tially. The degradation of natural capital has made its value explicit. The Mil-
lennium Ecosystem Assessment (2003) identifies provisioning, regulating 
and cultural services related to natural capital, and emphasizes that multi-
sectoral approach is needed on how to evaluate changes in ecosystem ser-
vices and how to identify the interrelationship among them due to human 
intervention to support sustainable use by respecting diversity, resilience, 
thresholds in services and ecosystem health.  
According to utilitarian approach, the total economic value concept of eco-
systems includes the direct use values like consumption and non-consump-
tion, the indirect use values like ecosystem services as intermediate inputs 
for production) and option values to use ecosystem services in the future by 
individuals or by others or by heirs (bequest value). The non-utilitarian ap-
proach emphasizes the ethical, religious and cultural values of ecosystems. 
Natural capital has appeared as a guiding principle for several international 
organisations and private institutions. A World Bank-led partnership Wealth 
Accounting and the Valuation of Ecosystem Services (WAVES) promotes 
the processes on how to go beyond traditional GDP under the umbrella of the 
Global Program for Sustainability. Over-exploitation and depletion of natu-
ral resources are visible in GDP and are not measured. National capital ac-
counting (NCA) for forests, land, water, ecosystems, or carbon within wealth 
accounting to sustain growth is proposed by the World Bank as a paradigm 
shift under the flag of ‘beyond GDP’. Environmentally adjusted multifactor 
productivity has been developed as an indicator of green growth in the OECD 
countries in 2017. The Natural Capital Protocol developed jointly by the 
World Business Council for Sustainable Development, Conservation Inter-
national, the International Union for Conservation of Nature and others, 
helps businesses measure and value their impact and dependence on natural 
capital.  
At Stanford University, the Natural Capital (NatCap) Project aims to enhance 
nature and people thrive with the help of science and technology in coopera-
tion with the Chinese Academy of Sciences, the University of Minnesota, the 
Stockholm Resilience Centre, The Nature Conservancy, and the World Wild-
life Fund in an interdisciplinary context. Their aim is to facilitate a paradigm 
shift to see the world’s ecosystems as capital assets that yield a flow of ser-
vices. The Project combines ecosystem services science, global environmen-
tal data and worldwide communities to encourage policy, finance and man-
agement decisions.  
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13.1. ESG factors 
Not only at the macro-level but also at the micro-level, responsibility and 
sustainability have become guiding principles to promote complex analytical 
approaches. Environmental, social and governance (ESG) factors provide a 
framework for harmonizing natural capital and social capital with stake-
holder interests within the corporate decision-making context. ESG is a 
toolkit for businesses to reevaluate the so-called triple bottom line aspects in 
their revenue models, operations, investments, and financing. ESG factors 
help financial institutions, multinational companies and SMEs align their 
guidelines and business-as-usual processes with social responsibility and en-
vironmental sustainability.  
ESG pillars and factors 
Environmental Social Governance 
• Climate change 
• Global warming 
• Green-house gas-
ses emission 
• Pollution, eco-
toxicity 
• Energy use, re-
duction, alterna-
tive sources 
• Recycling 
• Water disposal 
• Carbon footprint 
• Biodiversity im-
pacts 
 
Workforce 
• Absenteeism rate, retention, di-
versity 
• Diversity 
• Training and development 
• Health, safety, wellness, work-
life balance 
• Fair labour practices, living 
conditions 
• Management,  
• Executive 
compensa-
tion, 
• Policies, 
standards, 
codes  
• Audits,  
• Internal con-
trol, 
• Sharehold-
ers’ rights 
• Board inde-
pendence 
• Transparency 
• Ethics 
• Related-party 
transactions 
Product 
• Life-cycle use impact 
• Packaging and pricing 
• Product safety, responsibility 
Customer 
• Customer health and safety  
• Ethical advertising 
• Privacy 
Community 
• Human rights 
• Community engagement, phi-
lanthropy 
• Volunteerism 
ESG facilitates investors to assess corporate performance beyond financial 
measures. Sustainable companies apply ESG standards and policies to their 
operations in a transparent manner. 
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ESG risks are associated with the environment, human health, and govern-
ance practices. Environmental risks arise from the negative effect on land, 
water, air, and ecosystems, including pollution, emissions, and climate im-
pacts. Reducing environmental risks lowers regulatory, litigation and reputa-
tional costs. Social risk management contributes to health, safety, work-force 
morale, low level of absenteeism, reduced turnover, protected human rights, 
product integrity, and community engagement programs. Socially sustaina-
ble companies reduce the human costs of doing business by fair practices 
applied for managing the relationships with employees, workers in the value 
chain, customers, and local communities. Products that ignore public health 
issues can have an adverse material impact on the manufacturers. Govern-
ance risks are linked to executive compensation, business ethics, competitive 
corporate behaviour, litigations, or lobbying.  
The forms of ESG reporting range from sustainability reports, CSR reports, 
eco-reports to corporate accountability reports. Sustainability reports are 
ways to meet investors’ expectations to provide data to ESG metrics. Inte-
grated reporting, i.e. a financial report and a sustainability report, combine 
disclosures on financial, social and natural capitals. CSR reports are diverse 
in users and use, in topics, in objectives, in measurements, voluntary nature, 
long-term horizon, and the role of externalities are further characteristics.316 
Measuring, collecting and reporting relevant information in ESG disclosures, 
media presence, and CSR activities require financial resources, so it seems 
reasonable that companies would opt for sustainability reports and perfor-
mance if cash flows from reputational capital or brands, and the value-added 
by advantageous risk assessment from rating agencies and local communities 
are higher than related costs. According to a survey on how traditional in-
vestment professionals make decisions, the relevance to investment is the 
most important factor in ESG reporting beyond product strategy or ethical 
considerations.317 Sustainability reports can be viewed as a form of self-in-
surance to protect brand value against reputational risks. 
The link between Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and Financial Per-
formance (FP) has been under scrutiny for many years in financial research. 
                                                     
316 Christensen, Hans Bonde and Hail, Luzi and Leuz, Christian, Adoption of CSR and Sustaina-
bility Reporting Standards: Economic Analysis and Review (July 27, 2019). European Corporate 
Governance Institute - Finance Working Paper No. 623/2019. 
317 Amel-Zadeh, Amir and Serafeim, George, Why and How Investors Use ESG Information: Ev-
idence from a Global Survey (July 1, 2017). Financial Analysts Journal, Forthcoming. 
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The challenges to identify a common ground for the two fields are as fol-
lows:318  
• different definitions and metrics of both CSR and FP, 
• conflicting hypothesis between the two areas, 
• diverse CSR datasets and factors among industries, countries, and 
timeframe of focus, 
• and varieties of econometric models.  
More standardized and measurable metrics can facilitate comparability and 
decrease disagreement among ESG data providers.319 Global Reporting Ini-
tiatives standards are one of the most influential frameworks in this field. In 
2013 Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB) developed a con-
ceptual framework for publicly listed corporations in the U. S. on the key 
definitions of sustainability accounting and disclosures, including evidence-
based materiality, industry focus, decision-usefulness, and cost-benefit anal-
ysis. Companies – reporting material sustainability information in line with 
the standards set by SASB – show higher stock price informativeness.320 The 
trend of the transition to full ESG integration has started in the financial sec-
tor.  
Information asymmetry problems associated with ESG reporting may lead to 
adverse publicity, lobbying, or boycott campaigns by consumer or pressure 
groups321 or divestment by socially responsible investors.322 Companies with 
debt overhang or financial constraint, and firms with old technologies in the 
pollution producing industries might have difficulties covering the costs of 
                                                     
318 Brooks, Chris and Oikonomou, Ioannis, The Effects of Environmental, Social and Governance 
Disclosures and Performance on Firm Value: A Review of the Literature in Accounting and Finance 
(November 4, 2017). British Accounting Review, Forthcoming. 
319 Kotsantonis, Sakis and Serafeim, George, Four Things No One Will Tell You About ESG Data 
(July 15, 2019). Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 31 (2), Spring 2019, pages 50-58. 
320 Grewal, Jyothika and Hauptmann, Clarissa and Serafeim, George, Material Sustainability Infor-
mation and Stock Price Informativeness (November 28, 2017). Harvard Business School Working 
Paper. 
321 Roberts, R.W. (1992): Determinants of corporate social responsibility disclosure Accounting, 
Organisations and Society 17(6), 595–612. and Sinclair-Desgagné, B. and Gozlan, E. (2003) A the-
ory of environmental risk disclosure Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 45(2), 
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322 Willis, A. (2003): The role of Global Reporting Initiative’s Sustainability Guidelines in the social 
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sustainability reports, so they are less likely to report.323 Greenwashing hap-
pens where firms make attempts to improve their performance for presenta-
tional purposes.324 
13.2. Challenges to ESG integration into finance 
The lack of ESG integration and implementation at companies is mainly ow-
ing to the lack of understanding of the link between a firm’s environmental 
performance (EP) and its financial performance (FP).325 The authors argue 
that there are three major reasons for problematic ESG integration: the lack 
of universally accessible, the quality ESG data; the dominance of investors’ 
short-termism in hypercompetitive data-driven investments; and the ineffi-
cient use of ESG data. The latter refers to the trade-off between the cost of 
ESG data collection and analytics, and the expected return achieved by the 
innovative approach, considering the investment time horizon. Reliability, 
granularity, freshness, actionability, and scarcity of data are the main dimen-
sions for investment decisions. CFA Institution (2018) published a paper on 
‘Guidance and Case Studies for ESG Integration: Equities and Fixed Income’ 
which is a detailed practical toolkit for financial professionals, showing not 
only the theoretical challenges in valuation techniques, risk management, and 
portfolio theory but also the versatility of empirical methods and proprietary 
metrics along a wide range of corporate best practices.326 ‘Mainstreaming 
sustainable investing’ is another publication of the CFA Institute Research 
Foundation, which summarizes how ESG can be integrated into financial 
factors and indicators.327 
13.2.1. ESG integration into financial intermediation 
Institutional investors are under pressure from governments, pensioners, eco-
friendly fund providers, and other stakeholders to form socially responsible 
and sustainable portfolios. The investment industry is struggling with how to 
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incorporate ESG scoring or individual ESG pillars into theoretical ap-
proaches and practical asset allocation decisions. The multi-attribute value 
function of investors is aligned with the interest of companies and their stake-
holders. Traditional efficient market hypothesis and portfolio theories focus 
on the value creation in risk and return context; meanwhile, an alternative 
paradigm of adaptive markets is proposed by Shoenmaker and Schramade 
for a long-term investment approach.328 According to their adaptive market 
hypothesis, asset allocation is based on long-term value creation, perfor-
mance measures include both financial and extra-financial data, and transi-
tion preparedness leads to financial, social and environmental value maximi-
zation. 
Institutional investments 
Nowadays, ESG criteria as extra-financial information are driven by alterna-
tive data boom based on unconventional digital data collection. Financial ser-
vice providers have adopted alternative data sources from satellites, smart 
technologies and use data science for evaluating cash flow potential and risk-
adjusted returns for investment projects. Data science is a more relevant par-
adigm for ESG investors than financial economics.329 The shift from tradi-
tional financial data to alternative data is underway in the financial sector to 
help investors make better decisions. ESG information and data are beyond 
conventional financial reporting, which may lead to higher competitiveness 
and extra profit. ESG data as a form of alternative data has special importance 
for financial managers at socially and environmentally responsible compa-
nies, ESG rating agencies, and socially responsible investment (SRI) funds. 
The need for standardization in ESG rating has increased in the sector. The 
Global Initiative for Sustainability Ranking (GISR) aims at helping financial 
markets agents adopt Sustainable Development Goals and global sustainabil-
ity agenda; facilitated the transformation of corporate valuation in 21th cen-
tury to the preservation and enhancement of all forms of capital, be it human, 
intellectual, natural, social or financial; and offers a voluntary accreditation 
process. 
Over the years, the shift from single-dimensional environmental performance 
measures to multifaceted properties has increased the complexity of ESG re-
search in finance. New interdisciplinary and innovative analytics are inte-
grated into financial services to tackle the interconnectedness between huge 
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amounts of environmental, social and financial data. The demand for green 
and sustainable bonds, social bonds, climate bonds, green loans, sustainabil-
ity-linked loans, and ESG ratings is developing sustainability-related finan-
cial ecosystems. New financial service providers have emerged over the past 
years in sustainability. Alonso and Marqués summarized new suppliers and 
services, new financial products, financial risk management, and technolog-
ical innovation in sustainability-related to financial services.330 They identify 
the following new sustainable service providers: 
• Second Party Opinion (SPO) providers: Vigeo-Eiris, Imug, CICERO, 
Robecoo, Sustainalytics, ISS-oekom,  
• External verification: Sustainalytics, ISS-oekom, 
• Rating companies: Beyond Ratings,  
• Certifications: CBS. 
Traditional financial service providers such as MSCI, Dow Jones, Deloitte, 
KPMG, PwC, EY, Moodys, S&P, or Fitch have adopted ESG into their ac-
tivities. The ESG ratings provided by several rating agencies are not homog-
enous, unlike credit ratings. ESG is integrated into price-earnings, price-to-
book, price-to-sales, price-to-cash flow or the dividend yield, earnings 
growth, sales growth, cash flow growth, book value growth in security valu-
ation methods applied by investment companies. ESG ratings are used by 
investment funds and other financial institutions for research, portfolio se-
lection, monitoring, and performance assessment to incorporate ESG into all 
asset classes and investment strategies. Institutions with longer investment 
horizons have a better sustainability footprint.331 Sustainability Investment 
Awards are available for the best practices in the financial sector: the best 
impact debt fund, the best infrastructure fund, the most transparent – ESG 
relevant – credit rating agency, the best-fixed income ESG fund, the best so-
cial fund, the best impact initiative for ESG, the ESG initiative of the year, 
the best ESG hybrid fund, the best initiative for ESG investment process, the 
best ESG reporting by an asset or fund manager, the best-fixed income ESG 
research, the best ESG data provider for investors, the best ESG index pro-
vider, and the best environmental fund awards were granted in 2019 among 
many others.  
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Kaiser demonstrates evidence on how to build style and momentum portfo-
lios with better sustainability ratings and higher risk-adjusted returns.332 Bet-
ter ESG reduces perceived tail risk.333 Investors can have long positions on 
companies with low ESG and short firms with high ESG to benefit from ESG 
premium.334 The life cycle of ESG conformity is relevant to portfolio re-
turn.335 The ESG excellence out-performance has disappeared after the fi-
nancial crisis in equity and bond prices.336 Governance scores increase the 
portfolio performance in Europe and North America, and better ESG scores 
reflect lower risks.337 According to other research findings, the environmen-
tal factor from the ESG pillar is more prevalent in North America; govern-
ance factor performs better in Eurozone.338 Socially responsible investors re-
lax financing constraints for responsible companies and internalize social 
costs.339 
Doyle identifies ESG rating biases towards large companies, areas of high 
reporting standards, oversimplified industry ratings, and he emphasizes in-
consistencies between rating agencies.340 There is a positive relationship be-
tween ESG rating disagreement and stock returns.341 ESG integration para-
dox still remains: corporate performance on ESG is normally distributed; 
only a few firms can show up alpha; thus, only a few asset managers adopted 
the strategy.342 Reporting fatigue, a web of confusion, problematic transpar-
ency, and credibility issues are the challenges the ESG initiative industry is 
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facing.343 Institutional investors are exposed to vulnerabilities in digital foot-
prints, misuses of fast-evolving machine learning algorithms, and the una-
wareness that sustainability data as assets can turn into liabilities; therefore, 
the threat of exploitation is a challenge, data defense is more and more im-
portant for the industry.344 The responsibility in sustainability-driven alter-
native data use is a newly emerging field in ESG investing.  
Banking services 
Banks that build sustainability credentials can help their corporate clients as-
sess their ESG ranking, compare their environmental, social and governance 
performance with peers, highlight under-performance in certain pillars in 
ESG rating and collateral valuation. Companies can be upgraded or down-
graded based on changes in ESG risk. Sustainability-linked loans aim at mo-
tivating corporate borrowers to achieve sustainability performance targets, 
such as better ESG scoring, over the loan period. Loan terms can be tied to 
the sustainability performance of the borrower; thus, corporate commitment 
to sustainability can reduce the cost of debt.345 Improved overall ESG rating 
reflects social and environmental quality management and lower reputational 
risks for the lender. Good ESG scoring can increase debt capacity.  
13.2.2. ESG integration into corporate financial practices 
The traditional discounted cash flow value (DCF) models of project valua-
tion and corporate valuation ignore ecosystem services, goods of nature, and 
social externalities. Complex metrics and data are needed for not only ex-
ante financial decision making but also ex-post accountability. Incorporating 
ESG into business models, corporate strategy, and value drivers is a way for 
the corporation to tackle social responsibility and sustainability challenges. 
Value drivers of sales growth, operating profit margin, investment needs, and 
cost of capital can be expressed before and after ESG assessment to quantify 
the value-added or given up due to sustainability-driven corporate decisions. 
There are several links between free cash flow to firm versus social respon-
sibility and sustainability. Value-added to corporate values by social and en-
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vironmental projects can be estimated by incremental cash flows, the oppor-
tunity cost of funds and the investment horizon. Low ESG performance de-
stroys shareholder value.346  
Free cash flow implications. Net operating profit after taxes (NOPAT) can 
reflect increases in sales from new markets and growth opportunities in re-
sponsibility and sustainability, and brand equity derived from a competitive 
advantage in sustainability. 88% of the sources in a meta-study reveal that 
companies with remarkably sustainable practices do better in operational per-
formance and cash flow generation (Clark et al., 2015).347 Price premiums 
from sustainability certificates (e.g. ISO standards) and eco-labels (e.g. EU 
Bio, ECO-CERT®, Oeko-Tex® for textiles) can increase gross profit mar-
gins. Costs incurred by or cost reduction achieved by implemented social and 
environmental projects are also incorporated into capital budgeting and cor-
porate valuation models. For example, water scarcity means natural capital 
dependence and imposes risks for a beverage company, so water manage-
ment and conservation of freshwater ecosystems can lead to costs and invest-
ment needs. Energy-saving programs and other resource efficiency initiatives 
can increase profitability in the long run. Degrading ecosystems and defor-
estation may harm the quality and quantity of certain commodity supply and 
can alienate environment-friendly customers from purchasing products, thus, 
incorporating natural capital valuation for business models and valuation 
metrics are important for decision making to identify growth opportunities 
and related risks.  
Changes in non-cash net working capital related to social and environmental 
impacts are linked to supply chain management and their sustainability as-
pects. The following table summarizes the conceptual differences between 
lean, green/sustainable, eco-efficient, and eco-effective characteristics of 
supply chain management.  
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Supply chain concepts 
 Lean Green/sustaina-
ble 
Eco-efficient Eco-effective 
Kind of 
supply 
chain 
Opened and 
closed-loop 
supply chain 
Opened and closed 
loop supply chain 
Opened and 
closed- 
loop supply chain 
Only closed-loop 
supply chain 
General 
purpose 
Maximize 
profits 
through cost 
reduction 
Improving ecolog-
ical 
efficiency 
Improving ecolog-
ical 
and economic 
efficiency 
Improving product 
in the life cycle 
from cradle to cra-
dle (C2C) 
Main idea Elimination of 
waste 
Pollution preven-
tion 
Zero: zero waste 
emission, zero 
resource use and 
zero toxicity 
Quality in the life 
cycle 
Focus Focus on cost 
reduction and 
increased flexi-
bility 
Focus on 
sustainable 
development 
 
Focus on doing 
things right 
Focus on doing the 
right things 
 
Product de-
sign 
Maximize 
performance 
and 
minimize cost 
Eco-design Cradle to grave 
design 
Cradle to cradle 
design 
KPI (key 
perfor-
mance indi-
cator) 
Cost, Service 
level 
CO2, eco-indica-
tor, 
etc. 
 
Integrated eco-
nomic 
and environmental 
indicators 
Indicators in life 
cycle from cradle 
to 
cradle (C2C) 
Concept Zero waste Environmental 
protection 
Eco-efficiency Eco-effectiveness 
Waste man-
agement 
Recycling Recycling Recycling Upcycling 
Source: Burchart-Korol, D., Czaplicka, K., Kruczek, M. (2012): Eco-efficiency and eco-
effectiveness concepts in supply chain management. Congress Proceedings - CLC 2012: 
Carpathian Logistics Congress. 5. 
 
The traceability of raw material in product segregation, mass balance, or 
book and claim models, the environmental performance footprint, the credi-
bility of the commitment to sustainability, or sustainable certifications are 
important elements of ESG issues in working capital management. Sustain-
ability Accounting Standards Board has developed standards on how to re-
port on corporate sustainability performance along the value chain. 
Capital expenditure (CAPEX) can be associated with the additional fixed as-
sets as investment needs derived from social responsibility and sustainability 
themes. Firms with high free cash flow have higher levels of corporate sus-
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tainability investments.348 Every industry has its own characteristics and sus-
tainability-specific investment needs. AS4 CFO Leadership Network (2019) 
lists environmental CAPEX in the field of carbon, water, waste, energy use, 
greenhouse emission, water pollution,349 climate change adaptation, land use, 
visual amenities; and social CAPEX in the field of construction noise, access 
to health care, health and safety, volunteering, cultural heritage, traffic pat-
terns, and community cohesion. BREEAM rating (sustainability assess-
ment method for master-planning projects, infrastructure and build-
ings) or Energy Performance Certificate (EPC) rating, for example, can 
increase asset values. 
Cost of capital implications. The conventional wisdom would assume that 
managing environmental and social risks lowers the firm risk premium; thus, 
the weighted average cost of capital; and increases enterprise value. ESG-
adjusted beta is a way to integrate material environmental and social risks 
into valuation practices. Scientific evidence from the international literature 
is mixed on the impact of sustainability on the cost of capital and asset prices. 
Some research articles are in line with basic logic. ESG risks lead to long-
term negative stock returns.350 The higher the engagement in CSR activities, 
the lower the cost of equity.351 Countries with better ESG performance have 
fewer default risks and lower sovereign bond spreads.352 Although, some sci-
entific research findings lead to results that contradict the previous state-
ments. International voluntary adaptors of integrated reporting are associated 
with higher market value and expected future cash flows, but not with the 
implicit cost of capital.353 A sustainable capital asset pricing model (S-
CAPM) was developed by Zerbib to demonstrate how sustainable investing 
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affects asset prices: there is a green investing taste premium.354 The ESG risk 
premium is due to firm-specific ESG characteristics and not to ESG beta.355  
Investment horizon implications. Social responsibility and environmental 
issues would require a long-term investment horizon, which is – in many 
cases – in conflict with conventional investor short-termism. The willingness 
of long-term investors to invest in firms with higher CSR scores increases.356 
The time value of money concept does not consider inter-generation equity 
and sustainability, and the capital budgeting techniques based on the time 
value of money reject certain sustainability projects which reach a positive 
net present value over a long-term horizon (Baur and Lagoardo-Segot, 
2015).357  
The concept of sustainable shared value creation has been developed by Por-
ter and Kramer (2011) where continuous sustainability performance im-
provements are pursued by companies.358 There are many sustainable man-
agement tools for sustainable project valuation for businesses. Traditional 
management concepts and valuation techniques are extended with environ-
mental and societal value creation efforts. Liensen provides a list of these 
approaches:359  
• Life Cycle Analysis quantifies the harmful environmental and social ef-
fects through the whole life cycle of the product or service;360 
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• Full Cost Assessment and Total Cost Assessment integrates social and 
environmental costs into cost analysis;361 
• Sustainability Management Systems sets targets, monitors financial, so-
cial and environmental impacts;362 
• Sustainability Balanced Scorecards is the extension of Kaplan and Nor-
ton’s Balanced Scorecard with environmental and social issues;363 
• Total Quality Environmental Management (Global Environmental Man-
agement Initiative) aims at continuous improvement in processes of en-
vironmental quality;364 
• Sustainability Key Performance Indicators quantifies efficiency ratios in 
the social, environmental and financial performance;365 
• Green Shareholder Value links environmental and social issues to eco-
nomic value;366 
• Net Present Sustainable Value and Rate of Sustainability integrate sus-
tainability issues into the traditional NPV method.367  
Return on Sustainable Investment (ROSI) approach is based on material sus-
tainability strategies, financial and societal value drivers, related cost-benefit 
analysis, and NPV calculation.368 The authors present a case study on how 
sustainability projects can create greater customer satisfaction (no discounts), 
better talent retention (increased revenue), more technological innovation 
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(cost reduction), better media coverage (avoiding revenue loss), higher oper-
ational efficiency (lower costs), better risk management (avoiding revenue 
loss), improved sales (price premium, increase in demand, new revenue 
streams), improved supplier relationships (reduced volatility in the corporate 
ecosystem, avoiding revenue loss), and emission avoidance (more value-
added to stakeholders).  
Social and environmental projects have real option characteristics, including 
growth, expansion, contraction, postponement, abandonment, or staged op-
tions. The present value of growth opportunities can be vulnerable to air pol-
lution, carbon emissions, child-labour violations, deforestation water short-
ages, or worker health and safety issues. The sustainability-related real op-
tion valuation methods are beyond the scope of this chapter. 
The latest models integrate data science and multidisciplinary approaches 
into investment decisions. The Natural Capital Project at Stanford University 
emphasizes that “ecosystems yield a flow of services that are vital to human-
ity, including the production of goods (e.g., food), life-support processes 
(e.g., water purification), and life-fulfilling conditions (e.g., beauty, opportu-
nities for recreation), and the conservation of options (e.g., genetic diversity 
for future use).”369 The Project uses artificial intelligence based on data 
sources from social media, satellite imagery, and human movement data; 
models ecosystem services at a global scale; studies the resilience of human 
and natural systems, and the importance of vital ecosystems services in 
health. The Project makes efforts to balance the social, environmental 
and economic goals of different entities. The free, open-source InVEST 
(Integrated Valuation of Ecosystem Services and Tradeoffs) Software covers 
models for carbon, crop pollination and production, habitat quality, marine 
fish aquaculture, reservoir hydropower production, urban cooling, wave en-
ergy, habitat risk assessment, offshore wind energy, scenic quality, recrea-
tion, and water purification, to name a few. It quantifies returns in biophysi-
cal terms and economic terms (e.g. net present value).  
As a whole, it can be concluded that there is no consensus on the best valua-
tion model for integrated analysis. “Those that monetize costs and benefits 
have the advantage of a common comparable measure, but conversion can 
be subjective and complex”.370 Technology-driven innovation opens up new 
models on how to value projects in complex systems. 
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13.3. Green/sustainable finance 
Traditional finance models assume that natural resources are abundant, and 
shareholders’ wealth maximization is the ultimate target of corporate operat-
ing, investment and financing activities. Sustainable finance makes an effort 
on how to bridge the gap between corporate environmental sustainability, 
data innovation and financial metrics. Sustainable finance is an integrated 
framework for the productive allocation of funds for economics, social and 
environmental projects at companies, balancing the trade-off between sus-
tainability goals. Sustainable finance is a means of reaching sustainable de-
velopment goals.371 The combination of material environmental, social and 
governance factors with traditional financial metrics is leading to a paradigm 
shift. Sustainable finance can contribute to a transition to a low-carbon and 
circular economy by  
• pooling funds from socially and environmentally responsible investors, 
• providing funds to sustainable companies and projects,  
• monitoring sustainable investments and managing the conflicts of inter-
ests among stakeholders,  
• assessing sustainability risks of future cash flows for valuation purposes; 
and applying different social and environmental scenarios in valuation.  
The EU Sustainability Action Plan aims to: 
• reorient capital flows towards sustainable investment in order to achieve 
sustainable and inclusive growth;  
• manage financial risks stemming from climate change, resource deple-
tion, environmental degradation and social issues; and support transpar-
ency and long-termism in financial and economic activity.  
13.3.1. Green finance 
In the European Union policy context, green finance is a means to achieve 
environmental, social and governance goals through financial intermediation 
by channeling investments into more sustainable technologies and busi-
nesses, finance growth in a sustainable way in a long-term horizon, and con-
tribute to a low carbon, climate-resilient, resource-efficient and circular 
economy. Financial institutions are seeking how to include ESG considera-
tions in financial instruments, risk assessment processes, and decision-mak-
ing frameworks. Green Bond Principles, Moody’s Green Bond Assessment, 
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and Standard & Poor’s Evaluation are examples for assessment frameworks. 
EU green bond standards have been set up. 
Green finance refers to any financial instrument or investment (equity, debt, 
guarantee or grant) issued in exchange for the delivery of positive environ-
mental externalities. The financial sector can play a role in green transfor-
mation. Green finance is a means to motivate environmentally friendly in-
vestors towards green projects. UK’s Green Finance Strategy (2019) has 
three pillars: greening finance, financing green, and capturing opportunity.372 
UK Green Finance Taskforce, for example, aims at boosting investment into 
innovative clean technologies, driving demand and supply for green lending 
products, setting up Clean Growth Regeneration Zones, improving climate 
risk management with advanced data, building a green and resilient infra-
structure pipeline, and issuing a green government bond.  
The issuance of corporate green bonds is associated with positive announce-
ment returns, increasing long-term value and operating performance, im-
proved environmental performance, better green innovations, and more long-
term and green investors.373 Green bonds are issued at a premium compared 
to conventional corporate bonds.374 Green bonds are traded at lower prices 
and higher yields than brown (standard) bonds.375  
Green banking regulations include guidelines for environmental risk assess-
ment (environmental due diligence, environmental risk management), banks’ 
own impact reduction (water and energy efficiency for bank buildings, solar 
panels for ATMs, carbon footprint measures, online services) and green busi-
ness opportunities (green credit guarantee facilities, green credit cards, green 
funds).376 For greening of the real estate holdings, the Global Real Estate 
Sustainability Benchmark was developed for institutional investors as an en-
vironmental scorecard.377  
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13.3.2. Sustainable finance typology 
Schoenmaker (2017, 2018) outlines sustainable finance typology, which is 
summarized in the following table.378 In traditional corporate finance or fi-
nance-as-usual approach, shareholders’ wealth maximization is the ultimate 
goal of a business, considering risk-adjusted returns and cash flows. Finan-
cial monitoring may lead to short-termism, even if shareholder value maxi-
mization would require medium- and long-term investment horizon.  
Sustainable finance typology 
Sustainable Fi-
nance Typology 
Value created Ranking 
factors 
Optimiza-
tion 
Horizon 
Finance-as-usual Shareholder 
value 
F Max F Short term 
Sustainable Fi-
nance 1.0 
Refined share-
holder value 
F ˃˃S and E Max F sub-
ject to S and 
E 
Short term 
Sustainable Fi-
nance 2.0 
Stakeholder 
value (triple 
bottom line) 
I = F + S + E Optimize I Medium 
term 
Sustainable Fi-
nance 3.0 
Common good 
value 
S and E ˃ F Optimize S 
and E sub-
ject to F 
Long term 
Note: F = financial value, S = social impact, E = environmental impact, I = integrated value.  
Source: Schoenmaker (2017) p. 20. 
 
Traditional corporate finance is neutral in terms of social and environmental 
issues. Three stages of sustainable finance make attempts to integrate socio-
environmental impact into corporate strategy and financial decision making.  
Sustainable finance 1.0 is the stage where financial institutions do not pro-
vide funds for so-called “sin” companies in tobacco, alcohol, drugs, arms 
industries or firms which pursue unfair trade practices or treat human labour 
in a morally unacceptable manner. Coal and fossil fuel industries are on the 
exclusion list of some socially responsible mutual funds nowadays. Corpo-
rate social and environmental activities are driven by economic considera-
tions in this phase of sustainable finance: how to support cash flows, market 
share, competitive advantage, and shareholders’ wealth by ESG spending 
and investments, and how to mitigate business risks and reduce costs by these 
                                                     
378 Schoenmaker, D. (2017): From Risk to Opportunity: A Framework for Sustainable Finance, 
Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University, Rotterdam and Schoenmaker, Dirk and 
Schramade, Willem (2018): Principles of Sustainable Finance, Oxford University Press, 2019. 
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practices are important aspects in corporate practices. Principles for Respon-
sible Investments (PRI), Focus Capital on the Long Term Global, and Equa-
tor Principles are examples for organisations between sustainable finance ty-
pology 1.0 and 2.0.379  
Sustainable finance 2.0 is the stage where negative social and environmen-
tal externalities are incorporated into financial decision making to avoid risk. 
ESG integration into equity and debt finance, banking and insurance is the 
driving force of this type of sustainable finance. Environmental externalities 
might be priced in through taxation, or can affect reputation. Monetization of 
social and environmental impacts by IT, data science, environmental eco-
nomics, and social life-cycle analysis are new analytical tools to quantify 
non-financial aspects.380 The sum of financial, social and environmental ma-
terial values add up to an integrated value. The situation when the net value 
between deforestation and economic gains from the woods is positive may 
lead to suboptimal decision making, highlighting the conflicts between un-
dervalued ecosystem services and overvalued economic and financial returns 
in certain valuation models. Not only this integrated profit and loss account-
ing but also triple bottom line approaches are examples of sustainable finance 
2.0.  
Sustainable finance 3.0 reflects the opportunity-seeking attitude of financial 
institutions to provide funds to sustainable companies and projects in the area 
of healthcare, green buildings, wind farms, land-reuse projects and other re-
sponsible and sustainable projects, based on positive selection and inclusion 
lists. The transition from shareholders’ wealth maximization to stakeholders’ 
wealth maximization leads to conflicts of interest. In Sustainable finance 3.0, 
investors optimize the socio-environmental value by increasing impact and 
mitigating risks, assuming minimum financial value. Capital preservation is 
the minimum of fair financial return on sustainable investment and lending, 
which approach is different from traditional shareholders’ wealth maximiza-
tion. In reality, the majority of investors expect a risk-adjusted market rate of 
return on their impact investments. Impact investing, green and social bonds, 
impact lending, microfinance and microinsurance are the most important 
fields in Sustainable finance 3.0. Global Impact Investing Network and 
                                                     
379 Schoenmaker, Dirk (2019): A Framework for Sustainable Finance. SSRN and Schoenmaker, 
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Global Alliance of Banking Values as organisations meet the standards of 
Sustainable Finance 3.381 
In Sustainable finance 3.0, according to legitimacy theory, firms make efforts 
to acquire a social license to operate in societies.382 An outside-in perspective 
of companies is about asking how they can contribute to solving social and 
environmental problems, instead of inside-out approach where they ask how 
they can reduce their social and environmental impact.383 Rezaee attempts to 
highlight how ESG can be integrated into an agency, stakeholder, legitimacy, 
signaling, institutional and stewardships theories.384 
13.3.3. SDG finance 
Sustainable development goals (SDGs) were set by the United Nations Gen-
eral Assembly in 2015. The goals cover interrelated economic, societal, en-
vironmental and overall causes:  
• Goal 1. End poverty in all its forms everywhere  
• Goal 2. End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition and 
promote sustainable agriculture  
• Goal 3. Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages  
• Goal 4. Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote 
lifelong learning opportunities for all  
• Goal 5. Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls  
• Goal 6. Ensure availability and sustainable management of water and 
sanitation for all  
• Goal 7. Ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern 
energy for all  
• Goal 8. Promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, 
full and productive employment and decent work for all  
• Goal 9. Build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable 
industrialization and foster innovation  
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sponsibility Disclosure: A Critical Review’, International Journal of Accounting and Financial Re-
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• Goal 10. Reduce inequality within and among countries  
• Goal 11. Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and 
sustainable  
• Goal 12. Ensure sustainable consumption and production patterns  
• Goal 13. Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts*  
• Goal 14. Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine re-
sources for sustainable development  
• Goal 15. Protect, restore and promote sustainable use of terrestrial eco-
systems, sustainably manage forests, combat desertification, and halt 
and reverse land degradation and halt biodiversity loss  
• Goal 16. Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable devel-
opment, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable 
and inclusive institutions at all levels  
• Goal 17. Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalize the 
global partnership for sustainable development  
These Goals have been extended with 169 associated targets by the 2030 
Agenda for Sustainable Development, which is a plan of action for people, 
planet and prosperity385. 
SDGs open up new opportunities for businesses in the form of new markets, 
new business models, and new investment needs in the field of research and 
development (R&D), human resources, physical assets and other activities. 
United Nations Global Compact Platform on Financial Innovation for the 
SDGs (2019) proposes an integrated model for corporate SDG finance. Com-
panies compete for capital based not only on their financial but also on their 
SDG impacts. Impact-oriented finance may facilitate bridging the SDG fund-
ing gap at the corporate level.  
In accordance with the above-mentioned integrated model for corporate SDG 
finance, companies: 
(1) develop a credible SDG impact theory based on intentional, specific, rel-
evant, intense, balanced, comparable, measurable and integrated charac-
teristics;  
• build new business models applying SGDs such as renewable energy, 
energy resilience, and efficiency, closed-loop manufacturing, product 
lifetime expansion, product-as-a-service, leasing vs. owning, sharing 
products and assets with a low use rate, 
                                                     
385 Source: https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/post2015/transformingourworld 
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• open up new markets and find new customers via “bottom-of-the-pyr-
amid (BoP) models for affordable products and services, increasing in-
come to reduce social inequality, building middle class, identifying 
new paying customers for health care and energy services, 
• transition stranded assets,  
• prioritize and align industry-level contribution under the themes of en-
ergy efficiency, green buildings, renewable energy, sustainable agri-
culture, sustainable forestry, water, affordable housing, education, in-
clusive finance, and health, 
(2) measure and monitor the impact of SDG investments,  
• apply effort-based methods to track resources and efforts (inputs) to-
wards the SDGs, 
• monitor and measure the quality of investments in impactful areas, set 
strategic goals and targets, report on SDGs related key performance 
indicators (KPIs), and assess and report on 15 categories of data in line 
with the table below: 
Impact management project 
Impact dimension Impact category 
What 1. Outcome in the period 
2. Importance of the outcome to the stakeholder 
3. Outcome threshold 
4. SDGs and SDG targets 
Who 5. Stakeholder 
6. Geographical boundary 
7. Baseline 
8. Stakeholder characteristics 
How much 9. Scale 
10. Depth 
11. Duration 
Contribution 12. Depth 
13. Duration 
Risk 14. Type of risk 
15. Level of risk 
 
• apply outcome-based methods quantify outcome-based indicators (e.g. 
decrease in GHG emissions, a rise in income and standard of living, 
improved education), 
(3) integrate SDG impact in corporate strategy and governance, 
• translate into pro-active SDG strategic goals, targets and KPIs, assess 
positive outcomes and mitigate negative impacts, 
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• integrate monitoring of SGD strategy into oversight by the board of 
directors and a specialized committee, internal control and audit, and 
reporting.  
Conclusions 
The transition towards ESG integration into mainstream finance is on the 
way. The shift from shareholder value to stakeholder (shared) value, from 
traditional financial systems to sustainability-linked financial ecosystems, 
and the evolution of regulations and ESG standards are just a few milestones 
in this road to a world that respects environmental and societal values more. 
Technological innovation and data science are leveraging these processes to 
more complex analytical tools, valuation methods, business models, and best 
practices.  
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14. Green bond market 
The international green finance segment is breaking records in the last dec-
ade, Trillions of dollars of investment are needed to fight against global 
warming. Realizing investment needs against climate change is relevant and 
there is a responsible customer base; moreover the issuers raise money spe-
cifically for environmentally friendly projects, and the green finance increas-
ingly becoming the mainstream in advanced financial markets, especially: 
green loan portfolio, socially responsible (Environmental, social and govern-
ance, ESG-based) asset management, or just issued by bonds. On the other 
hand, green-labeled financial instruments are not always whether a note is 
truly green; regulators are working on standards to help guard against green-
washing 386. 
14.1. What green bond is for? 
It is important that investors are using in their investment decision-making 
progress an environmental-social-governance (ESG) thread. Not only risk-
return test. Because ESG is also an internal control that protects investors' 
money. The incorporation of such criteria within financial markets’ struc-
tures is becoming becomes more evident (such as Moody’s, Standard & 
Spoor, and MSCI) have started developing green bond standards and indices 
to assess the environmental impact of their clients' portfolios. There is and 
another argument: originated in the 2015 Paris Agreement and it has a polit-
ical side. At the Paris climate conference, nearly 200 countries have adopted 
a fixing climate deal aimed at cutting down greenhouse gas emissions (or 
other gases that has equivalent to the greenhouse effect and has carbon foot-
print) in order to limit global warming 2° Celsius above pre-industrial levels, 
with 66% of probability by the end of this century 387.  
Such controlled forms of investment (from the other side: loans) in the finan-
cial market as they are based activity in sustainable energy, energy efficiency 
or water management. Alternatively, an activity based on specific indicators, 
                                                     
386 Magyar Nemzeti Bank: Zöld Pénzügyek Magyarországon. https://www.mnb.hu/letoltes/zold-
penzugyek-konzultacios-dokumentum.pdf (2019.06.03.) 
387 G20 Green Finance: Green finance synthesis report. http://unepinquiry.org/wp-content/up-
loads/2016/09/Synthesis_Report_Full_EN.pdf (2019.01.11.) 
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which aims to make the company more energy efficient. There can find qual-
itative and quantitative definitions and each has a purpose of determining 
grades of greenness. Of course, it is essential to set a standard and indicator 
for a measure of greenness. In this chapter, we will discuss this topic 388.  
Green Bonds are used to financing or re-financing projects which apply the 
four core components of the Green Bond Principles (Use of Proceeds, Pro-
cess for Project Evaluation, Management of Proceeds, Reporting), and has a 
clear environmental benefit. „Green projects include renewable energy, en-
ergy efficiency, pollution prevention and control, eco-efficient and/or circu-
lar economy adapted products, production technologies and processes, Green 
buildings, terrestrial and aquatic biodiversity conservation, clean transporta-
tion”.389 It is a direction for the public benefit and to avoid planetary destruc-
tion, all this without incurring any additional cost to investors. 390 
During the Fourth Industrial Revolution, it is negligible to focus on the waste 
and the productivity of the company. Building a sustainable industrial system 
also requires technologies for recyclable materials, or advanced waste man-
agement, better agricultural practices, stronger energy efficiency measures 
across sectors, and water desalinization infrastructures without question, any 
green industrial revolution must transform existing economic sectors and cre-
ate new ones391.  
14.2. What green bonds do investors invest in? 
The green financing is not about planting trees to the shop window and make 
handouts of it, to be socially accepted by the investors. Green Bond proceeds 
may only flow to projects that have positive environmental or climate effects. 
(see table Use of Proceeds – Green Bonds) The portfolio range is enormous; 
                                                     
388 Inderst, Kaminker, & Stewart, 2012: Defining and Measuring Green Investments: Implications 
for Institutional Investors' Asset Allocations”. OECD Working Papers on Finance, Insurance and 
Private Pensions. 
389 International Capital Market Association: https://www.icmagroup.org/green-social-and-sustain-
ability-bonds/green-bond-principles-gbp/ (2019.10.23.)  
390 Perez, Carlota 2012: Financial Crises, Bubbles and the Role of Government in Unleashing. FIN-
NOV Discussion Paper. 
391 (International Capital Market Association: Guidance Handbook- https://www.icma-
group.org/assets/documents/Regulatory/Green-Bonds/June-2019/Guidance-Handbook-June-
2019-120619.pdf (2019.10.13 
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moreover, there is a certain view also may include communications and in-
formation technology392.  
14.3. ESG 
The acronym ESG is made up of the term "Environmental, Social, Govern-
ance", i.e. it examines the impact of a given investment on the environment, 
society and governance issues of a given entity. At first, this may be consid-
ered too general, but the evaluation process is similar to a credit rating and 
the end product is an ESG rating. 
In other words, ESG wants to build a bridge between broader values in the 
gap between short-term and long-term optimization. It is important to note 
that this trend is not aimed at eliminating market forces, but rather to combine 
financial performance with other factors in order to improve the overall so-
cial and environmental situation in the long term in a sustainable way. Of 
course, a more stable environmental and social situation also means lower 
financial risks, so the application of the ESG framework will result in deci-
sions that are purely economically viable. 
Green bond issuance can be viewed as a proxy for firms to make environ-
mentally-friendly investments and change their ESG profiles. The issuers' 
stock prices increase significantly around the announcement of green bond 
issuance. Stock market reactions are stronger for first-time issuers than for 
repeated issuers and stronger for corporate issuers. 
 Green bonds can contribute to expanding the range of investors that issue 
green bonds can attract more media opportunities and can be used by efficient 
investors to fulfill their investment mandate. Overall, our findings suggest 
that existing shareholders will have a net benefit from issuing the green bo-
nus. 
14.4. What makes it green?  
We will look at two kinds of standards. One is the International Capital Mar-
ket Association's (ICMA) (formerly the Association of International Bond 
Dealers) The supranational co-operative ICMA reports and guidelines in sev-
eral areas. These include Capital Market Practice, Primary and Secondary 
Markets, MiFID Compliance, G20 Finance Development, and: Green Social 
                                                     
392 Carney Mark: Breaking the tragedy of the horizon – climate change and financial stability. 
https://www.bis.org/review/r151009a.pdf (2020.02.23)  
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and Sustainability Bond Markets. Interpretation of The Green Bond Princi-
ples (GBP) and the other is the Moody’s Green Bond Assessment (GBA) 
concept. Of course, there are overlaps and small differences. Obviously, oth-
ers are involved in certification business, but this chapter does not cover e.g. 
Climate Bond Initiative certifications. That was the first, but specialized only 
a couple of firms). The standards bring transparency to the market, although 
they are only recommendations.393 
First, let us look at GBP 2018394 , promoting integrity in the Green Bond 
market, according to ICMA 395 The GBP have four core components: 
• Use of Proceeds 
• Process for Project Evaluation and Selection  
• Management of Proceeds 
• Reporting 
14.4.1. How it is different  
An entity (which may be a state) can (also) issue capital through a bond issue. 
The bond is a debt security, so the investor lends to the issuer at a typically 
low-risk level396.  
The main difference between green bonds and conventional bonds is that the 
proceeds of the former must be throughout allocated for environmentally-
friendly projects. Moreover, green bonds often require a more complex issu-
ance control process even quarterly. Since at least three certification consult-
ant companies compete with each other for certification rights, whose roles 
are discussed in the next subsection397.  
Green bond finance and certification 
How can investors be sure that the proceeds of green bonds are invested in 
an environmentally friendly way, and not green-washed? There is no single 
global definition of what precisely constitutes an environmentally beneficial, 
                                                     
393 Magyar Nemzeti Bank i.m. 
394 Climate Bond Certified: Green Bond Labels and Standards. https://www.cli-
matebonds.net/files/files/Green%20Bond%20Labels%20and%20Standards%2010-06-2016.pdf 
(2019.10.23) 
395 International Capital Market Association i.m.  
396 World Bank 2016: What are Green Bonds. World Bank Treasury Department Washington DC. 
397 Climate Bonds Initiative: Bonds and Climate Change. https://www.cli-
matebonds.net/files/files/Climate%20Bonds_Standard_Version%203_0_December%202017.pdf 
(2020.02.23)  
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but the use of proceeds and standards makes it acceptable for market partic-
ipants. Some organisations have started to provide green label certifications 
that indicate adherence to particular definitions of green, including shades of 
green. Doing so can make those who want to invest and asset managers sat-
isfied. 
In this feature, we provide an overview of the state of the green bond market.  
The standards emphasize how the various green farming certification mech-
anisms have evolved to allow for detailed and continuous evaluation. The 
document that green bonds issued at the time of issue had an average pre-
mium compared to traditional bonds, while in the secondary market, they 
performed similarly to other bonds when hedging foreign exchange risks398. 
It must be documented that green bonds are relatively exposed to financial 
risks related to the environment. The rest of this feature is as follows. After 
defining green bonds, we briefly review the growth and composition of la-
beled green bond issuance from two different sources. The third section ex-
amines and classifies the various green labels used in the green sector to cer-
tify the issuance of green bonds. The fourth phase focuses on green rates, 
financial performance and the risk of green bonds399. 
According to the Green Bond Principles; what can a green bond invest in?  
Use of Proceeds 
Use of Proceeds – Green Bonds  
Example  
Renewable energy Wind, Hydroelectric, Geothermal, Bio-
mass, Ocean energy 
Energy efficiency More shift production 
Pollution prevention and 
control 
Using non-toxic or less toxic chemicals in 
agriculture 
Clean transportation Public trains, e-mobility 
Sustainable water and 
wastewater management 
Food Chain Reactor, bio-kinetic model-
ling, pollution prevention 
                                                     
398 Barclays 2015: The Cost of Being Green. Credit Reseach. 
399 European Investment Bank: New People’s Bank of China and EIB initiative to strengthen green 
finance. https://www.eib.org/en/press/all/2017-073-new-peoples-bank-of-china-and-eib-initiative-
to-strengthen-green-finance (2019.10.23) 
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Eco-efficient; circular econ-
omy adapted products, pro-
duction technologies and 
processes 
Complex manufacturing industry– good 
example: isoglucose 
Green buildings Active and passive houses 
Process for Project Evaluation and Selection  
• the environmental sustainability objectives; 
• the process by which the issuer determines how the projects fit within 
the eligible Green Projects categories identified above; 
• the related eligibility criteria, including, if applicable, exclusion cri-
teria or any other process applied to identify and manage potentially 
material environmental and social risks associated with the projects 
Management of Proceeds  
• The net proceeds of the Green Bond should be credited to a sub-ac-
count. 
• Periodically adjusted to match allocations to eligible Green Projects 
• They have to get information about the balance of unallocated net 
proceeds. 
• High level of transparency 
• Use of a third-party, independent auditor. 
Reporting 
• The annual report should include a list of the projects to which Green 
Bond proceeds have been allocated, a brief description of the projects 
and the amounts allocated, and their expected impact. 
• Qualitative performance indicators and, where feasible, quantitative 
performance measures (e.g. energy capacity, electricity generation, 
greenhouse gas emissions reduced/avoided, number of people pro-
vided with access to clean power, decrease in water use, reduction in 
the number of cars required 
• Disclosure of the key underlying methodology and/or assumptions 
used in the quantitative determination. 
• Issuers with the ability to monitor achieved impacts are encouraged 
to include those in their regular reporting. 400 
 
Secondly, look at Moody’s Investors Service: the Climate Bonds Initiative, 
which created the first green-bond standard in 2010. There are five different 
                                                     
400 International Capital Market Association i.m. 
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’shades’ of greenness.401 The shade scale ranges from 1 to 5; where 1 is the 
darkest and most appropriate, 5 is for poor. In addition, there is a brown who 
is responsible for the technological innovation of coal power plants. 
Moody’s green bond assessments 
 
Bonds are debt instruments. Moody's rating is based on the weighted average 
below for investment bonds. 
Use of proceeds 40% 
  
Clean water  
 Sustainable land use  
 Sustainable waste mgmt  
 Sustainable water mgmt  
 Clean transportation  
 Biodiversity conservation  
 Renewable energy  
 Climate change adaptation  
 Energy efficiency 
Ongoing  
reporting 
20% 
  
 Monitoring  
 Frequency and quality of reporting  
 Environmental impacts 
Organisation 15% 
  
Governance  
 Mission  
 Framework for deployment of proceeds  
 Project evaluation 
Management of 
proceeds 
15% 
  
  
 Allocation and tracking of proceeds  
 Temporary investment practices  
 Audit 
Disclosure on use 
of proceeds 
10% 
  
  
 Project disclosure practices  
 Funding practices  
 Reliance on external assurances 
Moody's: A Greener Approach to Financing. 
                                                     
401 Moody's: A Greener Approach to Financing. https://www.moodys.com/sites/products/Produc-
tAttachments/MIS_Green_Bonds_Assessment.pdf?WT.z_referring-
source=TB~ESGhub~GREENBONDS (2019.10.23.)  
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14.4.2. Comparison between the two standards 
Green bond standards could be improved to highlight: the magnitude of fi-
nancial risks from environmental factors in order to encourage investors fur-
ther to manage these risks effectively402. 
Major differences between the two standards  
 ICMA Moody's 
Use of Proceeds  
 
Essentially the same processes... but... 
 the Moody's also covers 
two additional activities  
Biodiversity conserva-
tion  
Sustainable land use  
Process for Project Eval-
uation and Selection Dis-
closure on use of pro-
ceeds 
Environmental sustaina-
bility objectives correct 
use proceeds  
Consideration of second-
ary effects, externalities  
Management of Pro-
ceeds Organisation + 
Management of proceeds  
Needed a sub-account for 
certification Accounting 
control of the money 
used  
Organisation + Manage-
ment of proceeds Gen-
eral audit 
 
While Moody's determines how much lenient a valuation is by %, it gives 
much more room for the professional work for securities rating agencies. 
Moody's Green Bond Assessment: The first public methodology for rating 
green bonds by a credit rating agency was released in March 2016 by 
Moody's Investors Service. The purpose of the Green Bond Assessment 
(GBA) is to assess the relative likelihood of the bond proceeds being invested 
in support of environmentally friendly projects, in line with the Green Bond. 
Like credit rating products, Moody's uses a number of quantifiable factors to 
determine GBAs, with the explicit purpose of increasing their transparency 
and repeatability. A regular review is expected, similar to the way regular 
credit ratings are updated over a period of several years. 
ICMA relies on the veracity of the projects and their accounting control.  
                                                     
402 Climate Bonds Initiative: Bonds and Climate Change: The state of the market in 2016. 
https://www.climatebonds.net/files/files/CBI%20State%20of%20the% (2019.10.23.)  
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Although not part of the four core principles of the green bond, the 2015 
edition of the core principles suggested that issuers of green bonds "use ex-
ternal certainty to confirm that they are aligned with the main characteristics 
of green bonds.403 
14.4.3. Just how green are green bonds? 
It is hard to measure, the shade of the bond, or find a globally accepted stand-
ard for a consistent verification. The world's biggest carbon user/emitter, 
China, has a different perception of the Green New Deal. China is the world's 
second-largest green bond issuer because they used to finance the construc-
tion of its thermal power plants. Undoubtedly, they are less polluting than 
their predecessors, often criticized for their method. The Oslo-based Cicero 
standard uses three shades of green: 
• dark green for things that will lower carbon emissions in the long 
run like the wind energy 
• medium green for things that make a good step forward such as 
plug-in hybrid buses 
• light green for environmentally friendly steps that will not change 
the long-term outlook on their own, such as more efficient fossil-
fuel infrastructure404. 
 
In addition, there is a debate as to whether the environmental or social impact 
of the issuer should be examined or the carbon footprint alone. Also, the ar-
guments that solar panels produce "free" energy, and the amount of pollution 
that solar panels produce, often come up. Then, how much environmental 
damage will occur after the economic life of its liquidation. It is not a negli-
gible argument that the efficiency of solar panels decreases radically over 
their lifetime. There is also a debate about the impact of wind farms on bird-
life and the cost of maintaining offshore wind farms.  
In any such debate, there is an argument for nuclear energy, which sounds 
like: that is that the cleanest energy, but any green-labeled securities will pre-
clude investing in it.405 
                                                     
403 European Commission: Action plan: Financing Sustainable Growth. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/le-
gal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52018DC0097&from=EN (2019.10.23)  
404 CICERO: Second opinions on green bonds. https://cicero.oslo.no/en/posts/single/CICERO-sec-
ond-opinions (2019.10.23) 
405 Center for International Climate Research: Center for International Climate Research. 
https://www.cicero.oslo.no/en/posts/single/cicero-shades-of-green (2019.10.23)  
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14.5. Investment bonds and their risks 
General and green bonds are similarly priced in the secondary markets. What 
investment advisors do not mention is technological advancement. In the 
fast-growing green sector, the (un)expected new; improved energy efficiency 
technology can cannibalize its predecessors406. General Risks with Investing 
in Bonds: 
• Spread Risk – Corporate spread versus the risk-free government 
bond; the flight to safety 
• Interest Rate Risk 
• Industry Risk 
• Default/Company Specific Risk – this can be Liquidity Risk or Sol-
vency Risk 
• Sovereign/Expropriation Risk 
• Inflation Risk – the loss of purchasing power 
• Option Risk – Catastrophe bonds, call options 
• Foreign Exchange Risks – If holding bonds in a different currency 
than the investor’s base currency 
 
14.5.1.  Green Bond Risk 
Green bonds carry the risk of all other types of bonds, but an additional bur-
den is a process of evaluating. The value of the project thus decreases the 
expected value of the bond at maturity through regular reporting, compliance 
with the standard and transparency. On the other hand, investors who like the 
low-risk level of clean investment are grateful. However, there is a greater 
risk: the greenwashing, so that polluting companies, who just want to look 
green, or some extent show some social responsibility are using the tools of 
green finance. For instance, most oil companies are buying green bonds or 
climate bonds, and they have some green or green labeled projects. As well 
as banks are working with green loans to financial investment in renewable 
energy technology e.g. solar panels. On the other side, the expansion is add-
ing to new questions, including which indicators should be used to provide 
evidence of progress against sustainability objectives, and how to report on 
                                                     
406 Anderson Mats and Patric Bolton (2016): Hedging climate risk. Financial Analysts Journal. vol 
72/ no3.  
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those indicators in a consistent manner. With those challenges lying ahead, 
sustainable financing seems just at the start of its innovation journey. 407  
14.6. Benefits of Green Bonds  
Green standards have implications for investors and policymakers. First, the 
estimation results can be used to build an optimal risk minimization portfolio 
between green bonds and conventional bonds. However, changes in esti-
mated hedging ratios between the green bond market and the traditional bond 
market indicate that the optimal portfolio mix often needs updating. Second, 
the results also show an increase in the link between the "labeled" green bond 
market and the traditional bond market, indicating a convergence of yields 
between the "labeled" green bond market and the traditional bond market. 
Therefore, as the green bond market continues to grow, it is important to 
introduce stronger differentiation strategies between green bonds and tradi-
tional bonds in order to attract a wider range of investors. Finally, policies 
aimed at standardizing the rating process for green bonds and raising investor 
awareness will allow the green bond market to reach a wider range of inves-
tors. 
Benefits for the investors Benefits for the issuers 
• Well-understood projects reduce risk expo-
sure 
• Well-managed projects reduce risk expo-
sure 
• Well-managed projects reduce risk expo-
sure 
• Trading at a premium in secondary markets 
• Strengthened reputation 
• Deeper engagement with company man-
agement on green 
• more favourable taxation (usually) 
• Investor diversification 
across regions and types 
• Investor engagement & 
“stickiness” 
• Strong oversubscription, 
yields tighter 
• Strengthened reputation 
• Alignment of CSR (or 
core business when pure-
play) with a funding 
scheme 
Climate Bond Certified: Green Bond Labels and Standards  
 
The analysis of green standards contains a number of suggestions for future 
research. First, the analysis may benefit from using a longer time series in 
the future to reflect the behaviour of green bonds throughout the business 
cycle. Secondly, it would be interesting to look at the role of green bonds in 
reducing climate or environmental risks and the relationship between green 
                                                     
407 S&P Ratings Direct: Green Finance: Modest 2018 Growth Masks Strong Market Fundamentals 
For 2019.  
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bonds and other financial markets, such as energy markets and stock mar-
kets408. 
Third, depending on the availability of data, future research could examine 
how the behaviour of green bonds changes with the type and location of is-
suers. Finally, a fuller understanding of the environmental impact of green 
bond projects would play an important role in driving the growth of this new 
market409.  
14.6.1. Issuers  
Including the World Bank and the European Investment Bank, there are 50 
countries that are selling green bonds. We can see companies also in the mar-
ket or local governments and national state governments. All indications are 
that these issuers want to follow well-founded and socially accepted noises 
in international conventions. This can happen not only for recognition rea-
sons but also for a hard material consideration. The first emerging-market 
green bond was issued in South Africa in 2012, later Poland opened the sov-
ereign market in 2016, followed by the likes of France, Belgium and Ireland.  
Green-Labeled Issuance from Financial Institutions, Top10 
 
                                                     
408 World Bank (2015): Green Bond Impact Report. World Bank Treasury Department Washington 
DC 
409 World Bank (2016): Innovative Finance for Development Solutions. World Bank Treasury De-
partment. World Bank Treasury Department. Washington DC. 
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S&P Ratings Direct: Green Finance: Modest 2018 Growth Masks Strong Market 
Fundamentals For 2019. 
14.6.2. Market size and The Rise in Sustainable Finance 
There is a fast development of new green markets as market fundamentals. 
That is lead to the expansion of the green bond (secondary) market with new 
types of issuers, and the emergence of green loans, green mortgages, and 
green derivatives410.  
Annual Green-Labeled Issuance By Issuer Type 
 
 
Worth a total of $ 580 billion of the green bond was purchased in 2018. Alt-
hough this is only a fraction of the total bond market, this small segment is 
growing 411. According to the 2015 Paris Agreement on Climate Change, Eu-
rope needs to sell $203 billion until 2030 to achieve the emission targets 412. 
In line with this, the Hungarian National Bank is acting to support green in-
vestments with interest-subsidized loans. We have seen, for example, solar 
panels investments or subsidized loans for energy-efficient real estate pur-
chases in 2019. 
                                                     
410 Climate Bonds Initiative i.m. 
411 Mittelman Melissa (2019): Sustainable Investing https://www.bloomberg.com/quicktake/sus-
tainable-investing (2019.10.23) 
412 Claquin Tanguy (2019): Green bonds: a promising tool for climate change https://www.ca-
cib.com/sites/default/files/2017-02/Proparco_Article_T_CLAQUIN_PSD_22_UK.pdf 
(2019.10.23) 
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14.7. Demand in the Secondary Market 
One of the largest differences between green bonds and conventional bond 
markets is that liquidity tends to be lower for green bonds in the secondary 
market. Because many investors buying green bonds do so for impact invest-
ment reasons, they tend to hold them to maturity. However, investors still 
trade with green bonds, and with the growing market volume, the secondary 
market also grows. Still with a lower liquidity profile than conventional bond 
secondary markets, in any case. There are several retail green bond funds, 
because of funds offers, a growing variety in the market as it grows in volume 
and matures. The first green bond Exchange Traded Fund was launched in 
2017, by Lyxor Asset Management. The European Capital Markets Union is 
further accelerating this process.413 As the market matures further, instru-
ments such as retail funds, indices, and ETFs will be increasingly used in the 
future414.  
The regulations of green bonds classes between AA–BBB are tighter than 
their comparable non-green bonds and government-related bonds, on the 
other hand, trade marginally wider. Besides Issue size, maturity and currency 
do not have a significant influence on differences in pricing but industry and 
ESG rating 415. 
These characteristics affect the pricing of green bonds and their attractive-
ness to investors. As opposed to comparable bonds without a green label, a 
premium per issuer indicates that a significant number of investors value the 
label enough to give issuers additional incentive to issue branded bonds. Over 
time, these investors will continue to be interested in the acceptable financial 
performance of green bonds over time. Another aspect is exposure to credit 
risk associated with environmental change. The fact that green bonds support 
green projects does not necessarily mean lower exposure to such risks.416  
 
  
                                                     
413 Vértesy László (2019): The legal and regulatory aspects of the free movement of capital - to-
wards the Capital Markets Union. in Jogelméleti Szemle 2019/4. 
414 Southworth Chris (2017): The Green Bond Market: 10 years later and looking ahead. Pension 
Found Service. Knutsford 
415 Hachenbergv Britta and Schiereck Dirk (2018): Are green bonds priced differently from con-
ventional bonds?. Springer Nature Limited.  
416 Becker, B., Ivashina, V. (2015): Reaching for Yield in the Bond Market. Journal of Fi-
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